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ABSTRACT
A systematic review of the marketing literature on brands reveals very few studies
devoted to understanding brands in interorganizational exchange; however, the failure to
successfully manage relationships with supply chain partners is now seen as a potentially
fatal obstacle to the success of a brand (Shocker, Srivistava and Ruekert 1994). Focusing
exclusively on managing the brand in consumer markets ignores the needs of important
downstream customers such as distributors and retailers and fails to capitalize on the
potential for leveraging brand equity to create added value with upstream suppliers.
A multiple method approach was used to explore the phenomenon of brand equity
in the supply chain. First, a qualitative study using grounded theory methodology was
employed to explore the meaning of brand equity in the supply chain and to provide the
ground for a theory of the effect of brand equity in supply chain relationships. Sixteen
executives across six firms were interviewed for the study. A quantitative test of
hypothesized theoretical relationships was then conducted employing survey
methodology for data collection and structural equation modeling for data analysis. The
survey was conducted in the home appliance industry with retailers as respondents.
Traditional ways of thinking about branding from a consumer perspective have
produced "both an incomplete analysis of branding from an academic perspective and
incomplete management of the brand from a company perspective" (Webster 2000, p.
22). This research addresses this gap in the literature and proposes directions for future
research that have the potential to make a significant contribution to both marketing
practice and academic research.
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CHAPTER I
DEFINING THE PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
Firms around the world are entering a new era of business competition. The
convergence of forces such as the globalization of markets, the escalating pace of
technological change, and increasing economic turbulence provides a catalyst for the
emergence of a network paradigm which recognizes that competition occurs increasingly
between global networks of firms rather than on the traditional firm-to-firm basis (Achrol
1997; Achrol and Kotler 1999). In the global networked business environment, effective
supply chain management is essential to the survival and success of the enterprise;
however, acquiring and maintaining profitable supply chain relationships is becoming
increasingly difficult. On one hand, many companies are responding to economic
pressures by rationalizing their supplier bases in favor of building stronger supply chain
relationships that promise shared cost savings (Dorsch, Swanson and Kelly 1998;
Emshwiller 1991), significantly reducing the number of potential trade partners. In
contrast, informants in the study undertaken in this dissertation reported the dissolution of
long-standing relationships in favor of dramatically lower prices available through global
sourcing arrangements facilitated by electronic markets such as reverse auctions.
Marketing scholars have suggested that under these conditions the failure to
successfully manage the firm's brand with trade partners is a potentially fatal obstacle to
success (Shocker, Srivistava and Ruekert 1994). Traditional ways of thinking about the
brand from the consumer perspective have produced "both an incomplete analysis of
branding from an academic perspective and incomplete management of the brand from a
1

company perspective" (Webster 2000, p. 22). Focusing exclusively on managing the
brand in consumer markets ignores the needs of critical downstream customers such as
distributors and retailers and fails to capitalize on the potential for using brand influence
to create added value with upstream suppliers.
This new level of supply chain competition presents tremendous challenges to
brand managers. They are forced not only to think about short-term tactics necessary to
attract and maintain market share with end consumers while fending off competitors, but
also to consider the strategic function and nature of brand management itself in delivering
customer value under these new competitive conditions (Shocker, Srivistava and Ruekert
1994). While firms that have developed powerful consumer brands have the opportunity
to leverage their brands to strengthen relationships with supply chain partners, companies
that have not invested in brand management may be advised to do so in order to secure
their positions as desirable trade partners in their supply chains.
Developing brand strategies for the supply chain poses significant challenges for
brand managers and raises several intriguing questions for marketing scholars. To what
extent does our considerable knowledge of brands in consumer markets translate to
brands in the supply chain? What do firms stand to gain or lose by investing in brand
management targeted toward trade partners? The purpose of this research is to address
these issues by examining the concept of brand equity in the supply chain. The supply
chain is defined as "a set of three or more companies directly linked by one or more of
the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances, and information from
a source to a customer" (Mentzer et al. 2001). The supply chain provides a context for
exploring the potential for brand management as an effective tool for achieving and
2

sustaining a profitable position in the global networked business environment.

BRAND MANAGEMENT IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN
What exactly do we mean when we talk about “brands?” The practice of
branding has been around for centuries as a method for distinguishing the goods of one
producer from another, exemplified by the farmer’s symbol burned into the hides of
livestock, the medieval silversmith’s trademark on the base of a candlestick, or the
sixteenth-century distiller’s name burned on a whiskey barrel (Farquhar 1989). These are
all examples of branding as defined by the American Marketing Association (cf. Keller
1998, p. 2) and widely published in marketing textbooks:
A brand is a name, term, sign, symbol, or design or a combination of them
intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or group of sellers
and to differentiate them from those of competition.
As stated in the definition, branding involves a set of marketing activities designed to
identify the firm and distinguish the firm’s offerings from competitors’ products in the
marketplace by linking the product with an abstract representation in the minds of
customers. Aaker (1996) describes the brand as a “mental box” where consumers file
away information related to the brand and store evaluations of the brand. Brands
“package meaning” by providing a kind of shorthand that makes consumer choice easier
(Biel 1993, p. 67). Branding is the visible, tactical stage of the more critical process of
developing brand strategy.
At the heart of brand strategy is the notion of added value achieved through
meaningful differentiation and linked to the brand in the minds of potential customers
(Alderson 1957). Hence, two foundational assumptions of brand strategy are that
3

customers in a given product-market have the ability to perceive differences and that they
will have differential responses to differentiated offerings. These assumptions
immediately raise questions for the transferability of theory developed in the consumer
setting to the supply chain context: How are brands perceived in the supply chain context
where the customer is an organization rather than an individual? How is meaningful
differentiation accomplished when products offered in the supply chain are often
considered commodities?
In the supply chain context, the challenge to brand managers is three-fold: 1)
understanding how to build brand equity when the customer is an organization rather than
an individual, 2) knowing when to invest in the trade brand versus the consumer brand,
and 3) identifying critical target markets both within the supply chain as well as in
consumer markets. Examining existing theory in the brand equity literature provides a
stepping-off point for exploring these issues.

Brand Equity
Ultimately, the goal of brand strategy is to build brand equity. Brand equity has
been variously defined in financial and behavioral terms (Table 1). Following Farquhar
(1989), several authors define brand equity as the added value to the seller endowed by
the brand and recommend calculations of incremental cash flows to measure brand equity
(de Chernatony and McDonald 1998; Simon and Sullivan 1993; Swait et al. 1993).
Aaker (1991) conceptualizes brand equity as the set of assets and liabilities linked to a
brand, its name and symbol that add to or subtract from the value provided by a product
or service to a firm and/or to that firm's customers, and proposes a set of measures for
4

Table 1. Definitions of Brand Equity
Author
Aaker

DeChernatony
and McDonald
Farquhar
Keller

Park and
Srinivisan
Simon and
Sullivan
Srinivasan

Swait, Erdem,
Louviere and
Dubelaar

Source
(1991) Managing Brand Equity

Definition of Brand Equity
A set of brand assets and
liabilities linked to a brand, its
name and symbol that add to or
subtract from the value provided
by a product or service to a firm
and/or to that firm’s customers
(1998) Creating Powerful Brands The differential attributes
in Consumer, Service, and
underpinning a brand which give
Industrial Markets
increased value to the firm’s
balance sheet
(1989) Managing Brand Equity
The added value with which a
given brand endows a product
(1993) Conceptualizing,
The differential effect that brand
Measuring, and Managing
knowledge has on consumer
Customer-Based Brand Equity
response to the marketing of that
brand
(1994) A Survey-Based Method
The incremental preference
for Measuring and
endowed by the brand to the
Understanding Brand Equity and product as perceived by an
Its Extendibility
individual consumer
(1993) The Measurement and
The incremental cash flows that
Determinants of Brand Equity: A accrue to the firm due to its
Financial Approach
investment in brands
(1979) Network Models for
The component of overall
Estimating Brand-Specific
preference not explained by
Effects in Multi-Attribute
objectively measured attributes
Marketing Models
(1993) The Equalization Price: A The monetary equivalent of the
Measure of Consumer-Perceived total utility a consumer attaches
Brand Equity
to a brand
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for each of five dimensions of brand equity: 1) brand loyalty, 2) brand awareness, 3)
perceived quality, 4) brand associations, and 5) other proprietary assets. Building on
Aaker’s work, Keller (1993) developed the concept of customer-based brand equity based
on the associative network model of memory that he defined as “the differential effect of
brand knowledge on consumer response to the marketing of the brand" (p. 8). Park and
Srinivasan (1994) also take a consumer-based behavioral approach in defining brand
equity as the incremental preference endowed by the brand to the product as perceived by
an individual consumer; however, they also develop a financial measure for evaluating
brand equity. Each of these approaches to understanding brand equity is more fully
explored in Chapter II.

Brand Equity in the Supply Chain
The fundamental premise of this dissertation is that our understanding of brand
equity in consumer markets provides only a partial explanation of the brand equity of the
firm. That proposition is made clear in this research by distinguishing consumer-based
brand equity from trade-based brand equity as dimensions of a focal firm's brand equity
(Figure 1). Trade-based brand equity is a concept that emerged during the qualitative,
theory-building step described in Chapter II. Following Keller (1993), trade-based brand
equity is defined here as the differential effect of the brand on the response of trade
partners to marketing activities of the firm. The brand equity of the firm is proposed to
be a function of two dimensions of brand equity: consumer-based brand equity as
defined by Keller (1993) and trade-based brand equity. Therefore, the brand equity of the

6

Trade-Based
Brand Equity

Consumer-Based
Brand Equity

BRAND
EQUITY

Vendors

FOCAL FIRM
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(Resellers)

Consumers
(Individuals)

SUPPLY CHAIN RELATIONSHIPS
Figure 1. Dimensions of Brand Equity
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focal firm is proposed to arise not only from perceptions held in the minds of individual
consumers, but also from perceptions held by trade partners - both vendors as well as
organizational customers (see Figure 2).
In this conceptualization, the focal firm and its trade partners are resellers in the
supply chain; that is, products are acquired from upstream vendors, value is added by the
focal firm, and then the enhanced product is sold to a downstream organizational
customer. Depending on the position in the supply chain, there may be multiple resellers
between the focal firm and the individual consumer. A notable exclusion from this study
is the exchange of industrial goods consumed by organizations in production processes,
such as machinery and tools. While trade-based brand equity is likely to play an
important role in these exchanges, this type of exchange relationship is outside the scope
of this project. By examining relationships in supply chains that serve individual -- rather

Value
Created

Branded
Offer

BRANDED
MANUFACTURER

SUPPLIER

Differential
Response

Value
Created

Branded
Offer

Brand Equity
Generated

ORGANIZATIONAL
CUSTOMER

Differential
Response

Figure 2. Brand Equity in the Supply Chain
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than organizational -- end consumers, it will be possible to tease out the differences
between our traditional understanding of brand equity in consumer markets and brand
equity in the supply chain.
The theory-building step of the project described in Chapter II began with a
rudimentary conceptual map laying out three key areas as the basis for an exploratory
study using grounded theory methodology (Figure 3). The central phenomenon, brand
equity in the supply chain, is embedded in interorganizational exchange. As such,
relationship management is a key aspect of the context of brand equity in the supply
chain. The theoretical structure that emerged from the qualitative study (Figure 4)
proposes brand equity as a moderating variable to perceived risk; that is, brand equity in
the supply chain affects supply chain relationships by changing the level of perceived risk
in interorganizational exchange. In the following sections, theoretical concepts are
introduced, and relationships are discussed.

Interorganizational Exchange

BRAND
EQUITY

Relationship Management

Figure 3. Initial Conceptual Map

9
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TradeBased Brand
Equity

Brand
Equity
Cooperation

Uncertainty

Dependence

Perceived
Risk

Power

Relationship
Commitment

Propensity
to
Leave

Forbearance

Figure 4. The Effect of Brand Equity in the Supply Chain

Interorganizational Exchange
The study of interorganizational exchange can be found in the literature under
multiple rubrics such as industrial marketing, buyer-seller relationships,
interorganizational relationships, relationship marketing, organizational buying behavior,
channels, and supply chain management. The core phenomenon of this body of research
is the study of market exchanges between two or more organizations. The literature
suggests there are significant differences between consumer purchasing and
interorganizational exchange that may affect transferability of theory from consumer
behavior to the supply chain context.
Organizations initiate exchanges “when members of a firm perceive a need and
have a motive to form an exchange relationship” (Frazier 1983). In their seminal work
10

on buyer behavior, Webster and Wind (1972) examined theoretical foundations of
exchange relationships from the buying firm’s perspective. They defined organizational
buying behavior as:
...the decision-making process by which formal organizations establish the
need for purchased products and services, and identify, evaluate, and
choose among alternative brands and suppliers (p. 2).
This definition highlights two key dimensions on which interorganizational exchange
differs from consumer purchasing: 1) the actors in the exchange and 2) the nature of the
exchange.
Actors in the Exchange. As described above by Webster and Wind (1972),
interorganizational exchange involves a market exchange between formal organizations.
Perhaps the most obvious difference between the consumer context and the
interorganizational exchange context is the interface between the buyer and seller. While
there is a growing awareness of the company behind the brand (Goodyear 1993),
consumers are thought to form relationships with the brand itself (Fournier 1998) rather
than members of the selling firm who are typically unknown. In contrast, organizational
buyers often have direct, multiple contacts with members of the selling firm. Depending
on a variety of factors, the organizational customer may have a minimal or extensive set
of relationship connections with the supplier (Cannon and Perrault 1999). Discovering
critical points of contact and managing a consistent, coherent interface with
organizational customers can be a formidable task for brand managers.
Another key difference in the two contexts is the number of people involved in
the exchange and the roles they play. Members of the organization who interact during
the buying decision process can be defined as the buying center (Johnston and Bonoma
11

1981; Webster and Wind 1972). The number of members of a buying center is generally
larger than a household group, and their roles may shift depending on the buying task and
the stage of the decision-making process (Bunn 1993). Several individuals may fulfill the
same role, and one individual may play more than one role as the buying task unfolds.
Identifying the members of the relevant buying center, understanding their needs and
motivations, and discerning the decision-making process add considerable complexity to
developing an understanding of the brand’s target market in a supply chain context.
Nature of the Exchange. Following the resource dependence view of
organizational behavior, organizations engage in market exchanges in order to secure
resources to fulfill the needs of the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The buying firm
may face a serious disruption of operations and substantial financial loss if the selling
firm fails to meet expectations of product quality or timely delivery. On the other hand,
selling firms may rely on a handful of key customers for a significant portion of their
revenues.
This situation produces high levels of interdependence among trade partners that
distinguish interorganizational exchange from consumer purchase situations.
Interdependence among trade partners defines the interorganizational exchange as not
only the consideration and choice of products or brands, but also the selection of a trade
partner with whom the firm will engage over a period of time. Pure, discrete transactions
- building blocks of the microeconomic theory of market exchange - are rare in
interorganizational exchange (Day 2000; Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Weitz and Jap
1995; Wilson 1995). Macniel (1980), a leading scholar in the development of the
behavioral model of interorganizational exchange, asserts that discrete exchanges do not
12

exist in the real world. Thus, in interorganizational exchange, brand managers are faced
with the dual task of delivering value in the relationship as well as the product.

Interorganizational Exchange and Perceived Risk
In field interviews reported in depth in Chapter II, informants validated the
resource dependence theory of interorganizational exchange when they described
interactions with trade partners in terms of securing adequate resources to assure
profitability. These resources included both physical goods and information flows from
upstream vendors as well as reverse financial and information flows from downstream
customers. Based on resource dependence theory, the perceived risk model of decisionmaking provides a framework for understanding interorganizational exchange consistent
with the problem-solving perspective of organizational decision-making and permits
meaningful analysis of strategies that organizations use to reduce risk to tolerable levels
(Webster and Wind 1972). Empirical research confirms perceived risk as a significant
characteristic of interorganizational exchange (Henthorne, LaTour and Williams 1993;
Puto, Patton and King 1985).
Originally posed by Bauer (1960), perceived risk in the consumer context is
conceptualized as a function of the uncertainty about the outcome of a given course of
action and the consequences associated with alternative outcomes (Bauer 1960; Cox
1967). Thus, perceived risk in the consumer context is a second-order construct
comprised of two dimensions: uncertainty and consequences. The decision to purchase
known brands is thought to minimize perceived risk by reducing uncertainty (Bauer
1960; Cox 1967).
13

Informants in this study described risk as a phenomenon arising from conditions
of uncertainty, dependence, and power; that is, uncertainty is antecedent to risk rather
than a dimension of risk. They characterized risk as the potential effect of lost resources
on the firm’s profitability, such as reductions in the availability of supply or the loss of
revenue from key customers. Uncertainty, defined as the level of predictability of
resource flows, was described as a significant contributor to risk in interorganizational
exchange. Informants reported being unsure of future orders from customers (because
customers were unsure of consumer demand) as well as delivery dates and supply
availability from vendors. They also expressed the need to manage dependence on trade
partners in order to reduce risk to firm profitability. Dependence was expressed as the
extent to which alternative vendors were available for critical supply as well as the level
of reliance on specific customers for revenues. Informants were also concerned about
issues of control over resource flows, which can be conceptualized as the level of power
in the exchange. Power was described as the extent to which the trade partner had the
upper hand in determining terms of the exchange, such as product pricing, quantities, and
assortment. These conditions -- uncertainty, dependence, and power -- varied across
situations and are conceptualized in the theoretical model as antecedents to perceived risk
in interorganizational exchange.

The Moderating Effect of Brand Equity
The strength of the trade partner’s brand equity was found to be a condition that
changed the levels of importance of the three antecedents -- uncertainty, dependence, and
power -- to perceived risk. Similar to the effect of brand equity in the consumer context,
14

uncertainty was described as less important to perceived risk when the trade partner had
high brand equity. On the other hand, doing business with a trade partner with high
brand equity was reported to increase the importance of power and dependence to
perceived risk. Even informants in firms that held high brand equity themselves reported
increases in perceived risk when dealing with trade partners who also enjoyed high brand
equity. As reported in detail in Chapter II, informants described trade partners with high
brand equity as having a nearly monopolistic advantage. The effect of the trade partner’s
brand equity, therefore, was to raise the level of perceived risk in interorganizational
exchange by increasing the importance of dependence and power.
In summary, brand equity was found to change the level of perceived risk by
moderating the relationships between perceived risk and its antecedents. Informants in
the qualitative study described relationship management as a significant strategy for
handling perceived risk in interorganizational exchange.

Relationship Management
The relational elements used to coordinate supply chain activities and to manage
relationships among supply chain members are a key aspect of interorganizational
exchange (Frazier 1983; Reve and Stern 1979; Stern and Reve 1980). With the growing
awareness of the importance of relationships in interorganizational exchanges, the
development of appropriate governance structures and the management of relational
exchange have emerged as top priorities for many firms (Anderson and Narus 1991;
Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987) and the focus of a significant stream of research.
A variety of concepts have been shown to be relevant to understanding
15

interorganizational relationship management. Scholarly research has examined factors
that influence relationship formation such as trust and commitment (Anderson and Weitz
1992; Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer 1995; Morgan and Hunt 1994), uncertainty and
dependence (Heide and John 1988; Mohr, Fisher and Nevin 1996), risk and value
(Wilson 1995), and power and dependence (Gaski 1984; Gundlach and Cadotte 1994).
In addition to analyzing dimensions of relationships, researchers have also examined
situational factors that moderate hypothesized linkages such as the organization of the
buyer-supplier interface (Noordewier, John and Nevin 1990) and the effect of anticipated
interaction patterns (Heide and Miner 1992).
Underlying many of these studies is the assumption that lower-order factors are
highly correlated and can be combined to form a unidimensional continuum of
relationship distance with close, collaborative exchanges as the prototype at the lowdistance end of the spectrum and arms-length, discrete transactions as an ideal type at the
high-distance extreme (Day 2000). Other research suggests that multi-dimensional
conceptualizations are more appropriate and propose various taxonomies of relationships
(Cannon and Perreault 1999; Wilson 1995). Elements of both frameworks can be
explored by examining the concept of relationship commitment, defined by Anderson and
Weitz (1992) as the strength of the intention to develop and maintain a stable, long-term
relationship. Firms with low relationship commitment are likely to fall toward the highdistance, transactional end of the relationship distance spectrum and to have minimal
relationship connections in the typology framework. Firms with high relationship
commitment would be positioned at the low-distance end of the relationship distance
spectrum with a relationship type characterized by multiple relationship connections.
16

Research has shown that firms structure their exchange relationships to minimize
risk by means of establishing formal or semiformal links with other firms (Pennings and
Woiceshyn 1987; Ulrich and Barney 1984). In the qualitative field study, perceived risk
was found to increase relationship commitment. Brand equity was also found to increase
relationship commitment by raising the level of perceived risk through its effect on the
relationships between the antecedents of perceived risk -- uncertainty, dependence and
power -- and perceived risk.
At the end of the day, the goal of understanding and increasing relationship
commitment is to enhance profitability of supply chain members. Research suggests that
committed customers are more profitable than price-sensitive, deal-prone switchers who
see little difference among alternatives (Page, Pitt and Berthon 1995; Reichfield 1996).
In addition, committed relationships are linked to sustainable competitive advantage in
that they are difficult for competitors to understand, copy or replace (Day 1997).
Morgan and Hunt (1994) explored the outcomes of relationship commitment by
testing the association of commitment to cooperation, acquiescence, and propensity to
leave the relationship. They found that increases in relationship commitment led to
increased cooperation and acquiescence, and reduced propensity to leave. Cooperation
can be defined as the degree to which the buying firm works with the supplier to achieve
mutual goals (Anderson and Narus 1990). Their conceptualization of acquiescence is
based on the concept of compliance found in the work of Kumar, Stern and Achrol
(1992) and can be defined as the degree to which the buying firm accepts or adheres to
the supplier’s specific requests or policies. Morgan and Hunt (1994) define propensity to
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leave as the likelihood that the buying firm will leave the relationship in the near future.
An exploration of behavioral consequences of relationship commitment in the
qualitative phase of this study affirmed the relationships between commitment and
cooperative behavior as well as commitment and propensity to leave found by Morgan
and Hunt. In the field study, the behavior described by Morgan and Hunt as
acquiescence appeared to be more closely related to power, an antecedent to perceived
risk, rather than relationship commitment. That is, informants reported their compliance
with requests and policies as a function of the trade partner’s power rather than their
commitment to the relationship. However, another consequence was revealed related to
commitment arising from the effects of brand equity. The concept of forbearance, or the
degree of tolerance of the terms of the exchange, was reported by informants as an
important consequence of committed relationships.

RESEARCH PURPOSE
Research Objective
The purpose of this research was to understand and explain brand equity in the
supply chain by generating and testing a theoretical model. First, a grounded theory
approach was used to integrate field research with relevant literature in the theorybuilding step. The theory was subsequently subjected to a quantitative test in the context
of a focal customer-supplier relationship using a survey methodology.
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Research Questions
This research addressed the propositions related to the importance of brand
management with supply chain partners raised by Shocker, Srivistava and Ruekert (1994)
and Webster (2000). The fundamental question was, “What is the effect of brand equity
in the supply chain?” To answer this question, we must first understand the meaning of
brand equity in the supply chain. Related questions include:
1. What is the relationship between brand equity in the supply chain
and perceived risk?
2. Does relationship commitment differ with various levels of brand
equity?
3. What is the relative importance of trade-based brand equity versus
consumer-based brand equity to the level of brand equity perceived
by the organizational customer?
4. What do companies stand to gain by building brand equity with
trade partners?
CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE OF THIS RESEARCH
First, this research extends our knowledge of brand equity by examining the
concept in an important new context, the supply chain. Exploring the phenomenon in this
environment addressed the concern that limiting study to the consumer point of view has
led to an incomplete understanding of brands. Phase One of this study explored brand
equity in the supply chain by examining: 1) the meaning of brand equity in the supply
chain, 2) the effect of brand equity on perceived risk in interorganizational exchange, and
3) the effect of brand equity on relationship commitment. Phase Two of the study tested
the theoretical model generated in Phase One from the perspective of a focal customersupplier relationship.
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The research also contributes to our understanding of relationship commitment in
supply chain relationships by investigating the effect of a new situational variable, the
level of brand equity, from the customer’s perspective. Does brand equity assure a place
at the table when organizations consider alternative suppliers? Or, are firms with high
brand equity avoided due to dependence or power issues? Are firms with high brand
equity more likely to be considered again before final selection of a supplier? Do firms
make stronger or weaker commitments to their relationships with suppliers with high
brand equity? What are the consequences of such relationships?
Finally, this research adds to our understanding of the role of perceived risk in
interorganizational exchange. What is the relationship among uncertainty, dependence,
and power to perceived risk in interorganizational exchange? How does brand equity
affect perceived risk? Does brand equity affect relationship commitment through its
effect on perceived risk, or does it have a direct effect on commitment?
There are significant managerial implications for this research. For
organizational buyers, this study provides insight into the role of the supplier’s brand in
organizational buying. Understanding how brand equity affects the buying decision
provides insights into improving interactions with branded suppliers. The research also
contributes to managers’ understanding of perceived risk in interorganizational exchange,
providing a framework for analyzing the risk facing the firm.
For executives, it is critical to know whether or not their firms should invest in
building brand equity with trade partners. Understanding the nature and role of brand
equity in the supply chain is fundamental to developing effective brand strategies. This
study provides a framework for understanding brand equity in the supply chain and the
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relative contributions to brand equity of trade-based brand equity and consumer-based
brand equity, which can support managerial decision-making about investments in
marketing activities directed at brand building. The research also offers understanding of
the potential for leveraging brand equity by examining the effect of brand equity in
interorganizational exchange. Finally, this dissertation proposed and measured the
consequences of relationship commitment derived from building brand equity.

ORGANIZATON OF THIS DISSERTATION
This dissertation is organized in five parts. Following the introduction in Chapter
I, Chapter II describes the steps in building the theory, presents the findings of qualitative
field research along with the theory, and offers testable hypotheses. It begins with an
overview of grounded theory, the method used to build the theory. Grounded theory
methodology requires a thoughtful treatment of the literature. In this study, there is an
initial literature review intended to provide theoretical sensitivity for the researcher and to
inform subsequent collection of data from the field (Maxwell 1996; Strauss and Corbin
1998). The initial literature review explored existing brand equity theory along with the
literatures in interorganizational exchange and relationship management. As the theory
builds during data analysis, the literature is consulted again as an additional data source
to provide further evidence for the emerging theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss
and Corbin 1998). In the discussion of findings, the theory is presented and discussed
along with a set of testable theoretical hypotheses.
Chapter III offers justification for the quantitative research design and outlines the
research methodology used to test the theoretical hypotheses. The chapter includes a
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discussion of the research design and reports the analysis of pre-test data. Chapter IV
reports the results of the main study outlined in Chapter III and offers an analysis of
findings. The results of statistical tests of theoretical linkages are presented, along with
analyses of validity and reliability of the measures.
Chapter V is a discussion of findings from the theory test, including conclusions
drawn from the analysis of data and implications for marketing scholarship and practice.
Answers to the questions posed in this introductory chapter are found in Chapter V. This
chapter also includes a presentation of the limitations of the study and directions for
future research. Key research documents such as the interview protocol employed in the
qualitative study, items included on the survey, and detailed tables of the various
statistical analyses in the quantitative study are found in the Appendices.

22

CHAPTER II
BUILDING THE THEORY
The objectives of this dissertation research are two-fold: 1) to build a
theory of brand equity in the supply chain and 2) to test the theory. This chapter
deals with the first half of the research objective - building the theory. While both
quantitative and qualitative methods have been successfully employed in theory
building, the qualitative method of grounded theory was chosen for this project.
Grounded theory is particularly appropriate for examining new phenomena or
existing phenomena in new settings, as is the case for this study. The grounded
theory approach provides a framework for methodically relying on the data to
provide insights and understanding rather than imposing a preconceived
theoretical framework (Glaser and Strauss 1967).

GROUNDED THEORY
Distressed by the emphasis in sociology on quantitative theory testing at the
expense of theory generation, Glaser and Strauss (1967) wrote a book designed to be a
primer for beginning social science researchers, exhorting them to move beyond testing
miniscule parts of the “great man” sociological theories of the day in favor of developing
original thinking about the rich and varied human experience. They offered a set of
techniques and guidelines for inductive theory generation -- moving from the parts to the
whole -- grounded in field data that came to be known as the grounded theory approach.
Grounded theory is a research methodology by which theory is derived from data
that are systematically gathered and analyzed throughout the research process (Glaser and
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Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998). The analysis is a comparative process whereby
the researcher “jointly collects, codes, and analyzes data” (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p.
45), allowing theory to emerge from the data. Comparative analysis for theory
generation involves an iterative process of generating conceptual categories based on the
evidence, comparing those categories to additional data, and circling back to refine the
conceptual categories based on comparisons. The objective of grounded theory
methodology is “not to provide a perfect description of an area, but to develop a theory
that accounts for much of the relevant behavior” (p. 30).
Glaser and Strauss (1967) advise the grounded theorist to enter the field with a
perspective (e.g., a marketing perspective), along with a focus, general question, or a
problem in mind (e.g., brand equity in the supply chain) and “without any preconceived
theory that dictates, prior to the research, ‘relevancies’ in concepts and hypotheses” (p.
33). McCracken (1988) echoes this advice, stating “preconceptions can be the enemy of
qualitative research” (p. 31). Some researchers have taken such admonitions to mean
they are ill advised to conduct a literature review before engaging in grounded theory
development. However, a closer reading of opinions on methodological rigor in
qualitative research shows there are divergent views on the role of the literature review.
At one end of the spectrum, Glaser and Strauss (1967) advise researchers
“literally to ignore the literature of theory and fact on the area under study, in order to
assure that the emergence of categories will not be contaminated by concepts more suited
to different areas” (p.37). This seems at odds with their caution to the researcher a few
pages later to be “sufficiently theoretically sensitive” in his or her area of research by
building familiarity with existing theory (p. 46). In a later book on grounded theory,
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Strauss and Corbin (1998) modify advice on the use of literature and provide an outline
of potential benefits of a literature review. They note that while it is not necessary to
review all of the literature beforehand, familiarity with relevant literature before entering
the field can serve several purposes such as enhancing sensitivity to subtle nuances in the
data, assisting in formulating questions that act as “a stepping-off point” during initial
interviews, and suggesting areas for productive theoretical sampling. During data
analysis, literature can be used again as a secondary source of data for making
comparisons with the emerging conceptual categories, to stimulate questions during
analysis, and to confirm findings (p. 48-50).
At the other end of the spectrum, McCracken (1988) directs qualitative
researchers to begin with “an exhaustive review of the literature” (p. 29). The purpose of
the review is to help define problems, assess data, and sharpen the researcher’s “capacity
for surprise” (Lazersfeld, 1972). McCracken counters the argument that a literature
review leads to preconceptions by arguing that “a good literature review creates more
distance than it collapses” by exposing the researcher to diverse viewpoints (p. 31).
Taking the middle ground, Maxwell (1996), warns that there are two ways in
which qualitative researchers fail in the use of existing theory: “by not using it enough
and by relying too heavily on it” (p. 36). The first fails to explicitly apply or develop any
conceptual abstractions or theoretical framework, severely limiting the usefulness of the
work. The second forces a fit between theory and data, imposing dominant theories or
the researcher’s own bias rather than relying on the views and perspectives of those
studied. He advises using prior research to develop the justification for the study, to
inform research methods, and as a source of data during theory development. In his
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advice to qualitative researchers on the use of literature, Maxwell quotes Mills (1959)
who counsels: “Perhaps the point is to know when you ought to read, and when you
ought not to” (p. 214).
The qualitative research design in this study takes the middle ground with a
careful approach to the literature review. An initial literature review on key concepts brand equity, interorganizational exchange, and relationship management - was
conducted in order to enhance the researcher’s sensitivity to the phenomenon, to develop
opening questions for field research, and to explore promising methodologies for the
study. During data collection and analysis, the literature was consulted again as a
secondary source of data for sharpening emerging concepts and stimulating further
questions. Insights from the initial literature review are described in a subsequent
section; literature used as a secondary data source is intertwined with the reports of field
data in the discussion of findings.

Research Question
The purpose of the qualitative study was to answer the question, “What is the
meaning of brand equity in the supply chain?” Drawing on the notion of brand equity as
the differential response of customers (Keller 1993; Park and Srinivasan 1994), the
qualitative study was designed to examine this question from the customer’s point of
view; that is, what do brands mean in the customer-supplier relationship from the
customer’s point of view?
Once an understanding of the meaning of brand equity in the supply chain was
developed, then questions raised in Chapter I related to the effect of brand equity in
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supply chain relationships could be answered through a theory test. Thus, the first task
was to understand the phenomenon using a qualitative methodology. The next step was
to find out the extent to which brand equity matters in supply chain relationships by
employing a quantitative method to test the theory. The theory test stimulated further
questions, calling for an iterative process of ongoing research in order to more fully
explain the phenomenon.

Sample
Grounded theory employs a theoretical sampling technique that requires the
researcher to use emerging theory to guide data collection. The initial sample decisions
are based solely on the perspective and the problem. In this study, the only assumptions
required were that executives engaged in supply chain management are likely to have
some knowledge about brand equity in the supply chain.
The primary data source for the theory-building phase of the study was comprised
of reports obtained from 16 executives in six firms across three supply chains (Table 2).
The executives interviewed were at a senior level and had knowledge of trade partner
relationships. The unit of analysis for this study was the report of the informant’s
perception of the nature of a specific trade partner’s brand equity from the customer’s
point of view; therefore, one executive could provide multiple reports of brand equity in
the supply chain. Twelve executives interviewed are employed at three firms in a home
textiles supply chain (basic material manufacturer - finished goods manufacturer retailer), two work for an office supply manufacturer, and two are employed at apparel
manufacturing companies. As noted previously, relevant literatures were sampled as a
27

Table 2. Informant Profiles
Supply Chain Position
Raw material manufacturer

Industry
Textile

Title
Business Supply Chain Specialist
Business Logistics Director
Director of Sales
Purchasing Manager

Finished goods manufacturer

Home textiles

Chief Executive Officer
Chief Operating Officer
Vice President/Purchasing
Director/Logistics
Manager/Logistics

Retailer

Home textiles

Marketing Manager
Director/Replenishment Process
Inventory Manager

Manufacturer

Apparel

Director/Supply Chain

Manufacturer

Apparel

Director/Supply Chain

Manufacturer

Office supplies

Director/Supply Chain
Marketing Manager

secondary data source, guided by the emerging theory.
The aim of theoretical sampling is to “maximize opportunities to compare events,
incidents, or happenings to determine how a category varies in terms of its properties and
dimensions” (Strauss and Corbin 1998, p. 202). The researcher samples the properties
and dimensions of the conceptual categories under varying conditions looking for
similarities and differences in order to densify categories, to differentiate among
categories, and to specify their range of variability (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Sample
size is determined as the study progresses. The goal is to reach theoretical saturation the point where reports of the phenomenon are redundant and analysis of additional data
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would offer no new theoretical insights.
Data Collection
A semi-structured interview protocol was used to guide data collection (Appendix
A). Initial interview questions were purposefully broad and were not always asked in the
same sequence. As data collection progressed, questions with a higher degree of focus
were added as theoretical sampling adapted to emergent findings (Strauss and Corbin
1998). Some consistency in the interview questions was required as data collection
progressed in order to facilitate systematic comparisons of categories; however, it was
also important to maintain flexibility in the interview format in order to allow the
informant to offer relevant information unconstrained by interview questions.
Twelve interviews were conducted over the telephone and four were conducted at
informants’ workplaces. Site visits are the preferred method for this type of research
because face-to-face interviews in a natural setting provide more information in the way
of visual cues, observations of the workplace, and observations of interactions with
coworkers. However, telephone interviews were used in most cases rather than site visits
in order to accommodate informants’ schedules. All interviews were audiotaped for
subsequent verbatim transcription by a professional transcriptionist.

Data Analysis
In grounded theory, analysis is accomplished through methodical coding of the
data in order to facilitate systematic comparisons. Coded concepts are grouped into
categories and then linked in a theoretical framework. Grounded theory methodology
calls for data analysis to begin immediately following the first sampling of data and to
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continue throughout the collection process. As soon as the first interview transcript was
available, the principal researcher coded the interview data using QSR NVivo 1.3
software (NVivo 2000). NVivo allows the researcher to manage the task of identifying,
naming, and categorizing ideas and concepts as they emerge from the data and to retrieve
the coded data in a manner that allows a full range of comparative analysis. The coding
process followed the method recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1998): 1) open
coding, 2) axial coding, and 3) selective coding.
Open coding. Open coding is a two-step process of conceptualizing and naming,
followed by categorizing. Each transcript was first read as a whole in order to reacquaint
the researcher with the informant’s experience with the phenomenon. Then each major
section of the transcript was read again, looking for the main concept offered in the
response. A label was assigned to the concept using words relevant to the context of the
response. Wherever possible, a word or phrase taken directly from the informant’s
response is used for the label, a technique called in vivo coding (Glaser and Strauss
1967). The response was then read again examining each thought in the response as a
possible concept. NVivo allows the researcher to assign multiple labels to a single unit of
text, to store definitions of labels as the coding progresses, and to annotate the transcript
in order to clarify indirect references or capture researcher insights. The key question
during this step in open coding is “What does this response describe?” In this study, 63
concepts were coded in the open coding step (see Appendix B).
As concepts begin to accumulate, the researcher begins to realize that certain
concepts are describing different aspects of the same dimension or property of the
phenomenon that can be categorized under a more abstract, higher order concept. These
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categories are “important analytic ideas that emerge from the data. They answer the
question ‘What is going on here?’” (Strauss and Corbin 1998, p. 114). Maxwell (1996)
metaphorically describes these categories as hooks in the theoretical closet on which to
hang the data. Ultimately, ten categories were abstracted from the 62 concepts that
emerged in open coding.
Once categories begin to emerge, the researcher can develop them by considering
their properties and dimensions to densify the category by adding precision to the
category definitions. A property is a characteristic of a category while a dimension
represents the location of the property along a continuum (Strauss and Corbin 1998).
For example, we could see that the frequency of communications is a property that
differentiates close relationships between firms from arms-length relationships. The
frequency property could then be dimensionalized by saying that in close relationships
the frequency of communication is at the high end of a continuum.
Axial coding. Axial coding involves coding around the axis of a category in order
to add depth and structure (Strauss and Corbin 1998). This is achieved by relating
categories to subcategories - the codes that identify the categories’ properties and
dimensions - and connecting major categories with each other. Axial coding begins as
soon as patterns or themes begin to appear during the open coding process and continues
in parallel with open coding. The tasks associated with axial coding are:
1. Laying out the properties and dimensions of categories;
2. Identifying the conditions, actions/interactions, and consequences
associated with categories;
3. Relating categories to subcategories; and
4. Relating major categories to each other.
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The main task of axial coding is to discover relationships among categories by asking
why, how, when, where, and with what results? By asking these questions, the researcher
is simultaneously exploring structure and process - the conditions in which the
phenomenon is situated (“Why?”) and the manner in which it occurs (“How?”).
During axial coding, the researcher samples reports of events and incidents that
identify significant variations in order to verify similarities and differences. This
sampling may be done by revisiting data already collected or by going back to the field to
collect additional data.
Selective coding. Selective coding is the step that integrates the categories into a
theoretical framework. As categories and properties emerge during axial coding, their
accumulating interactions begin to form an integrated framework, or the core of the
emerging theory. The core then becomes the guide for further collection and analysis of
data. The emergence of the core has been described as that moment when the analyst
realizes that “the data are beginning to ‘gel’” and commits to a theoretical scheme
(Strauss and Corbin 1998, p. 144). Selective coding involves delimiting the theory by
reducing the number of categories to those that are pertinent to the developing theory
(Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998). The goal of selective coding is to
reach theoretical saturation, the point where no new insights are gained by analysis of
additional data.

Assessing the Rigor of Grounded Theory Research
With any research project, it is important to assure rigor in the research design in
order to support the trustworthiness of the findings. The key question here is “Why
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should we believe it?” (Maxwell 1996, p. 87). There were several checkpoints in this
study aimed at minimizing researcher bias and supporting data quality and
trustworthiness:
The data collected from the field were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim
by a professional transcriptionist in order to assure accuracy and
completeness in data collection (Maxwell 1996; McCracken 1988).
The data were collected from 16 individuals across multiple companies to
minimize the possibility of chance associations (McCracken 1988).
The method of analysis, grounded theory, was chosen in order to provide a
framework for methodically relying on the data to provide insights and
understanding rather than imposing a preconceived theoretical framework
(Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998).
The software tool, NVivo, provided a mechanism for systematic
organization of the data and consistent application of codes throughout the
coding process.
Informants reviewed a summary of the researcher’s interpretations of their
interviews to ensure the data analysis was both complete and credible
(Hirschman 1986).
Colleagues familiar with the constructs were consulted throughout the
project and reviewed final results to ensure they were understandable and
confirmable (Hirschman 1986).

QUALITATIVE STUDY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
This section presents reports from the field of the phenomenon of brand equity in
the supply chain, together with existing theory drawn from relevant literatures. As
described previously, these reports were collected from 16 executives who have
knowledge of supply chain relationships for their companies. They represent six firms
across three industries, and three of the six firms are linked in a home furnishings supply
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chain (see Table 2).
To answer the question “What is the meaning of brand equity in the supply
chain?” it was fundamental to explore the nature of interorganizational exchange.
Findings related to interorganizational exchange are presented first, followed by reports
related to brand equity. The final sections describe aspects of brand equity in the supply
chain in terms of its effect on supply chain relationships. Each section includes testable
theoretical hypotheses developed from field reports and relevant literature. The
hypotheses are summarized in Table 3, and their locations in relationship to the
theoretical framework are displayed in Figure 5.

Interorganizational Exchange
The universally high level of anxiety about exchange relationships expressed by
managers in this study was stunning. Interviews were conducted over a five-month
period in early 2002. Across industries, executives were reeling from the dramatic
downturn in the global economy the previous spring, compounded by market reactions to
the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington,
DC on September 11, 2001.
When September 11 happened, nobody wanted to buy anything and our
orders just decreased dramatically, and no one knew when they were
coming back. [Uncertainty] And so, you know, first, right when that
happened the forecasts stayed where they had been and then people
started saying, you know, maybe something’s going to happen because of
this, particularly because a couple of businesses in my supply chain
provided things to restaurants and airlines and hotels. [Dependence]
Manufacturers in the study reported reduced orders from retail customers, which
required downsizing manufacturing facilities and passing reduced orders for
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Table 3. Summary of Hypotheses
Interorganizational Exchange:
H1a: Increased uncertainty increases perceived risk.
H1b: Increased dependence increases perceived risk.
H1c: Increased power increases perceived risk.

Brand Equity:
H2:

Both trade-based brand equity and consumer-based brand equity are
dimensions of brand equity.

H3:

Brand equity held by a trade partner moderates the relationships between
perceived risk and its antecedents.

H3a: High brand equity decreases the strength of the relationship between
uncertainty and perceived risk.
H3b: High brand equity increases the strength of the relationship between
dependence and perceived risk.
H3c: High brand equity increases the strength of the relationship between
power and perceived risk.
H3d: Low brand equity increases the strength of the relationship between
uncertainty and perceived risk.
H3e: Low brand equity decreases the strength of the relationship between
dependence and perceived risk.
H3f: Low brand equity decreases the strength of the relationship between
power and perceived risk.

Relationship Commitment:
H4:

Increased perceived risk increases relationship commitment.

H5:

Increased relationship commitment increases cooperation.

H6:

Increased relationship commitment decreases propensity to leave.

H7:

Increased relationship commitment increases forbearance.
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Figure 5. Locations of Hypotheses
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materials to upstream suppliers. When expectations for earnings were reduced at
the end of 2001, painful restructuring was necessary to align costs with expected
revenues. As these reductions were being put in place in early 2002,
manufacturers reported experiencing a sudden, unexpected upturn in orders from
downstream resellers:
All of a sudden the business came back and it came back like this (snaps
fingers) [Unpredictability] and the forecast didn’t show it coming back
that soon. We had inventory at very low levels. And now we are doing
everything we can to get the customers their goods.
While meeting higher levels of demand with reduced capacity and lower levels of
raw materials was a challenge, companies were experiencing good financial results for
the first quarter of 2002.

Perceived Risk in Interorganizational Exchange
Asked to describe their relationships with trade partners, informants readily talked
about the importance of managing risk in interorganizational exchange (see Figure 6).
An executive at a finished goods manufacturer commented on risk associated with
purchasing decisions: “In order to get a reasonably good manufacturing quantity you
know you’re taking a lot of risks on the product [Risk]. Or you’re going to carry
product, carry inventory, which is space and time value on money, [Financial risk] but
you’re also going to take some additional risks.” In another situation, a raw material
manufacturer talked about trade-offs made by suppliers as they attempted to assure
product availability by anticipating customer orders based on order history: “We accept
no responsibility for anything [Risk avoidance] even though we’ve forecasted it
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previously. We’ve told them it has changed. If they continue (production), then it’s at
their own risk really.” [Risk] One informant talked about pressure from customers to
accept higher risk by taking on the role of broker for supply from international sources:
“Because as long as they have to source it from India and Pakistan and China [Global
Sourcing], they are stuck [Risk] with the crappy container, and the lost goods, and the
no delivery.” Customers were looking for ways to minimize their own risk by
transferring responsibility for procuring goods overseas to a reliable supplier.
Webster and Wind (1972) addressed perceived risk in interorganizational
exchange from the customer’s point of view in their description of nontask-oriented
models of buyer behavior. These models introduce the human element into exchange and
focus on variables such as motivation that are not directly related to the buying task.
Among the nontask-oriented models is the perceived risk framework, which proposes
buyer behavior is motivated by a desire to reduce the level of risk in the buying situation
to some tolerable level. Borrowing from consumer behavior (Bauer 1960; Cox 1967),
Webster and Wind define perceived risk as “a function of the buyer’s uncertainty about
the probability of an event (stated as a probability between zero and one that the event
will occur) and the consequences associated with that event should it occur” (p. 17).
They propose the perceived risk model as the most consistent with the view of
organizational buying as problem-solving behavior and the behavioral theory of the firm.
“Understanding the nature and components of perceived risk allows one to make a
meaningful analysis of the strategies that organizational buyers adopt for reducing
perceived risk to tolerable levels and, therefore, provides a framework within which to
think about the requirements for effective marketing strategy” (p. 101).
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Following Webster and Wind, several studies in buyer behavior include perceived
risk in models of organizational buying. Wilson, Lilien and Wilson (1991) proposed and
tested a contingency framework that examined the effects of the buying task and
perceived risk on group choice processes in organizational buying. Adopting Sheth’s
(1973) definition of perceived risk as “the magnitude of adverse consequences felt by the
decision maker if he makes a wrong choice and the uncertainty under which he must
decide” (p. 53), they operationalized risk as the combination of technical uncertainty (the
chance the product will not perform) and financial commitment. They found perceived
risk situational factors to affect the types of choice used by the buying center, indicating
support for including perceived risk in models of interorganizational exchange.
Choffray and Johnston (1979) examined perceived risk in the pre-purchase stage
of decision-making. They found decision participants held different perceptions of
perceived risk. More importantly, variations in perceived risk affected the formation of
preferences. In their study of reference points in decision-framing in organizational
buying, Qualls and Puto (1989) found perceived risk to play a role in modifying reference
points.
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) offer an alternative conceptualization of perceived
risk from the perspective of their resource dependence framework. Resource dependence
theory views risk as an outcome of antecedent conditions of uncertainty and dependence
rather than comprised of the dimensions of uncertainty and consequences as suggested by
Bauer (1967) and Sheth (1973). Building on early work in social exchange theory
(Emerson 1962; Thibaut and Kelley 1959), resource dependence theory assumes that
organizations are not internally self-sufficient with respect to all of their critical
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resources; hence, two conditions are created. First, a lack of self-sufficiency creates
dependencies on external resources (Emerson 1962). Second, uncertainty is introduced
into the firm’s decision-making to the extent resource flows are not subject to the firm’s
control and, therefore, may not be predicted accurately. Following the behavioral theory
of the firm, organizations can be characterized as coalitions of individuals who engage in
problem solving in order to achieve organizational goals (Cyert and March 1963) such as
the acquisition of resources necessary for goal attainment. These resources, acquired
through interorganizational exchange, include inflows of materials, supplies, and
information from the firm’s environment.
Similar to Pfeffer and Salancik’s conceptualization, informants often described
risk in terms of acquiring necessary resources: “We work with very rigid margin
constraints. In other words, we set up preseason what kind of margin rates we have to
deliver [Financial Resources] by product category, and the job of the sourcing merchant
and production teams is to be able to create quality product [Quality] within the
constraints of those margin requirements… and so our merchants and sourcing people
are incented to try and drive costs down, but not letting quality slip [Quality] in the
process. That's a fine line for us.” Financial risks were described not only as the direct
costs of acquiring resources, but also as indirect costs. For example, service levels were
described as an important factor: “We can see by some of our measurements that [the
supplier’s] service levels have only been at 85% [Service Levels]. That’s costing us
[Increased Costs] quite a bit of money. And theirs might be a penny cheaper than vendor
Y, but they’re servicing at 98%. There are some real dollars [Financial Risk] related to
that.”
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Financial risk was associated not only with higher costs but also with revenue loss
due to the risk of losing customers: “Today a very large business is now a much smaller
business.” [Revenue loss] Driven by the power of a single retailer, discussed
subsequently, a sizeable domestic customer base for one manufacturer in the textile
industry was reduced to insignificance: “There are probably only twenty cut-and-sew
operators in the United States doing table linen where ten years ago there were probably
eight- or nine-hundred.” [Industry Restructuring]
The risk to the firm was also described in terms of the risk of losing customers or
customer loyalty due to failure to meet expectations of downstream customers: “So,
yeah, on occasion it (rejecting inferior goods from a supplier) disappoints customers, but
I think it would be disappointing a customer even more if we served up poor quality
products [Customer Expectations].” Describing a situation where a supplier failed to
deliver goods on time, a retail buyer reflected on consumer response: “Their (a
supplier’s) lead time for whatever reason just got longer, and we didn’t have the
[product] that we should have on hand at each door for an event. And you know it
wasn’t pleasant.[Customer Risk]” In another scenario, the supplier failed to deliver at
all: “But once it’s in print, I mean that’s it -- it’s over. How many (sale notices) go out?
50 million copies to the newspaper? I mean, it’s over. We’ll just take rain checks or
special order them for customers, and most understand, but some are disappointed.”
[Customer Expectations]
Field data in this study supported Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) conceptualization
of perceived risk, highlighting key differences between perceived risk in
interorganizational exchange and consumer exchange. First, as illustrated in comments
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cited previously, informants in this study associated perceived risk with resource
acquisition, in contrast to the concept of perceived risk in the consumer setting which is
linked with performance of a product or brand. Second, risk in interorganizational
exchange was described in terms of the impact of resource flows from upstream vendors
on subsequent performance with downstream customers, an issue that does not pertain to
the consumer setting.
In this study, perceived risk in interorganizational exchange is defined as the
potential impact of the failure to acquire necessary resources on the profitability of the
firm. The domain of the construct is comprised of two dimensions: financial risk and
customer risk. Financial risk involves potential loss of revenue and increased costs
related to resource acquisition. Customer risk is the potential loss of future orders due to
the failure to meet customer expectations. Informants described perceived risk as a
phenomenon apart from the conditions that precipitate it. Further analysis of descriptions
of conditions that give rise to perceived risk resulted in classification of responses into
three categories hypothesized to be antecedents to perceived risk: uncertainty,
dependence, and power.

Uncertainty
Uncertainty about product performance was reported to be significantly reduced
in interorganizational exchange by stringent quality inspection programs adopted during
the move to continuous quality improvement in previous decades. Managers reported
that reliable quality levels are the price of admission to consideration as a potential
supplier: “If it’s (product quality) not reliable, from a manufacturing side, you're out.”
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Extensive quality control processes minimize the probability of selecting weak trade
partners: “Before they become a supplier they're looked over with a fine tooth comb.
Financially and all the way through, A to Z [Supplier Qualification].” Quality control
continues from the initial consideration of a supplier through continuous monitoring of
product as it arrives at the customer’s location: “I mean even some of our private label
[product] hit the docks, and it was 150,000 units that had poor quality, and we said
we’re not accepting them.[Quality Control]”
Informants strongly associated uncertainty with change in interorganizational
exchange precipitated by globalization of trade networks and the adoption and expansion
of Internet-based technology. The ability to build a global supply network was explained
as a threat to business with long-standing customers:
The market has changed drastically. It’s the same everywhere; there’s
Asian suppliers and Mexican suppliers [Global Sourcing] where there
weren’t before. It’s changed radically in two years as to what it used to
be. It was probably very stable for forty years. And probably in the last
two or three years, it’s changed dramatically as to who gets what and
when and where. [Change]
Across industries represented in this study, globalization has shifted the balance between
supply and demand, resulting in excess capacity and eroding profit margins. “There’s an
overcapacity globally” in the textile industry, and in the office supply industry, “It is not
a growth market.” Excess capacity was seen as precipitating major change in industry
structure:
In fact, there is an excess of capacity [Excess Capacity], both at the retail
side and at the manufacturing side. The industry is about to collapse in
on itself and go through a major consolidation [Industry Restructuring].
Then also from a manufacturing standpoint, things are slow and there’s
excess capacity. So, we’re trying to make profitable decisions. That’s
what everybody is trying to do.
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Globalization was portrayed as generating change by shortening product life
cycles: “But it’s also drastically shortened life cycles [Change]. Because if I design
something gorgeous and Bloomingdale is willing to pay me for it - trust me, there’s a
shopper in there who’s going to be sending it to China [Global Sourcing] the next day.
And they’ll be getting it in Target in four weeks for half of what Bloomingdale charges
for it. That’s the fear factor on our side. [Risk]”
Industry restructuring, a common theme as companies respond to economic
pressures on profitability in the face of excess capacity, was reported to be a major
characteristic of uncertainty in resource acquisition. One manager described the impact
of a potential buy-out of his firm on customer orders: “Our company was recently up
for sale [Industry Restructuring], and that made a lot of our customers very nervous
[Uncertainty]. Good partners hung in there with us. Others said, ‘Yeah, sure. We
understand what you are doing.’ And then turned around and took business away from
us.” In a different industry, a supply chain manager provided the customer’s viewpoint
on potential restructuring at a supplier: “There’s an IPO working now that they want to
get rid of the division [Industry Restructuring].” This relationship had been in place for
decades, yet the manager was actively searching for alternative suppliers because of the
potential spin-off of the division. The same manufacturer was experiencing dramatic
shifts in the supplier network:
You’re already seeing plants close. A lot of the raw material I use is
actually left over from another process. Let’s say you’re a gasoline
manufacturer. Well, one of the byproducts left over from your operation
goes into mine. So if it’s not profitable to make mine anymore, you just
get rid of your byproduct somewhere else. [Industry restructuring]
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Industry restructuring was described in terms of its effect on both the number and
type of potential trade partners: “There’s nobody left in the middle. All these lower level
department stores, they’re all gone.” Consolidation at the retail level was described as
contributing to uncertainty by driving change in the customer order process: “There used
to be a fairly solid commitment process with [a national retailer], but that’s not the case
anymore.” Often, this change in the commitment process increased costs for suppliers
who were left holding inventory built for specific customers: “If I tell them they got to
take it, then they’ll say, ‘Well, I’ll go take my business elsewhere.’ And right now in the
economy, nobody wants to lose anything.”
Another external factor portrayed as a significant dimension of change associated
with uncertainty was the introduction of new business models afforded by the global
connectivity of Internet technology. Manufacturers were dealing with the threat of
reverse auctioning on the Internet by retailers: “In a year it’s (reverse auctioning) going
to kill everybody. It’s going to change the world. Now that’s drastic change in a year.
And see, you have no marketing there either. There’s nothing.” With no opportunity to
differentiate their offers, firms are reduced to price competition: “Our business units that
do cotton - cotton twills, plain weaves; they’re on the phone with their customer who is
on the auction. And with the customer, they have to negotiate the whole time while the
auction is going on to see how low you can go.”
Uncertainty was also associated with surprises described as customers who
unexpectedly ratchet up requirements to their vendors, requiring increased expenditures
due to expedited orders and introducing unpredictability into the exchange relationship:
In the past there have been situations where they (retailers) have ramped
46

things up whether we thought they needed to be ramped up or not. If
they see a couple of good sales weeks a lot of times they react to that
immediately and ramp up the numbers in their system, which in turn
generates orders to us. So that sometimes comes as a surprise
[Unpredictability].
This was confirmed by a retailer who explained the challenge of working with
suppliers to respond to unexpected consumer demand: “You may have items that take
off and are bigger and better than you ever thought they were ever going to be, and it
may put some constraints on the supply base. The sourcing group would then potentially
have to go out and chase sources of supply that they had not anticipated
[Unpredictability].” As they “chase supply,” retailers develop new sources that introduce
additional competition to current suppliers, contributing to price competition that
threatens profitability.
In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of marketing scholars examined the concept of
uncertainty as dimension of perceived risk in consumer behavior (Cox 1967; Bauer 1960;
Cunningham 1967). Exploration of uncertainty appeared again in several studies in the
late 1980s and 1990s (Dowling and Staelin 1994; Moorthy, Ratchford and Talukdar
1997; Urbany, Dickson, and Wilkie 1989). Urbany, Dickson, and Wilkie (1989)
identified two dimensions of uncertainty, which they labeled “knowledge uncertainty”
and “choice uncertainty.” Knowledge uncertainty is the extent to which consumers are
unsure about knowledge potentially required to make a decision, while choice uncertainty
reflects uncertainty about choice intentions. Thus, in the consumer context, uncertainty is
conceptualized as a psychological construct located in the mind of the consumer; that is,
the consumer is thought to experience uncertainty in the choice process. In
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interorganizational exchange, uncertainty appears to be simultaneously located in the
individual buyer’s sense of uncertainty as well as in the exchange relationship; that is, the
relationship in which resource acquisition is situated is perceived to be uncertain.
In their classic work on the resource dependency of firms, Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978) observed that reliance on external resources introduces uncertainty into firms’
decision-making processes to the extent that they cannot accurately predict or control the
future flow of resources. Following Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), uncertainty is defined
as the degree to which future resource flows cannot be accurately predicted. The
domain of the construct appears to include the perceptions of both the accelerating pace
of change in levels of unpredictability and the absolute level of unpredictability. The
issue of control was conceptualized as a separate construct - power - that is discussed
subsequently.
These managers are describing the relationship between uncertainty in their
exchange relationships and the risk to their firms’ profitability in support of the definition
of uncertainty proposed earlier, adapted from the work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).
The evidence provided by these examples led to the first hypothesis related to
interorganizational exchange:
H1a: Increased uncertainty increases perceived risk.

Dependence
Resource acquisition that involved high volumes of exchange, accomplishment
of strategic objectives, a limited number of alternative trade partners, and high switching
costs were categorized as dimensions of dependence. Exchange relationships that
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involved a high volume of interactions or a large dollar amount were reported to
contribute significantly to perceived risk: “But one big factor is just the sheer amount of
volume you do with a vendor or a customer.” Likewise, relationships with suppliers
whose products represented a large percentage of cost-of-goods sold or customers who
generated a high percentage of sales were most likely to earn more management
attention: “Let's say you had three hundred suppliers and out of that 20 or 25 of them
represented 80 percent of total shipments. So those are the guys I'm going to call
straight on.” Managers were aware of the need to reduce risk by managing dependency
generated by doing a large volume or high percentage of business with one partner:
“Basically when somebody gets that big [Volume of Supply], they pretty much own you
[Dependence]. And then you could have some issues [Risk].”
Managers also described dependence associated with the ability to achieve
strategic goals: “We have product categories that we call best-at/win-at. And the best-at
is the product category that we want the brand to be known for. Because the answer is
we have to win in [this product category] or we won't win. So we would have a less
strategic supply base [in other product categories]” [Strategic Supply]. In addition to
supporting quality in key product categories, strategic partners also supported anticipated
growth in the business: “We want to really build a base of supply that supports some
huge growth numbers, because I mean for example you're talking about taking [our
company] from maybe a two billion dollar business today to a five billion dollar business
in the next five years. If we don't begin to put strategic sourcing arrangements in place,
there's no way we're going to hit those numbers.”
The availability of alternative trade partners was reported by managers in this
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study as another characteristic of dependency:
A lot of it ties to what people have to offer, whether it’s some commodity
or supply versus some special niche. There are some cases where you
don’t have a choice. You may have two people that do it (offer the
product). There are some that only have one that supplies it.
[Alternative Suppliers]
In another example, a manager related how his customers were leveraging the availability
of global trade partners to change product lines in order to manage dependence on
suppliers:
The other issue that’s changing on our supply side is the third-world
developing or semi-developed countries. “We’ll use all natural fibers
because it’s what they have.” And that has driven the retail chain to
natural fibers because it’s cheap and easy to get. So if you were to go buy
a new jacket in a very expensive, sueded microfiber - which is very
technical, very hard to make, and expensive - your supplier list would be
very short [Alternative Suppliers].
Investments in the relationship generate significant switching costs, which can
also result in dependence (Cadotte and Stern 1979) by reducing the number of alternative
suppliers. In some cases, dependence was associated with capital investments: “When
you buy [this product], you have to buy equipment to utilize [it] in manufacturing. And
that equipment is also provided through the vendor. So we can’t buy [supplies from
another vendor] because that means we’ve got to shift to the kind of equipment they
have” [Switching Costs]. Cook and Emerson (1978) proposed that dependence varies
inversely with the availability of alternative partners; that is, the lower the number of
potential partners, the higher the level of dependence.
Dependence in interorganizational exchange is defined as the extent to which
attainment of goals is mediated by another firm and is available only through the
relationship with that firm (cf. Emerson 1962). The higher the level of valued rewards
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anticipated in the relationship relative to those available in alternative relationships, the
higher a firm’s dependence (Aldrich 1975, Emerson 1962). The nature of
interorganizational exchange creates dependence, as reflected in these examples. Firms
attempt to manage dependence in order to minimize perceived risk to their profitability.
Alternatives for managing dependence reported by informants in this study included
managing the volume of business with individual trade partners, building partnerships to
assure availability of strategic resources, and seeking alternative sources of supply in
order to expand the number of available suppliers. Thus, the second hypothesis related to
interorganizational exchange was:
H1b: Increased dependence increases perceived risk.

Power
The growing power of retailers in the supply chain was confirmed by managers in
this study: “You always hear that the buyer has a pencil [Perceived Power] (the
resources to place large orders), and you run across a lot of buyers that utilize that
power [Exercised Power], and suppliers that are afraid a lot of times to say speak up and
be honest.” A retail buyer at a major corporation reflected on how the perception of
power affected relationships with suppliers: “You know, we’re a pretty big company. We
have to be careful with our suppliers, and most suppliers are probably scared of us, too.
They love the business with big companies, but they are definitely afraid of it, too”
[Perceived Power].
There is a great deal of research on use of power in interorganizational
relationships, including power and influence (Etgar 1976; Hunt and Nevin 1974; Pfeffer
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and Salancik 1978), use of power (Kelley 1972, Regan 1978), sources of power (El
Ansary and Stern 1972; French and Raven 1959; Gaski 1984), and coercive and
noncoercive power (Lusch and Brown 1972). El-Ansary and Stern (1972) examined
power in channels of distribution and defined channel power as one firm’s ability to
control the marketing decision variables of another firm in a different location in the
channel. Gaski (1984) notes: “Power has been defined as a relationship defined by the
perception of the party over whom power is held … Indeed, it may be more correct to
regard the perception itself as the source of power” (p. 10). Following Gaski’s (1984)
notion that power is a perception and adapting El Ansary and Stern’s (1972)
conceptualization of channel power, power is defined as the perception that a trade
partner has the ability to control the firm’s marketing decision variables. Power in
interorganizational exchange appears to be comprised of two dimensions, perceived
power and exercised power. Perceived power is inferred due to characteristics of the
trade partner such as size or position in the supply chain. Exercised power includes
reports of actual experiences in which the trade partner controlled marketing decision
variables of the focal firm.
A retail buyer commented on power exercised over suppliers: “We may strategize
together (with suppliers) to come up with a different marketing twist, a different handle.
But 90% of it, we tell them [Exercised Power] what we’re doing.” Describing the power
of retailers to dictate pricing, one manufacturer stated:
The rules change every day. I think that’s more of an issue then it ever
was before. Next week you better lower your price by 8%. And not that
we understand it costs you more, or this is the way it’s going to be - it’s
8% or don’t come back. And there is no middle ground [Exercised
power].
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Retailers were reported to exercise power by dictating not only pricing, but also
sources of supply to their vendors:
I’m going changing the name - let’s says it’s Sears. Sears will go to the
largest textile tradeshow in the world, and they’ll see something, and it’s
made by a guy in Korea. Because Sears doesn’t want to buy from him or
set up the manufacturing or have no way to charge anybody back, they’ll
say okay, my best curtain supplier is Springs Industry. They’ll call up
Springs and say here’s his name and card. You buy it from him.
[Exercised power]
In another example, a retailer’s actions affected the customer base of a
manufacturer of basic goods two steps removed from the retailer in the supply
chain:
Wal-Mart was the largest table linen customer ten years ago, and my
customers were cut-and-sew [operators] in the United States with my
fabric. Eight years ago Wal-Mart said cut the price a little bit, so my
customers started buying a lot of imported fabric in cutting and sewing in
the United States, and I lost more business. Six years ago Wal-Mart said
cut the price and so my customers started importing made-up goods and I
lost more business. So now all of my former customers are 100%
importers of finished goods getting paid until last year when Wal-Mart
said, “We know where you’re getting it, we’ll do it ourselves from now
on.” And now they have no customers at all. That’s where we’re going.
[Power - Risk]
As poignantly illustrated in this example, when a firm perceives a trade partner to
have high power, the perception of risk also increases. This led to the third
hypothesis related to interorganizational exchange:
H1c: Increased power held by the trade partner increases perceived risk.
In summary, the conditions of uncertainty, dependence, and power give rise to
perceived risk in interorganizational exchange. These are the conditions in which the
phenomenon of interest, brand equity in the supply chain, is situated. The next section
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describes findings related to brand equity as perceived by organizations linked in a
supply chain.
Brand Equity
When managers used the term “brand equity” (see Figure 7), it was typically in
reference to equity built with consumer markets as they relate to branded products of the
firm: “Brand equity is the promise, I think, that the brand delivers to the consumer
[Consumer-Based Brand Equity]” reported a retail buyer. This is echoed at the
manufacturing level: “I think the connotation of brands is it relates to consumers.” For
one manufacturer, firms that did not have consumer recognition were considered not to
have a brand: “Brand is not an issue because we’re buying raw materials that the
majority of people do not know anything about the brand name.”
However, the same informant who said “brand is not an issue” in doing business
with trade partners was able to name firms that were unknown to consumers but who
were known as “quality firms” in the trade: “There are certain companies that we just
know them as quality companies, and therefore that gives them a leg up” [Trade-Based
Brand Equity]. This “leg up,” or differential effect of associating the brand with the
offer, is the essence of trade-based brand equity, that is, brand equity perceived by trade
partners as opposed to brand equity built in consumer markets. Logically, it makes sense
that there must be a different source of brand equity (i.e., trade partners in the supply
chain) for firms that have no visibility in consumer markets. For such firms,
trade-based brand equity represents the totality of their firms’ brand equity. However, it
is not an either/or proposition; obviously firms can have both consumer-based and
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trade-based sources of brand equity. A manufacturer that holds a mixed portfolio of
products organized by strategic business units, some with market-leading consumer
brands and others known only to retail customers, reflected:
Probably our greatest brand recognition is to the trade [Trade-Based
Brand Equity]. It doesn't go beyond that, for the most part, to the
consumer level [Consumer-Based Brand Equity]… We've always had a
struggle between do we promote [our company] as a brand versus the
individual business unit brands, and how do you do that? All of a sudden
you're talking about a lot of brands. So that's something that we haven't
quite figured out yet. We're going down the path of developing both.
The following sections provide details on these two constructs - consumer-based brand
equity and trade-based brand equity - the dimensions of brand equity.

Consumer-Based Brand Equity
Informants were clearly aware of the consumer-based definition of brand equity
and could identify which of their own products as well as which of their trade partners’
products held consumer-based brand equity: “One of the issues that we have is how many
commodity categories we're in, and for the most part consumers do not connect with the
brand that's on” [our products]. The consumer connection is the basis for consumerbased brand equity (CBBE), called customer-based brand equity by Keller (1993) and
defined as the differential effect of brand knowledge on consumer response to the
marketing activities of the brand. Keller emphasizes the importance of achieving
differential advantage and associating it with the brand, focusing on consumer behavior
as evidence of differential effect attributable to the brand. For Keller, the measure of
consumer-based brand equity is “reflected in perceptions, preferences, and behavior
related to all aspects of the marketing of a brand” (p. 45).
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Brand knowledge, the central concept of CBBE, is based on the associative
network model of memory (Collins and Loftus 1975; Raaijmakers and Schiffrin 1981)
that represents memory as a network of nodes and links. Nodes represent stored
information and associated links represent the strength of associations between the nodes.
Brand awareness and brand image are the two elements of brand knowledge. The
measure of brand equity using the CBBE framework is the assessment of what consumers
know about the brand discovered through tracking studies documenting the level of brand
awareness and the nature of brand image in terms of specific perceptions and evaluations.
Informants reported it is often CBBE that provides entrée for companies in their
relationships with downstream retail customers: “And if you have a brand… then at
least they (prospective customers) have a reason or a need to talk to you.” The
consumer brand also plays an important role for many firms maintaining relationships
with trade partners: “…because you have to have [our product brand]. It’s like in
laundry detergent, you have to carry Tide.” Recognizing the power of CBBE, many
retailers develop store brands in competition with their suppliers:
[A national retailer] believes that they have a better opportunity to
promote their brand [Store Brand] versus promoting the hundreds of
brands that they merchandise in their stores. They think they'll get more
bang for their buck there. They're looking to improve their margins and
also their brand recognition. [Brand Equity]
The battle for CBBE between manufacturers and retailers makes for some
tense supply chain relationships:
Do retailers care, or do they look at the financial well being [of their
trade partners]? They don’t. They just buy from people who do the most
for them and at the lowest price. And they always assume if they go out of
business, you know, I’ll just go somewhere else. That’s the assumption
unless you have a brand.
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Several firms in the study actually had two divisions - one that managed the firms’ brands
with consumers and the other that produced private-label store brands for national
retailers. Other manufacturers in the study assiduously avoided producing private label
brands, which they described as “the road to commoditization.” In one case, the firm
provided value-added services associated with their consumer brands in order to maintain
a presence in retail outlets heavily dominated by store brands: “We are always
positioning our brand against a customer who's going down the path of private label or
direct force, positioning the brand and how we support that brand within their
environment” [Value Added Services].
Manufacturers described the importance of developing consumer-based brand
equity to pull product through the supply chain by going directly to end-consumers to
build awareness of the brand: “We also do pull marketing sometimes where we’ll go
directly to an end user to create a pull that channels back through several distributors.”
Pull marketing works because downstream trade partners, such as distributors and
retailers, respond to brand equity built in consumer markets by their upstream suppliers
by choosing products because of their high levels of consumer-based brand equity.
An interesting twist on pull marketing was described by an upstream supplier who
leap-frogged customers to go to downstream organizational customers in the supply
chain: “We’re calling pull marketing going to the retailer with [product brand]
marketing that you see in trade magazines.” This manufacturer also had selling teams
that routinely called on retailers, bypassing finished goods manufacturers that were their
direct customers in order to create a pull for their products within the supply chain.
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While they found this to be an effective strategy, they realized the potential for conflict
with their customers:
It’s tough on our direct customers. They don’t like it. They don’t like
being told that they have to buy [our products] to supply their customers’
needs. But over the years they’ve gotten used to it and have finally
realized that we’re the ones spending the millions of dollars promoting
[the product], not them. And that their sales are guaranteed - they just
have to buy it from us. And it’s worked well.
Manufacturers recognized the need to have a strong value proposition associated
with the brand in order to use a pull marketing strategy:
It tends to be performance [products] that pull through because you can
go to the end-use customer [Consumer-Based Brand Equity] and say, “it
lasts four times longer, it will do this, it won’t do that, here are our
comparisons to the competition, we guarantee all these things
performance-based.” And normally our [products] are far superior in
performance and can demand pull through. And because I’m the only
one in the world that [produces this high-performance product], I do
have a brand. [Value Proposition]
The concept of a value proposition can be found in the literature on customer
value. Woodruff (1997) defines customer value as “a customer’s perceived preference
for and evaluation of those product attributes, attribute performances, and consequences
arising from use that facilitate (or block) achieving the customer’s goals and purposes in
use situations.” Brand equity is created when customers perceive the connection between
the brand and the value proposition thereby generating a differential effect in responses to
the marketing activities of the brand. Thus, the level of brand equity arises from both the
strength of the value proposition as well as the strength of the connection of the value
proposition with the brand. For example, customers who value reliable overnight
package delivery are likely to name FedEx as a brand strongly connected with that value
proposition. Other brands, such as Airborne Express and UPS, offer the same value
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proposition of reliable overnight package delivery. However, they do not have levels of
brand equity equal to FedEx because their brands are not as strongly identified with the
value proposition. The next section provides more information about value propositions
associated with trade-based brand equity.

Trade-Based Brand Equity
While some firms have CBBE, all firms that have organizational trade partners
have some level of trade-based brand equity (TBBE), defined in this study as the
differential effect of the brand on the response of trade partners to marketing
activities of the firm. Logically, it makes sense that there must be a different source of
brand equity (i.e., trade partners in the supply chain) for firms that have no visibility in
consumer markets. For such firms, trade-based brand equity represents the totality of
their firms’ brand equity. Building TBBE appears to require offering a value proposition
responsive to the needs of organizational customers and associating that offer with the
name of the firm. While most studies of brand equity focus on equity built with
downstream customers or end consumers, an interesting finding in the qualitative study
was that informants described the effect of their firm’s brand equity on relationships not
only with downstream customers and end consumers, but also with upstream suppliers
(see Figure 2). In other words, trade-based brand equity is built with both upstream and
downstream trade partners. Brand equity in supplier relationships is briefly discussed
following reports from customers on trade-based brand equity.
As described in the previous section, having CBBE is often an important part of
the value proposition to trade partners, especially when the downstream customer is a
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retailer: “For us (supplier to national retailers), a brand name is very important”
[Consumer-Based Brand Equity]. In other cases, CBBE was not considered at all, as
illustrated earlier by the manager who said that most of their suppliers were unknown to
consumers. One manager realized that his firm’s CBBE was an important selling point
for trade partners: “Your branded products become a part of your value proposition”
[Trade-Based Brand Equity].
Descriptions of trade-based brand equity can be grouped into four categories:
corporate reputation, product quality, service quality, and relationship quality. The first
category of responses describes corporate reputation and relates to the differential effect
of associating a firm’s name with their products:
The name [of our company] today means everything in [our] industry
[Corporate Reputation]…. [We are] not known as the low price person
out there. If they want to buy on price alone, they’re coming to the wrong
place. We get a good price for our [products], but we also supply the best
quality [along with] value-added [services] [Value Proposition]. So that
plays a big part in making a sale [Differential Effect] with the customer.
In this example, the informant was describing the positive effect of associating the firm’s
name with the value proposition of high quality products and value-added services. The
name of the company “plays a big part in making a sale.”
Informants described three aspects of corporate reputation: trustworthiness,
stability, and business philosophy. Relationships with firms that were known to be
trustworthy were highly valued: “We deal with people that are trustworthy.”
Trustworthiness was described as those companies who were known to follow through on
commitments: “You said you were going to do this and this is what you did. Your
actions show that you’re trustworthy.” In a less elegant report, an informant further
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described trustworthiness as knowing that a trade partner is “not going to screw us.”
Related to trustworthiness, informants also reported the importance of working
with suppliers with reputations as “solid citizen vendors that have been around a long
time” [Stability]. This implies some minimum longevity in the trade in order to become
“known.” It also assumes some level of financial stability to support follow-through even
when a business proposition turns out to be not as profitable as planned. A supply chain
manager with 40 years’ experience in the industry summed it up: “The only way to have
a good relationship with [a vendor] is to be honest. I’m serious - I’ve been in it long
enough to know that.”
Finally, informants reported business philosophy to be an important element of
corporate reputation: “So, there are certainly customers that are philosophically more
aligned with our organization than others. So, therefore, you tend to have a better
relationship with some than others” [Business Philosophy]. Some companies hold
stronger views about the value of relationships to the firm: “Not all customers are willing
to collaborate in that kind of degree.”
However, associating the firm’s name with the offer is not always positive.
Depending on the quality of interactions with trade partners, firms may enjoy positive or
negative trade-based brand equity. One manager acknowledged that while his firm has
built a strong consumer brand (i.e., positive CBBE), they have a reputation in the trade as
being difficult to deal with, resulting in negative TBBE: “I think people know
historically that this a pretty leading edge retailer. And, sometimes we're also known to
be very difficult to work with” [Corporate Reputation]. The manager acknowledged that
this has been a problem for his firm’s profitability, which he described as cost
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inefficiencies in the supply chain: “We historically have been very cost inefficient in how
we have run our supply chain… The whole concept of branding has really led us to think
very differently about supply base and supply chain.” This manager went on to explain
that they are now investing in building stronger relationships with suppliers in order to
assure consistent quality and reliability from their supply base.
All managers in the study acknowledged that product quality is fundamental to
building brand equity with trade partners: “The first thing I look for is the quality of the
product that we’re getting from the supplier.” As firms experiment with expanding their
supply networks overseas, product quality is an important issue: “Quality is a major issue
with [our suppliers]. You can get some really terrible things out of Mexico, but they are
very cheap, but you can’t [use] them.” This was echoed by a manufacturer in another
industry: “There are certain grades of product … that have a standard that is subject to
very high rigorous standards.” Product quality is never taken for granted. New
suppliers are examined “with a fine tooth comb” and existing suppliers must continue to
meet rigorous quality standards. Reporting on declining product quality coming from a
long-time, major supplier, a supply chain manager reported: “I mean you didn’t have to
worry about product lines. They were all just super; the missed specs, we just didn’t
worry about bad quality. Today it’s just the reverse of that.”
Informants also portrayed service quality as an important element of trade-based
brand equity. Service quality was described as having three dimensions: service levels,
value-added services, and responsiveness. Service levels involved the traditional
measures of service quality - on-time, complete delivery of orders. A manager with
several decades of experience in his industry commented: “But today it’s much different.
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I’ve seen a completely different attitude, I think, in the relationship between the supplier
and us, by a prominent supplier. They really do want your business, and they want to
meet every request, and meet it on time, if that makes any sense to you.” High service
quality was attributed to suppliers who work “to make everything come in on time or get
on time deliveries. They really work with you like you wouldn’t believe.” Service quality
also includes the way in which the product arrives at the customer’s site. Services that
make the product ready to use - such as unloading, bar-coding, and palletizing parts - are
important to customers. Reporting on shipping requirements for a major customer, a
supply chain manager commented: “Frankly, they have huge shipping requirements on
how we palletize. All that stuff is probably hard for a small supplier to do.”
The second dimension of service quality is providing value-added services, such
as cooperative advertising and technical support. In one case, the benefit of value-added
services received from a supplier was passed along to downstream customers: “And we
paid our customer half of his advertising in marketing expenses. And [our supplier] paid
us half of what we paid them.” Vendors also often provided technical expertise to
downstream customers such as design and engineering consultation with manufacturers
or on-site representatives to assist with promotions for retail customers: “We tended to
be with one major supplier just because they provided some marketing support, some
technical support and those kind of things.” However, customers recognize that valueadded services often mean higher pricing: “Over time it became not as worth the money
that it used to be, and there was some much lower priced items out there.”
The third dimension of service quality, described as a critical characteristic, was
responsiveness to changing customer needs. Supplier responsiveness was described as
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“jumping through hoops” and “scrambling to make things happen.” Responsiveness
involved timely reactions to customer requests: “They [a manufacturer] could do a lot of
things; make a lot of quick decisions that these other companies probably wouldn’t do.
And people like to do business with them.” Describing a supplier, one informant talked
about the impact of a supplier’s responsiveness on their own value proposition to
downstream customers: “They are [producing my raw material] ahead of time in order
to get me a two week turnaround (in my production process).” A retail buyer rated
responsiveness as the most important characteristic of good service quality:
The biggest thing would be people that we could call if we had to scale up
incredibly fast above some forecast that we had given them, or was able to
push up a delivery. Also could accommodate us if we needed to cut
orders in half and, you know, and to do that pretty easily and sometimes
do that minimum effect on cost and those kind of things [Responsiveness].
Another key dimension of trade-based brand equity is relationship quality. The
most common description of relationship quality can be described as working together for
mutual gain: “We brainstorm ideas to build the business that are beneficial for both of
us, not just them, but how can it benefit [my company].” Nearly every manager in the
study recognized the importance of having trade partners who help improve the bottom
lines of their operations: “They make more money; hopefully, we make more money.”
Another informant described this as engaging in “win/win” propositions with suppliers.
Informants described working for mutual gain as having suppliers who not only know
their business, but also care about their success.
Developing win/win propositions requires suppliers to have an understanding of
what drives profitability for trade partners. Asked to describe the characteristics of a
good trade partner, one retailer said: “So on their end, they (suppliers) should know our
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business just as much, just as good, or better than us.” Knowing the customer’s
business provides insight into ways to help trade partners reduce costs, thereby adding to
profitability and building TBBE: “You don't survive in this marketplace for the most part
any more if you're a single line entity. So if we were out there [in just one product
category], it's difficult to get the time and the mind share that the guys who can walk in
with four or five different categories. So [our company] is one of those mega
manufacturers with something like 50 different product lines.” Carrying multiple product
lines reduces costs for customers by minimizing the number of suppliers they deal with:
“You can have a one order, one invoice. It’s cheaper to place the order to [one
supplier] than to have two suppliers.” Understanding the drivers of customer
profitability were reported by an informant to be a key part of working toward mutual
gain:
We use a term called category management, and we think that that's a
value we bring to the customer, that is, either in a catalog or in a retail
setting. It's a combination of the product assortment, how the product is
arranged - either on the shelf or on a catalog page - how it’s priced, how
it’s packaged, how it’s signed and identified [Value Proposition]. And we
drive customer profitability [Know my Business] with those activities.
They make more money; hopefully, we make more money [Mutual Gain].
Informants also talked about the importance of doing business with companies
that care about their success: “If you’re known as an industry leader and known to really
care about trying to help your customers [Taking Care], I think that’s the key to
growing our business and helping customers grow their businesses” [Mutual Gain].
The final dimension of relationship quality was related by informants to the role of the
salesperson: “Their (the supplier’s) rep, you know, stays in contact, and has a very
good relationship with you, and is honest, and jumps through hoops when they can
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[Role of the Salesperson].” The salesperson is the primary interface with the customer
and, as such, is a key communicator of the firm’s brand. A manufacturer confirmed this:
“[Salespeople] are the ones that are going to be communicating that (what the company
stands for).” Recognizing the importance of staying in contact, many firms co-locate
salespeople near the offices of key customers: “A lot of our sales people work out of
their homes and are located right at the, you know, in the same town as our customers.”
In many cases, suppliers co-located staff near or at the customer’s site in order to assure
effective, ongoing communication:
I think my best relationship is with one company, and I think it just goes to
who manages the account, and how involved they are in the account. I
probably talk to this one person two to three times a day.
An interesting finding in this study is the link that informants described between
brand equity and upstream trade partners. Brand equity in the supply chain is not only
important in relationships with downstream customers, it also plays an important role in
securing scarce resources from upstream vendors: “The Gaps of the world, the
department stores of the world, they're all basically trying to source in the same location
whether it's China, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, wherever.” Manufacturers reported that
suppliers want to be a part of the supply network of companies with strong brand equity:
“Everybody wants to do business with us.”
In summary, consumer-based brand equity and trade-based brand equity are two
distinct constructs that together comprise the brand equity of the firm. Firms may or may
not have consumer-based brand equity; all firms with trade partners have some level of
trade-based brand equity. The brand equity of the firm is a function of the levels of
consumer-based brand equity and trade-based brand equity.
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H2: Both trade-based brand equity and consumer-based brand equity are
dimensions of brand equity.
The Moderating Effect of Brand Equity
Informants reported differences in perceived risk attributed to the level of brand
equity held by their trade partners. The differences they reported appeared to be related
to changes in the relationships between the antecedents of perceived risk – uncertainty,
dependence and power – and perceived risk. That is, the trade partner’s level of brand
equity moderated the relationships between the antecedents of perceived risk and
perceived risk. Hypotheses are offered at the end of each section following a description
demonstrating the moderating effect of brand equity on each of these relationships.
H3: Brand equity held by a trade partner moderates the relationships
between perceived risk and its antecedents.
Uncertainty and Perceived Risk. Doing business with a company with a national
brand (i.e., high brand equity) made uncertainty less of an issue. As one retailer
described it: “National brand [vendors], you kind of assume that they are going to
manage their own business.” These vendors need less monitoring because it is assumed
their deliveries will be on time and high quality. The high brand equity of the firm was
equated with a solid base of resources that made doing business with them less risky:
“[A national brand] is a huge company in America. They have the resources - the IT
capabilities and human resources - to manage a vendor program versus a smaller
company. Let me think of somebody – maybe [a less well-known brand]. They are still a
pretty big company, but nothing like [the national brand].”
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On the other hand, doing business with vendors with low trade-based brand equity
increased the importance of uncertainty:
To give you an example, I had a supplier in here for a meeting, and the
goods were supposed to have shipped. I received a message from our Far
East office in e-mail. Some of the goods didn’t ship. They were late. So I
took the e-mail and put it in my folder and went into the meeting with the
manufacturer, and I said, “You’re late.” “No, no, we’re not late.” I
said, “You are late.” I mean he argued with me for five minutes. So the
integrity - you just have to always be careful of the integrity issues
[Trustworthiness].
In this example, the low brand equity of the supplier made uncertainty a more
important element in the perceived risk to the firm. These examples illustrate the
moderating effect of the level of brand equity on the relationship between
uncertainty and perceived risk.
H3a: Increased brand equity weakens the relationship between uncertainty
and perceived risk.
Dependence and Perceived Risk. High brand equity was described as
strengthening the relationship between dependence and perceived risk by limiting the
perceived availability of alternatives. In some cases, high brand equity led to market
dominance that created dependencies by assuring high volumes of trade:
We have two-thirds of the market share. So, that allows us the power and
the retail footprint to be able to [have a definite presence] in every
customer because you have to have [our products]. So, in that category
we have that kind of dominance. In other categories, we don’t, but
because of our complete portfolio, sometimes the brand will allow us to
enter into other categories that are not number one or two.
In other cases, high brand equity supported by CBBE limited substitutability of
alternative products: “Something like Levi, that’s it. Levi’s is Levi’s – you can’t
substitute anything else.”
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On the other hand, low brand equity derived from TBBE was related with
decreasing importance of dependence to perceived risk. A supply chain manager
reported a deteriorating relationship with a long-standing vendor whose quality
had reduced significantly recently: “Unfortunately [this supplier] makes some
products that you can’t find anyplace else. It makes it doubly tough. If [this
supplier] didn’t exist, then you’d have to leave that product line all together and
just try to come back with some newer type product line.” These examples
portray a direct relationship between changes in the levels of dependence and
perceived risk depending on the level of brand equity.
H3b: Increased brand equity strengthens the relationship between
dependence and perceived risk.
Power and Perceived Risk. The level of brand equity was reported to affect the
importance of power to perceived risk. As one retailer described it: “I guess you don’t
have leverage - the negotiation skills aren’t as important when you buy a national brand
versus a private label product.” Dealing with vendors with high brand equity was
reported to be quite different from those with low brand equity:
Yes, there are different conversations when you discuss [a national
brand] because they dictate to you what the price is, they dictate to you
when the product goes on sale, and what the sale prices are. I don’t have
leverage with them…you have to go by their rules.
The examples given previously to illustrate power as antecedent to perceived risk also
provide evidence of the moderating effect of brand equity on the relationship between
power and perceived risk. Two managers reported the effect of international store brands
(i.e., Sears and Wal-Mart) that increased the importance of power to perceived risk.
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While some level of power can be attributed to the retailer’s position in the supply chain,
these examples are evidence of the tremendous power exerted by retailers with
international brands.
H3c: Increased brand equity strengthens the relationship between power
and perceived risk.
In summary, changes in the trade partner’s level of brand equity change the level
of perceived risk by moderating the relationships between the antecedents of perceived
risk and perceived risk. Although the importance of uncertainty is reduced as brand
equity increases, the importance of dependence and power are increased, thereby raising
the level of perceived risk. The most direct way to manage perceived risk is to manage
the sources of perceived risk - uncertainty, dependence, and power - by establishing
interfirm linkages in order to coordinate behaviors among trade partners. The next
section explores the link between perceived risk and relationship management.

Relationship Management
Managers described varying levels of commitment (see Figure 8) to relationships
with trade partners: “I work with 357 suppliers, and out of that [there are] probably
about 60 suppliers that I'm real close with” [Relationship Distance]. The range of
relationship distance associated with levels of commitment was reported to be quite wide.
At the high distance end of the spectrum, some engagements were described as minimal,
“for a single season,” while relationships involving high levels of commitment were
typically low distance relationships involving investments made over decades: “For
many, many, many years we’ve probably bought 80 percent of all of our raw material
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from one company. And there’s forty years of history there” [Relationship
Commitment]. Informants often cited the 80/20 rule; that is, 20 percent of trade partners
account for 80 percent of supply on the supply side and revenue on the customer side.
Informants frequently described committed relationships as partnerships: “They
are here with us all the time. I mean it is definitely a partnership.” Asked to say more
about what the word “partnership” means, an informant replied: “A true partnership is a
win/win. True partnership is where you work together [Cooperation] and you develop a
product, and they make money and you make money” [Mutual Gain]. The idea of equal
levels of risk and reward was a consistent theme: “I think of there are equally shared
risks and rewards.” Another manager described it as working “as if we are not two
companies. We approach it as if we are one.”
Committed relationships were reported to require significant investments. These
relationships were consistently portrayed as those with high investment of time devoted
to interaction, described as “continuous interaction” rather than “a one-way download to
somebody” found in less committed relationships. The willingness to pay a higher price
was associated with relationship commitment: “We have said we’re going to pay a little
bit more because we want to be with a strong player, we want to be with a good
partner.” Firms were also willing to restrict the number of alternative trade partners in
favor of stronger commitments: “We moved primarily to sole-sourced product where it
makes sense.”
Relationship commitment can be defined as the strength of the intention to
develop and maintain a stable, long-term relationship (Anderson and Weitz 1992).
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Why do firms make commitments to interorganizational relationships? The literature
suggests, “It begins when members of a firm perceive a need and have a motive to form
an exchange relationship” (Frazier 1983). This could involve replacing a current
exchange partner, adding a new exchange partner in anticipation of increased volumes or
profit margins, or starting a new business or going into a new geographical region where
no exchange relationships currently exist. When the firm’s need is “intense enough,” it
initiates a search for exchange partners, gathering general information on benefits of
association with potential partners. This information is used to form the evoked set - the
alternatives the firm sees as potentially acceptable and about whom additional
information will be collected (Howard and Sheth 1969). From this information, the firm
forms beliefs of the expected intrinsic and extrinsic rewards that will be received over
time (Bagozzi 1975; Etgar 1976; Sheth 1973). Extrinsic rewards include increases in
market share, sales volume, and profits. Intrinsic rewards include the psychological
pleasure received from entering and managing an exchange relationship as well as
gaining approval and status within the industry.
The firm will choose the alternative that offers the highest level of valued rewards
at acceptable investment and risk levels (Anderson 1982; Van Horne 1980). Once a
choice is made, the firm engages in bargaining on the specific conditions of the exchange
relationship. If the target also decides the focal firm is a desirable partner, an interfirm
exchange agreement is formed (Bagozzi 1975). Each firm assumes a role, which carries
specific role expectations (Stern and El-Ansary 1992) that are highly related to expected
rewards (Frazier 1983).
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Morgan and Hunt (1994) examined two key constructs - commitment and trust associated with effective cooperation required for relationship management. They
conceptualized commitment and trust as key mediating variables between a set of
antecedent conditions and outcomes necessary for effective relationship marketing.
Among the antecedent conditions they tested were shared values, communication,
relationship benefits, and relationship termination costs. They examined cooperation,
acquiescence, and reduced propensity to leave as outcomes related to commitment, and
cooperation, functional conflict, and reduced uncertainty as outcomes related to trust.
They found both trust and commitment mediate cooperative behavior; however, they
found trust has the stronger effect on cooperation.

Relationship Commitment and Perceived Risk
Informants discussed managing relationships with trade partners in response to
handling perceived risk to firm profitability. Specifically, they talked about managing the
antecedents - uncertainty, dependence, and power - in order to affect the outcome,
perceived risk.
Reducing Uncertainty. Managers talked about the importance of reducing
uncertainty by engaging in relationships with suppliers who are trustworthy, described as
those who “meet their commitments” and are “always on time.” Although this may
seem like a fundamental premise of doing business, managers were plagued with
suppliers who failed to deliver as promised, contributing to uncertainty in resource
acquisition:
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And there are others (suppliers) that tell you one thing and do another.
They'll say, we're going to keep this much in reserve stock, and they put it
on paper. And then ten months later we find out, oh, their replenishment
days went up by a week. And what's going on? Well, we took you off a
loom. Well, you didn't tell us that, why didn't you tell us you took us off a
loom?
While managers valued relationships with suppliers who were trustworthy, they
especially prized those that were also flexible and responsive to their changing needs, that
is, the supplier who “jumps through hoops when they can.” Supplier responsiveness
allowed them to cope with uncertainty in their markets by selecting trade partners who
could “scale up incredibly fast” to meet unforecast demand.
Managing Dependence. Managers frequently talked about the need to manage
dependence with trade partners. On one hand, they described strategies to become
“important” to their trade partners by placing larger volumes of business with them. As
mentioned previously, the volume of exchange was consistently cited as a factor for
determining the need to establish a closer relationship: “The volume of business is going
to drive my time. I'm not going to worry about the little supplier that shipped ten
shipments or twenty shipments to the company, because it's not worth my time.” To
achieve higher volumes with key suppliers and, therefore, become more important to
them, firms concentrated resource acquisition in fewer suppliers: “You may drop
suppliers if your supplier base is too broad. You need to consolidate your supplier
base.” At the same time, they realized there is a threshold beyond which a supplier can
become too dominant and will “pretty much own you.”
Dependence was determined not only by volume, but also by contribution to
strategic goals: “We have to stay focused on a smaller group of strategic suppliers than
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having a large group of non-strategic suppliers.” Customers were more dependent on
suppliers who provide products or services that support customers’ strategic objectives:
We tend to operate in the fashion spectrum, and by definition it means
you’re working in partnership with certain key suppliers. The
partnership is driven from the fact that, not being vertical, we really have
to rely on them (suppliers) for creativity, for uniqueness, and to make sure
that they come to [us] when they have something special and something
unique.
Recognizing this, suppliers attempt to build dependence by offering “a lot of value added
services to the customer that will help them to grow. [We] create partnerships with
them. I think that’s the key to growing our business - helping customers grow their
business.”
Firms were motivated to make higher levels of commitment in order to achieve
strategic goals: “And real brands have strategic supplier type relationships that produce
the kind of quality product you want when you want it.” This comment about “real
brands” was interesting. The company restructured around brand management after
achieving high levels of success with a particular product. Management subsequently
chose to develop closer relationships with suppliers as a strategic initiative aimed at
building and maintaining brand leadership:
We can't be a fly-by-night, go find a factory every time we want to produce
something like we did in the old days when we shopped Europe, got a
sample, brought it home, sent it over, knocked it off, produced it, and
threw it in the stores. So, I think our suppliers definitely see us more as
brands today and, as a result we act more like brands, which is, you have
to have total end-to-end strategic relationships.
Balancing Power. Managers were aware of the need to monitor the balance
between dependence, created by forging close relationships, with power: “You don't
want to put all your eggs in one basket. Basically when somebody gets that big, they
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pretty much own you.” Once a supplier reaches a certain threshold, it becomes difficult
to switch to alternative sources of supply. Asked what would happen if a key customer
were to switch suppliers, one manager said, “They’ve tried over and over and over, but
they haven’t succeeded. That one style they buy from us is [thousands of] SKU’s for
them, which is unbelievable.”
While customers are trying to avoid situations in which suppliers have power over
them, suppliers are actively seeking to build dependence in order to gain more power: “I
mean giving zillions of people just a little bit doesn’t make you important. We have a
goal to try to be important [to our customers]. And so we do restrict somewhat the
people with whom we work.” In this situation, the supplier prefers to be more important
to a few customers than to have a large customer base.
In summary, firms in this study reported forming closer relationships with trade
partners in order to handle perceived risk by managing the antecedents to perceived risk reducing uncertainty, managing dependence, and balancing power.
H4: Increased perceived risk increases relationship commitment.

Outcomes of Relationship Commitment
Understanding the outcomes of relationship commitment is important to gaining
insight into the potential gains for managers who invest in managing the brand in the
supply chain. Informants in this study reported three important outcomes of higher levels
of relationship commitment: increased cooperation, decreased propensity to leave the
relationship, and forbearance.
Cooperation. Managers talked about their joint responsibility for assuring the
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well-being of trade partners: “If they do something inappropriate or something doesn’t
go right, they could be out of business. And so we have to make sure because we’re trade
partners with them that we also help them along.” Assuring equitable dealings was a
key element of cooperative behavior: “We want to be fair and just to our suppliers as
they want to be with us.” Recognizing the importance of sharing information with
suppliers, customers often talked about their information-sharing practices: “We have
also given our manufacturer (with a corporate brand) the fifty-two weeks [sales forecast]
and what we think we are going to sell on this (product).” By having information about
future demand, suppliers can optimize their operations by balancing production lines to
avoid down-time or overtime and by securing volume discounts from suppliers by
ordering larger quantities. Given the complexity of many supply networks, information
sharing is often a critical component of assuring the accomplishment of goals:
Let's say [our vendor] gets their [raw materials] from thirteen different
sources around the world. And let's say they're running a forty two
percent gain for the year. You can imagine the collaborative efforts that
have to go on behind the scenes between us and them and their third party
suppliers, in order to make all this happen. And a lot of these suppliers
don't want to reserve stock above what's in production. They want to run
real lean and mean.
A manufacturer discussed his awareness of the effect of his firms’ actions on customer
profitability: “One organization cannot succeed without the input and cooperation of the
other. So, for example, how we market [our market-leading product brand] will affect
the sales at our customers’ retail points.” A buyer described cooperation with a supplier:
I think that if you were in a situation where you needed something you
could call and say, you know, this is the situation I’m in. You can be
honest. And there could be some flexibility without penalty like if I could
move this, trade this, push this out, pull this in, without someone saying, I
know I can’t do it, or I will but, you know, it’s going on your record, you
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know. I mean, you know, wanting to do it for you as much as you need it
done.
The correlation between relationship commitment and cooperation is the
centerpiece of the seminal study by Morgan and Hunt (1994). Their work provided
evidence that relationship commitment is a key mediating variable to cooperative
behavior in relationship management. Borrowing from Anderson and Narus (1991), they
defined cooperation as the degree to which the buying firm works with the supplier
to achieve mutual goals. This definition was adopted for this study.
H5: Increased relationship commitment increases cooperation.

Propensity to Leave. Informants affirmed their intentions to stay in relationships
by limiting search behaviors when faced with situations that might require dealing with
new suppliers. For example, if a new supplier were to offer a lower price than the current
supplier, one manager said they would first give the current supplier the opportunity to
match the offer from the new supplier in order to remain important to that supplier. This
requires being very open with suppliers: “Tell him everything really that’s going on and
why you’re changing and see if he can meet the price.”
This can become important when the customer suddenly needs a responsive trade
partner: “[If demand suddenly increased], we would stick with our strategic sourcing
group, those that we are building those relationships with, and we would work with them
to try and up-size our product as fast as we possibly can.” Suppliers recognized the
advantage gained by taking care of committed partners:
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If it’s handled properly and all the deliveries are met on time, then the
customer’s happy about repeat business with us. If they have a good
situation and a good relationship and everything is flowing smoothly,
that’s a big incentive to want to keep doing business with a company that
can supply your needs.
Propensity to leave is one of the outcomes shown to be strongly correlated with
relationship commitment (Morgan and Hunt 1994). They define propensity to leave as
the likelihood the buying firm will leave the relationship in the near future. However,
their definition appears to be tautological with the definition of relationship commitment
adopted in this study (i.e., the intention to form a stable, long-term relationship). In this
study, propensity to leave was operationalized as the behavioral outcome of the
relationship commitment intention; hence, propensity to leave is the degree to which
the firm is actively searching for alternative trade partners.
H6: Increased relationship commitment decreases propensity to leave.

Forbearance. Several informants described situations in which they either
extended or were the recipients of forbearance from their trade partners. Forbearance is
defined as the degree of leniency extended to a trade partner in meeting the terms of
the relationship. A supplier was aware that relationship commitment built on the basis
of his firm’s consumer brands yielded leniency in meeting customer requirements: “If
you have a strong brand and you can get a little more leniency as you can’t throw out
[our brands] out of the catalog right away. You will over time if you can’t fulfill the
product, but you get a few more breaks.” Another informant described it this way:
“You can stumble for a little while and then get back up, and they (customers) are more
lenient. If you’re the number five in the category and you’re tripping over yourself,
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you’re likely to get replaced in the next plan or catalog review.”
Describing an incident in which a major supplier failed to meet a significant
delivery date, a retail buyer said: “Stuff happens. That vendor happens to generate 60%
of my volume… But you’re certainly not going to drop your number one supplier
because of this [failure to deliver an order].” A manufacturer was aware of leniency
with suppliers with whom they had committed relationships: “I know that some of them because of their longevity of performance and just everything they’ve done [for us] - they
bypass some compliance issues.”
H7: Increased relationship commitment increases forbearance.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature offers additional insights into the central phenomenon of this study,
brand equity in the supply chain. This review is not intended to be exhaustive; rather, it
was used to enhance the researcher’s sensitivity to the properties and dimensions of the
phenomenon and to answer questions raised by the research findings. Specifically, the
literature review examines findings in three literatures: brand equity, interorganizational
exchange, and relationship management. The literature review was driven by two
questions relevant to the qualitative study: What is the meaning of brand equity in supply
chain relationships? What is the effect of brand equity on interorganizational exchange?

Brand Equity
While branding has played a role in commercial trade for centuries, it was during
the twentieth century that brand management rose to prominence in building competitive
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advantage (Aaker 1991). As noted by Low and Fullerton (1994) in their examination of
the evolution of the brand manager system, the introduction and adoption of the
marketing concept in the 1950s can be viewed as the beginning of the second “Golden
Age” of brands. Fueled by the economic boom following World War II, “an explosion of
new products, soaring demand for national brands, and the impact of television
advertising increased the importance of brands” (p. 181). Anthropologist John Sherry
(1987) described the prevalence of brands in 20th century America as living in a rich
“brandscape.” The proliferation of brands in this new era means, “increased competition
for the customer’s mind as well as for access to the distribution channel” (Aaker 1991, p.
8).
The successful brand not only distinguishes the company’s products, but also
influences preferences that favor the brand’s bases of differentiation (Aaker 1991),
resulting in competitive advantage attributable to the brand. It is this incremental value
endowed by the brand that is the central phenomenon in the study of brand equity.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of brand equity received considerable attention
in academic research and has been explored from both the firm’s and the consumer’s
viewpoints.
Brand equity is typically defined in financial terms as the revenue earned by the
seller beyond the physical assets associated with the production of the branded product
(see Table 1). An alternative valuation measures the price premium a customer is willing
to pay compared to an identical unbranded product. Keller (1993) examined the concept
of brand equity at a deeper level when he defined it as the “differential effect”
attributable to the brand, opening the door for consideration of behavioral differences that
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drive financial gains. This broader, behavior-based conceptualization of brand equity fits
well with the reports of informants in this study. The following review of
conceptualizations of brand equity illustrates the challenges faced by brand managers
when they attempt to devise strategies to build brand equity.
Farquhar (1989) offers a broad definition of brand equity that is often cited in
subsequent scholarly work. He defines brand equity from the seller’s point of view as
“the added value with which a given brand endows a product” (p. 7). While this
definition could be construed to apply to either the value added to the seller or the value
perceived by the customer, Farquhar clearly states that the measure of brand equity
should be the incremental cash flow that accrues to the seller from associating the brand
with the product. He briefly mentions the consumer’s perspective on brands, reflected as
the increase in attitude strength for a product; however, he notes that his measure of
brand equity as incremental cash flows to the firm is preferred “because attitude strength
is a major determinant of product purchase behavior” (p. 8).
Aaker (1991) defines brand equity as “a set of brand assets and liabilities linked to
a brand, its name and symbol that add to or subtract from the value provided by a product
or service to a firm and/or to that firm’s customers” (p. 15). While he includes the
customer’s perception of value in his definition of brand equity, the five categories of
assets he defines as comprising brand equity are a mix of measures from the customer’s
and the seller’s viewpoints: 1) brand loyalty, 2) brand awareness, 3) perceived quality, 4)
brand associations, and 5) other proprietary assets. Based on these categories, Aaker
proposes a set of management guidelines for measuring and managing brand equity by
benchmarking and monitoring each type of brand asset.
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According to Keller, the advantage of his CBBE concept over Aaker’s
conceptualization of brand equity is that the CBBE framework “is based on a more
detailed and fully articulated conceptual foundation” that provides brand managers with a
better understanding of how to build and manage brand equity (Keller 1998; p. 625).
Like Aaker, Keller’s concept of brand knowledge includes brand awareness as an
important component in building brand equity. However, Keller incorporates Aaker’s
other assets - brand associations, perceived quality, and brand loyalty (which Keller calls
brand attitude) - into the higher-order concept of brand image. Thus, brand awareness
and brand image are the two elements of brand knowledge, the central construct in the
CBBE theory. The measure of brand equity using the CBBE framework is the
assessment of what consumers know about the brand discovered through tracking studies
documenting the level of brand awareness and the nature of brand image in terms of
specific perceptions and evaluations.
Taking a financial perspective, deChernatony and McDonald (1998) regard brand
equity as the incremental cash flow resulting from the brand name. They define brand
equity as “the differential attributes underpinning a brand which give increased value to
the firm’s balance sheet” (p. 397), proposing that the key to evaluating brand equity is to
understand the brand’s level of differentiation from competitors’ offers by assessing
relative attributes of the brand as a measure of the brand’s strength. Drawing on Keller’s
(1993) and Aaker’s (1996) work, they propose six core components of brand attribute
evaluation: 1) brand awareness, 2) brand image, 3) perceived quality, 4) perceived value,
5) personality, and 6) organizational associations. The relative evaluations of the brand’s
attributes affect the strength of the brand, which, in turn, is reflected in the financial value
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- the brand equity - of the brand.
Several authors have tackled the problem of estimating the financial value of
branded products. Srinivasan (1979) examined “brand-specific effects,” defined as the
component of overall preference not explained by objectively measured attributes. He
measured these effects by comparing actual choice behavior with choices implied by
utilities derived from conjoint analysis of product attributes without associated brand
names. Simon and Sullivan (1993) estimated brand equity as the incremental cash flows
resulting from the seller’s investment in brands. Swait and colleagues (1993) proposed
brand equity as the monetary equivalent of the total utility a consumer attaches to a
brand, departing from the notion of estimating added value to arrive at brand equity.
Park and Srinivasan (1994) define brand equity as “the incremental preference endowed
by the brand to the product as perceived by an individual consumer” (p. 273). They used
a survey methodology for measuring the monetary value of brand equity at the individual
consumer level while simultaneously capturing the sources of brand equity. An
interesting finding in the product categories examined in their study (toothpaste and
mouthwash) was that brand associations unrelated to product attributes (i.e., attributable
to the brand name) were more important than favorably biased product attribute
associations in determining a brand’s equity.
The focus of the body of literature on brand equity has overwhelmingly been in
the consumer context. However, several authors cited above refer to the importance of
channel or trade relationships to brand equity in their work, and there are a handful of
authors who have contributed conceptual insights and empirical research to
understanding the meaning of brand equity in interorganizational exchange.
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Brand Equity in Interorganizational Exchange
Levitt (1980) is perhaps the earliest author to consider the role of brands in
interorganizational exchange in his exploration of the potential for pursuing marketing
strategies based on differentiation of industrial goods. Levitt noted that when a product is
marginally differentiable, sales power shifts from what he calls the “generic” product to
the intangibles of the offered product. Levitt (p. 83) cites the following example to
illustrate his point:
On the commodities exchanges, for example, dealers in metals, grains,
and pork bellies trade in totally undifferentiated generic products. But
what they ‘sell’ is the claimed distinction of their execution -- the
efficiency of their transactions in their clients’ behalf, their responsiveness
to inquiries, the clarity and speed of their confirmations, and the like. In
short, the offered product is differentiated, though the generic product is
identical.
He observed that the usual assumption about so-called undifferentiated
commodities is that they are extremely price sensitive; therefore, harder personal selling,
intensified advertising, and more or better services are often the responses to potentially
devastating price wars. Levitt advises firms to consider taking advantage of the
opportunity to introduce brand management into the marketing process for industrial
goods, “especially those that offer generically undifferentiated products and services, to
escape the commodity trap” (p. 91).
One of the more extensive discussions of brands in interorganizational exchange
is offered by deChernatony and McDonald (1998), who devote an entire chapter of their
book on building brands to brands in the business-to-business setting. They note that
although trade advertising often focuses on product functionality and quality,
organizational buyers are also susceptible to emotional motivations for choosing branded
87

products. They conclude that while there are differences between consumer and
organizational markets, brand managers can fine-tune techniques used in consumer
marketing and adapt them to the organizational buying situation. Specifically, they
advise paying attention to the composition of the organization’s buying center and the
decision-making process used for choosing a product.
Although Aaker (1991) includes channel relationships in his concept of
proprietary brand assets, one of his five dimensions of brand equity, he does not discuss
the role of brand equity in interorganizational exchange. He notes that strong channel
relationships may contribute to consumer brand equity by assuring adequate distribution
by wholesalers and providing advantages in terms of display space at retail. Aaker
suggests that brand equity built in consumer markets can provide leverage in distribution
channels by reducing uncertainty on the part of trade partners; however, he does not
expand on this idea.
While Keller (1998) observes that “retailers have to be treated as if they were
‘customers’ too” (p. 193), he allocates only six pages to the discussion of
interorganizational exchange in his 650-page textbook on managing brand equity. Like
Aaker, Keller acknowledges that consumer-based brand equity can affect channel
relationships. He, too, notes that the opposite relationship holds: channel relationships
may have an effect on consumer brand equity: “By the actions they take, retailers can
enhance or detract from brand equity” (p. 192).
In his brief discussion of industrial product brands, Keller notes that companies
selling industrial goods “are more likely to emphasize corporate or family brands” (Keller
1998; p. 603) due to the complexity of the product mix and the manner in which they are
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sold. He acknowledges that marketing programs aimed at building brand equity for
industrial goods “can be different from consumer goods in that, given the nature of the
organizational buying process, product-related associations may play a relatively more
important role as compared to non-product related associations” (Keller 1998; p. 605).
This seems to conflict with his guidelines for building brand equity for industrial
products which advises focusing on non-product attributes such as company credibility,
company image, and prestige associated with being a customer of the firm.
A handful of papers represent the empirical research in the area of brands in
interorganizational exchange. Sinclair and Seward (1988) explored the effectiveness of
branding structured wood panels. In a two-phase study, they gathered data both from
manufacturers and their organizational customers, building material retailers. They
concluded that manufacturers tended to overestimate the effectiveness of their branding
strategies directed at retailers. Although most products offered in this category are
branded, retailers identified price and availability as the two most important
considerations in their purchase decisions. However, the authors note that a few
producers were able to achieve strong brand recognition and brand preference with their
retail trade partners, “even to the point that customers (i.e., retailers) were willing to pay
a premium price” in order to stock the product in their stores (p. 35). Although they
offered this observation in their summary, the authors did not explore the differences in
brand strategies between these successful companies and the companies that were not
successful.
Shipley and Howard (1993) examined branding practices for a range of industrial
products in the United Kingdom in a mail survey to marketing managers at
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manufacturing firms. The results showed that UK companies use brands extensively to
promote their industrial products with their organizational customers. However, they did
not include any effectiveness measures in their study. Michell, King and Reast (2001)
replicated the study by Shipley and Howard and extended their work by adding measures
of effectiveness. In addition to gathering information about the prevalence of brands in
industrial markets, their study also tested propositions related to managers’ perceptions of
competitive differentiation, brand loyalty, and brand equity afforded by their brands
targeted toward industrial buyers. They concluded that brands continue to be extensively
used by manufacturers of industrial products in the UK and that manufacturers believed
branding generated competitive advantage for their firms. A distinct shortcoming of this
research is the focus on the manufacturers’ perceptions of the importance and nature of
their brands as opposed to the trade partners’ viewpoints. As shown in other research,
marketing managers tend to overestimate the relative importance of their brand strategies
to their customers (Sinclair and Seward 1988).
Gordon, Calantone and di Benedetto (1993) surveyed electrical contractors in the
United States and concluded that brand equity is “alive and well” in the circuit-breaker
product market. However, their results indicated the contractors’ loyalty to distributors
was as important as their loyalty to the brand. An interesting finding in their research is
that brand loyalty was synonymous with firm loyalty in this product category.
Mudambi, Doyle and Wong (1997) conducted 15 in-depth interviews with
manufacturers, distributors, and purchasers of industrial products to probe the sources of
industrial brand value to organizational customers. They proposed four performance
components for industrial brands, each with a tangible and intangible dimension: 1)
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product performance, 2) distribution performance, 3) support service performance, and 4)
company performance. In a limited study with eight senior buyers of industrial goods,
Thompson, Knox and Mitchell (1997) examined the nature of brand attributes that are
important at various stages of the buying process. They concluded that industrial buyers
were influenced by brands and described 13 key attributes which they grouped into three
broad categories of parity criteria (comprised of technical capability, innovativeness, and
product/service quality), differentiators (comprised of financial standing, company size,
price, image, and reputation for delivering on promises), and partnership criteria
(comprised of cultural fit, personal compatibility/trust, professionalism/leadership,
management skills, and pre-/post-sales responsiveness). In addition to these crosssectional studies, the literature provides case studies of industrial branding such as
Norris’ (1993) study of Intel and Strong’s (1987) report of Kodak.
In summary, while the consumer brand equity literature offers a rich theoretical
base and a variety of useful concepts supported by extensive empirical research, the
application of these frameworks to the interorganizational exchange context has not yet
been tested. Overall, the development of theory and field research in the role of brands in
interorganizational exchange has been relatively neglected. The following sections
explore the literature relevant to the context - interorganizational exchange and
relationship management - in order to address the second question: What is the effect of
brand equity on supply chain relationships?
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Interorganizational Exchange
Following the behavioral theory of the firm, organizations can be characterized as
coalitions of individuals who engage in problem solving in order to achieve
organizational goals (Cyert and March 1963). A critical problem facing the firm is the
acquisition of resources necessary for goal attainment. These resources, acquired through
interorganizational exchange, include inflows of materials, supplies, and information
from the firm’s vendors as well as financial and information flows from organizational
customers. The literature in organizational buying provides a useful starting point for
gaining insight into interorganizational exchange from the buyer’s perspective.
In an early review of the study of organizational buying, Webster and Wind
(1972) noted there are two disciplinary orientations to explaining organizational buying
behavior – the microeconomic approach and the behavioral approach. The underlying
assumptions of the microeconomic model are that the unit of analysis is the transaction,
and the goal of organizational buying is to maximize efficiency by minimizing the costs
of transactions. Built on transaction cost theory (e.g., Williamson 1975), a significant
body of research examines decisions about resource acquisition achieved by comparing
the cost of available alternatives with expected benefits. However, microeconomic
theories have been criticized for failing to account for the behavioral dimensions of
organizational buying.
Macneil (1980) embraced the behavioral approach, introducing the notion of
relational exchange and developing a formal typology of discrete versus relational
exchange. He defines “discreteness” as:
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“…the separating of a transaction from all else between the participants
at the same time and before and after. Its [pure form], never achieved in
life, occurs when there is nothing else between the parties, never has been,
and never will be” (p. 60).
In contrast, his concept of relational exchange accounts explicitly for the historical and
social context in which transactions take place with enforcement of obligations as arising
from the mutual interests that exist between parties to the relationship. Thus, the
outcome of interorganizational exchange is viewed not as the completion of a discrete
transaction; rather, it is the negotiation of a relationship embodied in the selection of a
trade partner.
These two approaches to understanding interorganizational exchange have been
suggested as a continuum that can be described as relationship distance (Day 2000), a
significant dimension of relationship management in interorganizational exchange.
Relationship Management
Arndt (1979) conceptualized interorganizational exchange to be characterized by
long-term associations, contractual relations, and joint ownership. Dubbing these
phenomena “domesticated markets,” he argued that within such ongoing relationships
“transactions are planned and administered instead of being conducted on an ad hoc
basis” (Arndt 1979, p. 70). Observing a similar pattern in interfirm relationships over 20
years earlier, Forrester (1958) introduced a theory of management to explain the effect of
interdependence on firm and distribution system performance. He argued the dynamics
of flows of information, materials, money, manpower, and capital equipment in a
distribution system influence both the functions within the firm as well as the distribution
system as a whole.
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Forrester’s work laid the foundation for the supply chain management perspective
of interorganizational relationships. A supply chain is defined as “a set of three or more
companies directly linked by one or more of the upstream and downstream flows of
products, services, finances, and information from a source to a customer” (Mentzer et al.
2001). As noted in Chapter I, there is a growing awareness of the importance of
managing relationships in interorganizational exchange (Anderson and Narus 1991;
Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). Scholarly literature in channels and relationship
management provide additional insights into the nature and function of supply chain
relationships.
Mirroring the literature in organizational buying, channel relationship literature
also consists of two main research streams -- the microeconomic and the behavioral
paradigms (Stern and Reve 1980). Again, the general decision criterion underlying the
microeconomic model is efficiency. The choice here is between internal and external
organization of relationships, paralleling the make-or-buy decision in transaction cost
analysis (e.g., Williamson 1975). When a firm determines that it is more cost effective to
engage in external relationships, a level of control can be achieved by means of
reciprocal “hostage exchanges” (Williamson 1983, p. 532). Although the hostages in
question may never be really exchanged, the effect of such commitments is to create a
lock-in condition that promotes the continuation of relationships. Cooperation results
under such conditions because both parties have constrained alternatives open to them.
In effect, a dependence condition is created which, if symmetrical, constitutes a collective
incentive to maintain the relationship (Oliver 1990). Microeconomic theories such as
transaction cost analysis have been criticized for failing to account for processes that
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characterize channel relationships.
In response to the shortcomings of microeconomic explanations of
interorganizational relationships, a behavioral research paradigm emerged with a focus
on the design of mechanisms for controlling role performance of channel members (Stern
1969). Relationship management in this paradigm is a matter of establishing and
employing power, subject to the overarching goal of coordinating the efforts of channel
members. A level of power - “the potential for influence on another’s beliefs and
behavior” (cf. El-Ansary and Stern 1972) - accrues to the firm based on two primary
factors: authority and dependence (Frazier 1983). A firm’s authority represents its right
to influence or specify certain behaviors that are accepted by other firms (Robicheaux
and El-Ansary 1975). Dependence theory (Emerson 1962) predicts one firm’s power in a
two-firm relationship is based on relative dependence. The higher the level of valued
rewards anticipated in the relationship relative to those available in alternative
relationships, the higher a firm’s dependence (Aldrich 1979, Emerson 1962).
Heide (1994) developed a formal typology of approaches to relationship
management. His typology separated market and nonmarket governance, and then
further divided nonmarket governance into unilateral/hierarchical and bilateral forms of
governance. He proposed nonmarket governance is a heterogeneous phenomenon and
different relationship management strategies are appropriate under different conditions.
For each form of governance, he explicated three states of relationship development,
which he calls generic governance processes - initiation, maintenance, and termination noting that the emphasis in most relationships is on the maintenance phase.
In summary, the literature in relationship management offers several approaches
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to understanding the context of this study. The phenomenon of brand equity in
interorganizational exchange is clearly situated in relationship management. The
relationship management literature supports the theoretical framework for this study,
which parallels resource dependence theory and offers additional insight into the
interactions of various theoretical concepts such as power, dependence, and cooperation.
The literature also suggests that interorganizational relationships are dynamic over time,
moving through multiple stages of development.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter II provided an overview of grounded theory methodology, the method
used to collect and analyze field data in building the theory, followed by reports from the
field combined with extant theory to generate a theory of brand equity in the supply
chain. A literature review of the broad concepts relevant to brand equity in the supply
chain - brand equity, interorganizational exchange, and relationship management - was
provided and discussed in light of the field study. Key findings included the discovery of
a second dimension of brand equity, trade-based brand equity. Brand equity is proposed
to comprise both trade-based brand equity and consumer-based brand equity.
Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) conceptualization of perceived risk in organizations
as an outcome of uncertainty and dependence was confirmed; however, the uncertainty
construct developed in this study differs from their conceptualization. Pfeffer and
Salancik viewed uncertainty as the ability to predict and control future resource flows.
Informants clearly saw these as two separate conditions; that is, the level of predictability
is distinct from the level of control. In this study, predictability of resource flows is
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conceptualized as uncertainty; control over resource flows is reflected in the power
construct.
Brand equity was proposed to increase relationship commitment by operating as a
moderator between perceived risk and its antecedents. The level of the trade partner’s
brand equity changes the level of importance of the antecedent conditions - uncertainty,
dependence, and power - thereby changing the level of perceived risk. Thus, by
increasing perceived risk, brand equity increases relationship commitment. The findings
support Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) conclusions about the relationship between
commitment and cooperation, and commitment and propensity to leave. A third concept,
forbearance, also was found to be an important outcome of committed relationships.
The qualitative study provided a theoretical framework and testable hypotheses
related to brand equity in the supply chain. The following chapter presents the
methodology for the quantitative test of the hypotheses from the perspective of a focal
customer-supplier relationship.
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CHAPTER III
TESTING THE THEORY
RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter provides details of the procedures used for gathering and analyzing
data for the tests of theoretical hypotheses presented in Chapter II. A survey
methodology was employed to collect perceptions of the effect of brand equity in the
supply chain from a large, cross-sectional sample of retail managers in the home
appliance industry. Survey methodology was used for three reasons: 1) surveys are
appropriate for gathering a large number of responses in a relatively cost-effective
manner, 2) the large amount of cross-sectional data obtained from a survey permits
quantification of responses in a way that allows statistical testing for significance of
results, and 3) survey results are generalizable to populations within the limitations of the
sampling design. The following sections outline the research questions and hypotheses
tested, along with procedures for data collection, survey design, and data analysis.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
As stated in Chapter I, the primary purpose of the theory test was to determine the
effect of brand equity in supply chain relationships. The theory test was conducted from
the customer’s perspective of a focal customer-supplier relationship; therefore, this study
examined the effect of the supplier’s brand equity in relationships with customers. The
customers are home appliance retailers, and the suppliers are home appliance
manufacturers.
The home appliance industry was chosen because the structure and characteristics
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provide an appropriate context for a test of this theory. Home appliances are sold by
manufacturers directly to retailers, eliminating possible influences due to intermediaries
such as distributors. There are three major manufacturers of home appliances (General
Electric, Maytag, and Whirlpool) and a host of less well-known manufacturers in the
industry, providing the variation required to test CBBE and TBBE as dimensions of
brand equity and the effect of brand equity on supply chain relationships.
Again, the primary research question was “What is the effect of brand equity in
the supply chain?” Related questions included:
1. What is the relationship between brand equity in the supply chain
and perceived risk?
2. Does relationship commitment differ with various levels of brand
equity?
3. What is the relative importance of trade-based brand equity versus
consumer-based brand equity to the level of brand equity perceived
by the organizational customer?
4. What do companies stand to gain by building brand equity with
trade partners?
Figure 5 illustrates the theoretical model and locates the hypotheses to be tested.
The model can be viewed as a contingency model; that is, the customer’s
perceived risk was thought to vary contingent on the seller’s level of brand equity.
In turn, increased perceived risk affects the level of relationship commitment.
Therefore, the seller’s brand equity was hypothesized to operate indirectly through perceived risk - to affect the level of relationship commitment. These
theoretical relationships addressed the first three research questions. The fourth
question was addressed by the right-hand side of the model, the outcomes of
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relationship commitment.

DATA COLLECTION
The principal function of research design for a theory test is to control variance.
The objective is to maximize variance attributable to theoretical relationships (systematic
variance), control variance due to extraneous influences, and minimize error variance
(Kerlinger and Lee 2000). In this study, the theory test was limited to a single industry
(major home appliances) and a specific point in the supply chain (retailer-manufacturer
relationship) in order to minimize extraneous variance due to influences of industry
characteristics or position in the supply chain. To maximize variation of theoretical
relationships, respondents were asked to report on their relationships with either their
highest or lowest volume suppliers.

Sample Selection
The sampling frame was constructed from the list of current and prospective
United States-based retail accounts provided by a leading home appliance manufacturer.
Target respondents were senior-level managers with knowledge of relationships with
home appliance manufacturers. Pre-qualifying telephone calls were placed to identify
target respondents at each retailer who met knowledgeability criteria for key informants
and who agreed to complete the survey. As a final check on respondent selection, the
survey included self-report scales on the respondent’s degree of knowledge of the
relationship with the home appliance manufacturer, years of experience in the home
appliance industry, and position within the company.
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The initial list comprised approximately 21,000 names of independent, regional,
and national retail accounts of a leading home appliance manufacturer. Some accounts
were eliminated from the sampling frame due to either the unusual characteristics of the
retailer (e.g., military exchange stores) or unique relationships with appliance
manufacturers (e.g., manufacturers also the sole supplier of store brands). The pre-test
sample size was guided by response ratios to recent surveys in similar settings; the main
study sample size was determined based on responses to the pre-test. For the pre-test,
300 names were randomly selected for pre-qualifying telephone calls. During
telephoning, approximately one-third of the list was found to contain invalid contact
information along with names of businesses that had closed or no longer sold home
appliances. Callers were able to reach 163 potential respondents of whom 116 (71
percent) agreed to participate. Fifty-two pre-test surveys were returned, yielding a 45
percent response rate.
The sample size for the main study was guided by the need to obtain a minimum
of 700 usable responses in order to allow a robust test of the moderating latent variable,
brand equity, using structural equation modeling. Based on a 45 percent response rate in
the pre-test, the target was set at mailing a minimum of 1,500 surveys. A panel of 10
callers comprised of recent MBA graduates was employed to place pre-qualifying calls
over a three-week period. A random sample of 7,200 names was drawn and distributed
electronically to the callers along with a telephone protocol. Again, pre-qualifying calls
revealed approximately one-third of the list was not usable. Callers were unable to reach
another 17 percent of the list after three attempts. Contact was made with 3,636 potential
respondents of whom 70 percent (2,463) were qualified to participate. Of those who
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were qualified, 65 percent (1,612) agreed to participate. Surveys were mailed to these
1,612 retail managers in the home appliance industry in February, 2003. A total of 801
surveys were returned yielding a 49.7 percent response rate.

SURVEY DESIGN
The survey design for the pre-test and the main study followed Dillman’s (2000)
total design method. There were three to five contacts with each potential respondent,
depending on the date of the respondent’s reply, including two waves of survey
distribution. The contacts included:
1. Pre-qualifying telephone call
2. Initial distribution of survey packets
3. Follow-up postcard reminder of due date for survey
4. Second distribution of survey packets to non-respondents
5. Final telephone call
As an incentive for participation, the names of those who responded in a timely
manner (i.e., to the first survey mailing) were entered into a drawing for $500 with the
option to have the prize sent to either themselves or their favorite charities. The nature of
the incentive was decided after conversations with selected home appliance retailers. All
mailings were sent by first-class mail. The initial survey packet included a cover letter,
survey, reply envelope with first-class postage stamp, postcard for entering the drawing,
and University of Tennessee pencil. The second survey packet contained a cover letter,
survey, and business-reply envelope. For the main study, a commercial mail house was
engaged to assure timely distribution of the mailings.
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Given the large number of expected survey responses, the survey for the main
study was produced in scannable format to assure accuracy and efficiency in data entry.
A Pennsylvania firm specializing in scannable survey design (NCS Pearsons) designed
and printed the survey, and the University staff in the Office of Information Technology
scanned the surveys. Survey data were provided to the principal researcher in an Excel
spreadsheet. The survey pre-test items are found in Appendix C, and main survey items
are located in Appendix E.

Data Integrity
Pre-test responses were manually entered into an Excel spreadsheet. Each survey
was independently re-keyed a second time, and the results were compared to assure
accuracy in data entry. To verify data integrity in the main study, a random sample of 30
scanned surveys were manually re-keyed and compared to the scanned results. No
differences were found in the data verification step. Responses from all surveys in the
main study with a high number of missing values (i.e., more than 15 percent) were
reviewed to check for items that did not scan properly. Six surveys were inappropriately
marked and entered manually.

Scale Development
Because several of the constructs in this study have been used in previous
research, the first step in developing measures was to review scales used in similar
studies. Scales for dependence (Ganesan 1994), supplier power (Gaski and Nevin 1985)
and relationship commitment (Morgan and Hunt 1994) were compared to findings in the
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qualitative study and subsequently adapted for the theory test. Achrol’s (1988) scale for
Uncertainty and Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) scales for Cooperation and Propensity to
Leave were also reviewed. The Uncertainty scale was not adopted because the measures
were related to environmental uncertainty rather than uncertainty in a buying situation,
the context of this study. The Cooperation scale was not adopted because it was a
formative scale. The Propensity to Leave scale was not adopted because it measured
intentions to leave the relationship rather than behavior.
New scales were developed where no appropriate scales existed, drawing on
qualitative data to identify both the domain of the constructs and appropriate language for
generation of potential items. Scales were developed following a five-step process: 1)
generation of items, 2) review of items by academic colleagues familiar with the
phenomenon, 3) review of items with industry representatives, 4) pretest of scales with a
sub-sample of managers, and 5) purification of scales following both the pretest and main
study (Churchill 1979). These steps are detailed in the following discussion.
Item Generation. A pool of items was generated for each construct, drawing on
informant reports obtained in the qualitative phase of this study. Various forms for
measures were developed and tested such as statements and questions followed by
response mechanisms such as Likert scales and semantic differentials.
Academic Review. Academic colleagues familiar with the phenomenon and
context of the study reviewed a draft of the proposed scales in order to assess item
specificity, readability, face validity, and content validity. Item specificity evaluated the
extent to which items had one-to-one correspondence with the property or dimension
being measured; that is, items were assessed to minimize ambiguity and revise items that
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asked for responses on more than one characteristic. Readability examined the language
and grammatical construction of the items for ease-of-use by the intended audience. Face
validity assessed whether the items were consistent with the theoretical domain of the
construct and representative of the constructs they aimed to measure. Content validity
related to the extent to which the items were representative of the construct they were
intended to measure. Items were revised as needed based on feedback from this step.
Industry Review. Three managers in the home appliance industry were recruited
who were willing to talk through their thought processes as they responded to an initial
draft of the survey. Specifically, they were asked to evaluate items for readability and
clarity, to assess the survey format for ease-of-use, and to report the amount of time
required to complete it. Again, based on feedback from this step, items were reworded or
eliminated, and the format of the survey was modified.
Pre-test with Managers. As described previously, a sub-sample of 300
respondents was drawn from the sampling frame and contacted in the same manner used
for the main study. The purpose of the pre-test was to identify potential obstacles to
survey completion, determine response rates, assess data quality, and evaluate
unidimensionality and reliability of the scales.
Scale Purification. Scales were purified in a two-step process. First, scales were
subjected to factor analysis scale and reliability tests following the pre-test. Scales were
evaluated a second time during data analysis for the main survey. The following section
provides details of scale purification based on pre-test analyses; scale purification from
the main survey is detailed in the data analysis reported in Chapter IV.
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PRE-TEST DATA ANALYSES
This section presents the results of the analysis of pre-test data. All analyses were
conducted using SPSS 11.0.1. A copy of the pre-test survey is located in Appendix C,
and detailed output from the principal component and scale reliability analyses for each
construct are found in Appendix D.
Descriptive Statistics
Nine demographic questions were included in the survey. Three questions were
used to verify the knowledgeability of the respondent and one was a check on the
high/low volume manipulation. The five remaining questions described the retailermanufacturer relationship and the nature of the retailer.
As a check on knowledgeability, respondents were asked to report their level of
knowledge of the relationship with the manufacturer, number of years’ experience in the
home appliance industry, and position. Ninety percent of respondents reported adequate
or more than adequate knowledge of the relationship. Specifically, 52 percent (27)
reported “high” or “very high” levels of knowledge while 38 percent (20) reported
“adequate” levels of knowledge. Five respondents reported “very little” or “no
knowledge” of the relationship on which they were reporting. Thirty-seven respondents
(71 percent) reported more than 15 years’ experience in the home appliance industry, and
only five reported less than six years’ experience. Thirty-one respondents (60 percent)
were owners, presidents, or vice-presidents of their firms. Twelve were managers and
three were staff positions. Six respondents did not provide their positions.
More than half of respondents (56 percent) reported relationships of more than ten
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years with the appliance manufacturer. The second largest category of responses was one
to five years. Ten respondents reported doing business with only one appliance
manufacturer while nineteen reported relationships with five or more manufacturers.
Twenty-three did business with two, three, or four manufacturers.
Eighty-one percent of respondents were independent retailers. Seventy-six
percent had annual sales volume under $10 million and annual appliance sales volume
under $2 million.

Missing Data Analysis
To determine possible effects due to missing data, the surveys were first
examined for missing responses and then items were evaluated for missing data points.
Forty-two (85 percent) of the pre-test surveys had complete data. Of the remaining 15
percent, eight surveys had one missing response, one had two missing responses, and one
had nine missing responses. The survey with nine missing responses was removed from
further analysis. Of the 59 items on the pre-test, 51 had no missing responses, six items
had one missing response, and two items had two missing responses. Overall, the ten
missing responses represented less than 1% of all responses (0.00326) and were
determined to be missing completely at random (MCAR). By removing one survey,
missing data were eliminated as an issue with the pre-test data, and no further
adjustments were necessary.
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Independence Tests
The pre-test data were tested for differences on business type and number of
suppliers in order to identify possible confounds. To analyze business type, respondents
who selected regional, national, and multinational categories were grouped together as
business units of a chain, and this group was tested against those who selected the
category of independent retailer. In an independent samples test, no significant
differences (α = .05) were found on any item for these two business types. However,
retailers who do business with only one manufacturer were found to be significantly
different (α = .05) on five items – two in the Consumer-based Brand Equity scale, one
item that measures Dependence, and two items on the Propensity to Leave scale. These
ten respondents were removed from further pre-test analyses, and a question was added to
the pre-qualifying telephone protocol for the main study to screen out potential
respondents who did business with only one manufacturer.

Evaluation of Measures
Principal component factor analyses were conducted to evaluate
unidimensionality for each scale, and then Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was calculated to
assess scale reliability. Seven scales were found to be unidimensional while three scales
loaded on two factors and were subsequently modified to achieve unidimensionality. The
unidimensional scales were then evaluated for reliability. The following section
describes steps taken to purify each scale during the pre-test data analysis. The
characteristics of each scale are summarized in Table 4.
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Table 4. Summary of Pre-Test Scale Purification
SCALE
CBBE
TBBE
UNC
DEP
PWR
RISK
COMM
COOP
PPTL
FORB

N OF ITEMS
Initial

Retained

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
6

5
7
3
5
5
5
6
6
4
4

VARIANCE
EXPLAINED
67.78%
67.33%
77.04%
77.25%
66.83%
77.95%
77.38%
78.90%
66.19%
46.03%

ALPHA
0.8798
0.8957
0.8503
0.9005
0.8800
0.9297
0.9391
0.9464
0.8258
0.3153

MEAN
5.13
5.18
5.24
4.37
4.35
4.52
5.26
4.18
3.23
3.54

STD
DEV
1.19
1.13
1.25
1.44
1.33
1.27
1.28
1.49
1.25
0.93

Scale Purification
Consumer-Based Brand Equity (CBBE). All items loaded on one factor with 62 percent
variance explained. Item 13a, the only reverse coded item in the scale, had the weakest
loading. The item -- “Our customers rarely ask for appliances produced by this
manufacturer” -- taps the same dimension as items13c and 13f, which ask about the
extent to which customers expect the retailer to carry this manufacturer’s brand or would
be disappointed if this brand were not carried. Thus, removing the item did not affect the
substantive content of the scale. After removing item 13a, scale reliability improved to
.8798 and variance explained increased to 68 percent.
Trade-Based Brand Equity (TBBE). Principal component factor analysis revealed
two factors underlying six items with cross-loadings on several items. Factor 1 (items 7,
9, 11 and 12) appeared to relate to the value associated with the manufacturer’s name
while Factor 2 (items 6, 8 and 10) dealt only with name recognition. Factor 1 was more
relevant to the theory and was initially adopted.
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As the analysis proceeded, it appeared that three items originally intended to
measure Uncertainty (see explanation below) actually measured trade-partner reliability,
a dimension of TBBE. Retaining the four items from Factor 1 and adding the three items
from Uncertainty (items 16, 17, and 18) yielded a seven-item scale that again loaded on
two factors, with item 7 loading separately. The content of item 7 -- “Retailers recognize
this manufacturer as a strong trade partner.” -- is very similar to item 11 -- “This
manufacturer is known in the industry as a company that takes good care of their trade
partners.” Therefore, eliminating item 7 did not affect the substantive content of the
scale. Removing the item produced a more robust, unidimensional six-item scale by
adding additional items that more fully tap the domain of the construct (N=6 versus
N=4). The six-item scale improved explanation of variance (67 percent versus 51
percent), and increased the coefficient alpha measure of reliability (.8957 versus.6998).
The six-item scale was adopted for the main study.
Uncertainty (UNC). The six-item scale loaded on two factors. Factor 1 (items
16, 17, and 18) described trade-partner characteristics while Factor 2 (items 19, 20, and
21) dealt with uncertainty in resource acquisition. Factor 2 was a better fit with the
theory and was adopted for the main survey. As previously described, the three items
that comprised Factor 1 were added to the TBBE scale. The three-item scale explained
77 percent of variance and had a coefficient alpha of .8503.
Dependence (DEP). All items loaded on one factor with 66 percent variance
explained. Item 14a -- “Our company could easily replace this manufacturer” -- was the
only reverse coded item in the scale and had a weak loading. The content of the item also
overlapped an item in the relationship commitment scale: “The relationship my company
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has with this manufacturer would take very little effort to end.” Thus, item 14a was
removed due to substantive overlap with an item in another scale. Removing the item
improved reliability from .8604 to .9005 and increased variance explained to 77 percent.
Supplier Power (PWR). All items loaded on one factor with 58 percent variance
explained. Item 22a asked about the manufacturer’s ability to dictate pricing policies.
The item’s factor loading was significantly weaker than other items. The content of this
item differed from the rest of the scale in that all other items related to policies about
product availability or promotion. The item was removed due to the lack of consistency
in content with other scale items. Removing the item improved variance explained to 67
percent with a coefficient alpha of .8800.
Perceived Risk (RISK). All items loaded on one factor with 68 percent variance
explained. Item 15d -- “If we could no longer get appliances from this manufacturer, our
firm would see virtually no change in profits” -- was the only reverse coded item in the
scale. Item 15f asked the same question but was worded positively: “If we could no
longer get appliances from this manufacturer, it would threaten the profitability of our
firm.” The stronger item (15f) was retained, and the weaker item (15d) was removed.
Removing the item improved variance explained to 78 percent with a coefficient alpha of
.9297.
Relationship Commitment (COMM). All items loaded on one factor with 77
percent variance explained and a coefficient alpha of .9391. All items were retained.
Cooperation (COOP). All items loaded on one factor with 79 percent variance
explained and a coefficient alpha of .9464. All items were retained.
Propensity to Leave (PPTL). All items loaded on one factor with 58 percent
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variance explained. The content of item 31e -- “How often does your firm explore
options for replacing this manufacturer?”-- was very similar to item 31c, which asks
about the frequency of evaluations of alternatives to this manufacturer. Item 31e had the
weaker factor loading and was removed from the scale. The four-item scale increased
variance explained to 66 percent with coefficient alpha of .8258.
Forbearance (FORB). The six-item scale loaded on two factors with crossloadings on several items. Factor 1 included two reverse coded items describing
punishments that loaded in the wrong direction (items 29 and 30) and two items
describing leniency that loaded correctly (items 27 and 28). Factor 2 included one item
that loaded in the wrong direction (item 26) and four positive correct loadings (items 25,
26, 29, and 30). Various combinations were tried to produce a one-factor result with
loadings in the right direction. The combination of items 25, 27, 28, and 29 yielded the
only one-factor solution; however, item 29 loaded negatively while the other items load
positively. The combination of items 25, 27 and 28 correlated well with the domain of
the construct. Although variance explained and reliability improved by dropping item 29,
it was retained at this stage in order to avoid the possibility of a two-item scale when the
scales were purified again during the main study. The four-item scale explained 46
percent of variance with a coefficient alpha of .3153.

MAIN SURVEY DATA ANALYSES
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used in the main study as the primary
statistical tool to test for relationships among variables. This powerful statistical tool is
particularly well suited for analysis of complex, multivariable data such as that found in
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the social sciences. SEM combines the measurement model (confirmatory factor
analysis) and the structural model (linear regression or path analysis) in a simultaneous
statistical test (Garver and Mentzer 1999). The measurement model relates observed
(i.e., measured) variables to unmeasured constructs (i.e., factors), and the structural
model specifies and estimates the relationships among unobserved (i.e., latent) constructs
(Marsh and Hocevar 1986).
Various indices were used to evaluate the adequacy of the overall fit between the
data and the theoretical model, as well as the components of the model. Two absolute
measures and two incremental measures were used to determine appropriate fit. The
following list provides information about the test statistics along with their recommended
threshold levels for acceptable fit.
•

The likelihood-ratio chi-square (χ2) test is an absolute measure of fit that indicates
the degree to which the model is consistent with the pattern of variances and
covariances from the set of observed data. The chi-square test evaluates nonsignificance of difference (i.e., the observed matrix is not significantly different
from the estimated matrix); therefore, low values are an indication of good fit.
This test, while frequently used, is extremely sensitive to sample size and may
produce misleading results. When sample sizes are large (over 200 observations),
most models will produce significant differences in the chi-square test (Garver
and Mentzer 1999). This study qualifies as a “large” study; therefore, the chisquare statistic must be interpreted with caution.

•

The chi-square ratio (CMIN) is an absolute measure of fit that adjusts the chisquare statistic for the degrees of freedom (df) in the model. Ratios in the range
of two to five are generally thought to be an indication of acceptable fit (Hair et
al. 1998). However, because this statistic is based on the chi-square test, it also
tends to be higher when the sample size is large.

•

The Bentler comparison-fit index (CFI) is an incremental fit statistic that allows
the comparison of various models with the independent model where no
relationships among variables are specified. The index ranges from 0 to 1, and
values of .90 or greater represent an adequate fit (Baumgartner and Homberg
1996).
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•

The Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) is an incremental fit statistic that combines a
measure of parsimony into a comparative index between the proposed and null
models. Also known as the non-normed fit index (NNFI), the recommended
value for the TLI is .90 or greater.

•

The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is a measure of absolute
fit that compares the average difference per degree of freedom expected to occur
in the population (not the sample), thus this index is thought to be relatively
unaffected by sample size. Values falling between .05 and .08 are considered to
be acceptable (Baumgartner and Homberg 1996).

Testing the Moderating Effect of Brand Equity
In order to test the moderating effect of brand equity, the data were grouped and
then treated as categorical, rather than continuous, data. Splitting the data into groups
permitted analysis of the moderating effect of brand equity under two conditions relevant
to this study: High Brand Equity (HBE) and Low Brand Equity (LBE). In order to have
a strong test for differences, the data were trichotomized; that is, three groups were
created. The HBE and LBE groups were used to test for moderating effects and the
middle group was not analyzed. Testing for differences under HBE and LBE answers
the research question: What is the effect of brand equity in supply chain relationships?
In order to accommodate tests of the categorical variable, the hypotheses related
to the moderating effect of brand equity proposed in Chapter II were restated as follows:
Original hypotheses:
H3: Brand equity held by a trade partner increases moderates the relationships
between perceived risk and its antecedents.
H3a: Increased brand equity weakens the relationship between uncertainty
and perceived risk.
H3b: Increased brand equity strengthens the relationship between
dependence and perceived risk.
114

H3c: Increased brand equity strengthens the relationship between power
and perceived risk.
Restated hypotheses:
H3: Brand equity held by a trade partner moderates the relationships between
perceived risk and its antecedents.
H3a: HBE decreases the strength of the relationship between uncertainty
and perceived risk.
H3b: HBE increases the strength of the relationship between dependence
and perceived risk.
H3c: HBE increases the strength of the relationship between power and
perceived risk.
H3d: LBE increases the strength of the relationship between uncertainty
and perceived risk.
H3e: LBE decreases the strength of the relationship between dependence
and perceived risk.
H3f: LBE decreases the strength of the relationship between power and
perceived risk.
The Structure of Brand Equity
In addition to tests for the moderating effect of brand equity, analyses were
conducted on the structure of brand equity (Figure 9) in order to examine the relative
effects of trade-based brand equity and consumer-based brand equity in supply chain
relationships. A 2 x 2 matrix was employed with the levels of consumer-based and tradebased brand equity as the two axes (Figure 9). The trade-dominant brand equity and
consumer-dominant brand equity cells were the conditions of interest. Evaluating the
effect of dominance helped answer questions about the benefits of relative investments in
TBBE and CBBE.
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Figure 9. Brand Equity Structure Matrix

CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provided details of the survey design, reported results of the pre-test
survey data analyses and subsequent scale purification, and described the analysis
strategy for the main survey. A survey methodology was employed with the home
appliance industry as the context and retailers as the sample. The customer’s perspective
of the supplier’s brand equity was the unit of analysis. The study was limited to one
industry and one point in the supply chain in order to reduce extraneous variance;
respondents were asked to report on perceptions of their lowest or highest volume home
appliance suppliers to maximize theoretical variance.
Structural equation modeling with a nested model strategy was used as the tool
for data analysis in the main study. In order to test the moderating effect of brand equity,
the data were trichotomized and the high and low brand equity groups were analyzed.
Data were trichotomized to produce greater separation between the two conditions to
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allow a strong test of differences; therefore, the middle category was not analyzed.
Hypotheses related to the moderating effect of brand equity were rewritten to facilitate
the test of a categorical variable.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS AND ANALYSES
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the findings from the main survey and describes the
analyses conducted to test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter II. Descriptive statistics
were calculated using SPSS 11.0.1, and structural equation modeling analyses were
conducted using AMOS 4.01. For ease of reading, analysis details are provided within
the text rather than in the appendices in the following sections. Survey items are
displayed in Appendix E.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Eighty-five percent of the 801 respondents represented independent retailers, and
the remaining 15 percent were business units of chain retailers. Total annual sales were
reported to be less than $10 million for 86 percent of respondents, and 85 percent
reported annual appliance sales less than $3 million. Relationships between these
retailers and their appliance manufacturers were long-standing with over half of the
respondents reporting on relationships longer than 15 years. Only three percent had been
engaged less than one year with the manufacturer. The mean and median number of
appliance manufacturers serving these retailers was four.
Responses to questions evaluating respondents’ experience, positions, and
knowledge lend confidence to the suitability of these respondents as key informants. The
years of experience in the home appliance industry were heavily skewed to the high end
of the scale with a median response of more than 15 years. Only ten respondents (1.3
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percent) had less than one year of industry experience. Fifty-two percent of respondents
were executives (Owner, President, or Vice President) and 48 percent were managers.
Finally, respondents’ self-assessment of knowledge of the relationship with the appliance
manufacturer was also heavily skewed to the high end of the scale with a mean and
median response of 4 on a 5-point scale, indicating a “High” level of knowledge.

MISSING DATA
As the first step in data analysis, the main survey data were reviewed for
completeness. The level of missing data for each respondent was evaluated, and
responses to each item were assessed to discern both the level and pattern of missing
data, which may indicate systematic bias due to a problem with the item (e.g., sensitive
information, difficult or ambiguous wording). Finally, the extent of measurement error
due to non-response was assessed.
Among the 801 cases analyzed, 674 (84 percent) were complete and 127 had
missing responses. Nine cases with more than seven missing responses (15 percent) were
eliminated from further analysis, reducing the dataset to 792. In the item analysis, only
one item had no missing values. The average number of missing values per item was 4.6
out of 792 responses, or less than 1% (.00584). The missing pattern was evaluated using
Little’s MCAR test, and missing responses were found to be missing completely at
random (Little’s MCAR test: χ2 = 3729, df 3224, prob. 0.000). The expectation
maximization (EM) method was then used to estimate and replace missing values. This
method uses a two-step, iterative process to determine expected values of parameters and
then calculates maximum likelihood estimates. The EM method has been shown to be
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superior to alternative remedies such as listwise, pairwise, and mean imputation
estimation techniques (Meng 2000; Raaijmakers 1999).
As proposed by Armstrong and Overton (1979), non-response bias was evaluated
by testing for significant differences in responses from early and late respondents.
Surveys were classified as early or late based on their postmark dates, and an independent
samples t-test was conducted to determine if responses were significantly different for the
two groups. There were no significant differences (α<.05) on any item. Non-response
bias was also evaluated by testing responses of a random selection of 30 non-respondents
for significant differences as proposed by Mentzer and Flint (1997). These respondents
were contacted by telephone and asked to respond verbally to five substantive items
related to key constructs. There were no significant differences (α<.05) in responses to
any item.
To summarize the missing data analysis and remedies, nine cases with excessive
levels of missing data were removed from further analysis. Missing data in the remaining
792 cases were determined to be missing completely at random and were replaced using
the EM method. Non-response was eliminated as a concern through two tests for nonresponse bias. Thus, data integrity was sufficiently robust for further statistical testing.

CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
Following Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) recommended two-step process for
structural equation modeling, data analysis began with specification and evaluation of the
measurement model (Figure 10). Model specification was accomplished by assigning
observed indicators to latent variables as specified by the theory. Each observed
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Figure 10. Measurement Model
indicator was assigned to only one latent variable and all latent variables were allowed to
correlate freely. Diagnostic indicators were then inspected to discern potentially
problematic cases and items, and to determine the distribution pattern of the data.

Data Distribution Characteristics
Potential outliers were identified using the Mahalanobis D2 measure. This
measure estimates the distance in multidimensional space of each observation from the
centroid, or the mean center of the observations. One case was determined to be
significantly distant from the centroid and was removed from further analysis, reducing
the dataset to 791 observations.
Items were examined to identify those with offending estimates, that is, those that
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exceed acceptable limits by having negative variances or standardized regression weights
that exceed 1.00 (Hair et al. 1998). All items were examined and found to be
satisfactory.
All 48 measures in the main study were 7-point Likert-type scales. The mean
values ranged from 3.05 to 5.84 with standard deviations ranging from .96 to 1.68 (Table
5). The means of 37 items were centered around the middle of the scale with standard
deviations greater than one and less than two, indicating a normal distribution of data.
The remaining 11 items appeared to be skewed to the high end of the scale, with means
greater than 5. The item with the highest mean (v1 “Our customers know this
manufacturer’s products to be a good value”) also had the lowest standard deviation
(.96), strongly suggesting a non-normal data distribution for this item. Further analysis of
data distribution for all items was conducted using statistical tests for skewness and
kurtosis.
An examination of the test for normality (Table 6) showed five items with
distributions significantly different from normal. First, v1 in the CBBE scale was highly
kurtotic (kurtosis=3.25, c.r.=18.674) exhibiting insufficient variation, with most
respondents marking either “Agree” or “Strongly Agree.” Given the relatively high cost
of home appliances, it is understandable that retailers would stock only those appliances
they believe to be highly valued by their customers; therefore, the lack of variation in this
item is most likely an artifact of the home appliance industry and is not a good measure
of CBBE in this context. This item was removed.
The remaining four items had moderate levels of skewness ranging from -1.284 to
-1.203 and kurtosis ranging from 1.35 to 1.89. Three of these items were in the TBBE
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Table 5. Item Means and Standard Deviations
Item
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
v8
v9
v10
v11
v12
v13
v14
v15
v16
v17
v18
v19
v20
v21
v22
v23
v24
v25
v26
v27
v28
v29
v30
v31
v32
v33
v34
v35
v36
v37
v38
v39
v40
v41
v42
v43
v44
v45
v46
v47
v48

Scale
CBBE
CBBE
CBBE
CBBE
CBBE
TBBE
TBBE
TBBE
TBBE
TBBE
TBBE
UNC
UNC
UNC
DEP
DEP
DEP
DEP
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
RISK
RISK
RISK
RISK
RISK
COMM
COMM
COMM
COMM
COMM
COMM
COOP
COOP
COOP
COOP
COOP
COOP
PPTL
PPTL
PPTL
PPTL
FORB
FORB
FORB
FORB

Question
Q6a-Good value
Q6b-Expect to carry
Q6c-Pay more
Q6d-Exclusive buy
Q6e-Disappoint
Q7-Know what to expect
Q8-Accurately predict
Q9-Name advantage
Q10-Keeps promises
Q11-Takes care of partners
Q12-Willing to pay more
Q15-Uncertain follow-through
Q16-Get what we expect
Q17-Unexpected changes
Q13a-Dependent
Q13b-Crucial to success
Q13c-No good alternative
Q13d-Need to achieve goals
Q18a-Determine inventory
Q18b-Determine orders
Q18c-Determine product mix
Q18d-Display rules
Q18e-Promotion guidelines
Q14a-Hurt our firm
Q14b-Lose money
Q14c-Lose customers
Q14d-Lower customer satisfaction
Q14e-Threaten profitability
Q19a-Committed
Q19b-Maintain indefinitely
Q19c-Maximum effort
Q19d-Do anything to keep
Q19e-Care about long-term
Q19f-Little effort to end
Q24a-Boost sales
Q24b-Serve customers
Q24c-Solve problems
Q24d-Cut costs
Q24e-Estimate demand
Q24f-Common goals
Q25a-Meet with competitors
Q25b-Evaluate alternatives
Q25c-Search for information
Q25d-Entertain bids
Q20-Fulfillment
Q21-Lenient
Q22-Allow substitutions
Q23-Reduce future orders

Mean
5.84
5.53
4.58
4.77
5.22
5.34
5.23
5.21
5.37
5.22
3.97
3.09
3.05
3.12
3.87
4.16
3.47
4.16
3.50
3.51
3.47
4.22
4.38
4.35
3.81
4.29
3.89
4.00
5.10
5.31
4.96
3.93
5.18
4.62
4.10
3.94
4.64
3.48
3.40
3.67
3.80
3.68
3.60
3.44
3.35
3.47
3.30
4.07

Std. Deviation
0.96
1.18
1.43
1.41
1.32
1.21
1.19
1.25
1.27
1.32
1.44
1.40
1.39
1.37
1.64
1.63
1.53
1.65
1.62
1.68
1.54
1.67
1.65
1.61
1.62
1.53
1.55
1.62
1.34
1.18
1.32
1.51
1.29
1.56
1.45
1.47
1.40
1.59
1.56
1.64
1.49
1.41
1.44
1.46
1.24
1.30
1.42
1.37

123

Table 6. Assessment of Normality
Item
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
v8
v9
v10
v11
v12
v13
v14
v15
v16
v17
v18
v19
v20
v21
v22
v23
v24
v25
v26
v27
v28
v29
v30
v31
v32
v33
v34
v35
v36
v37
v38
v39
v40
v41
v42
v43
v44
v45
v46
v47
v48

Min

Max
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Skew
-1.424
-1.212
-0.495
-0.770
-0.857
-1.203
-1.101
-0.844
-1.284
-0.941
-0.257
0.436
0.514
0.440
-0.181
-0.353
0.170
-0.364
0.078
0.163
0.051
-0.431
-0.425
-0.431
0.069
-0.366
0.017
-0.113
-0.694
-0.866
-0.476
-0.047
-0.842
-0.290
-0.276
-0.187
-0.373
0.158
0.244
0.066
-0.030
0.041
0.110
0.150
0.203
0.251
0.145
-0.039

c.r.
-16.356
-13.914
-5.684
-8.843
-9.840
-13.815
-12.643
-9.693
-14.747
-10.799
-2.948
5.010
5.904
5.054
-2.079
-4.057
1.956
-4.179
0.901
1.877
0.588
-4.951
-4.878
-4.947
0.790
-4.200
0.192
-1.300
-7.965
-9.949
-5.470
-0.535
-9.671
-3.331
-3.166
-2.150
-4.282
1.819
2.799
0.761
-0.347
0.469
1.260
1.721
2.329
2.880
1.666
-0.453

Kurtosis
3.253
1.805
-0.213
0.230
0.524
1.716
1.353
0.613
1.886
0.642
-0.327
0.060
0.254
0.217
-0.720
-0.645
-0.521
-0.657
-0.794
-0.779
-0.727
-0.766
-0.624
-0.508
-0.641
-0.428
-0.495
-0.664
0.329
0.967
-0.130
-0.421
0.664
-0.432
-0.335
-0.349
0.039
-0.633
-0.605
-0.728
-0.517
-0.325
-0.434
-0.381
0.610
0.238
-0.378
-0.254

c.r.
18.674
10.361
-1.225
1.323
3.006
9.849
7.770
3.520
10.827
3.686
-1.879
0.347
1.455
1.245
-4.133
-3.703
-2.990
-3.772
-4.558
-4.474
-4.175
-4.400
-3.584
-2.918
-3.678
-2.455
-2.843
-3.812
1.889
5.550
-0.746
-2.414
3.814
-2.480
-1.925
-2.004
0.223
-3.636
-3.474
-4.182
-2.965
-1.866
-2.494
-2.190
3.500
1.368
-2.169
-1.460

124

scale (v6, v7, and v9) and one was in the CBBE scale (v2). The three items in the TBBE
scale all measured the reliability of the appliance manufacturer. Again, given that
respondents were largely independent retailers, it makes sense that they would establish
and maintain relationships with only with those manufacturers they believe to be reliable.
As small businesses, they are not in the position to trade off reliability for some other
consideration such as price breaks or promotional support. However, the qualitative
study strongly supports reliability as an important aspect of TBBE, so completely
eliminating this dimension would have compromised the theoretical analysis. Therefore,
the two items with higher kurtosis were removed and the item with the lowest level of
kurtosis (v7, kurtosis = 1.35) was retained. The remaining item, v2, measured the extent
to which retailers believe their customers expect them to carry the manufacturer’s brand.
It is very similar to v5, which asks if customers would be disappointed if the retailer did
not carry the brand. Because there is substantive overlap between the two variables, v2
was removed.
To summarize the analysis of data distribution, the lack of a normal distribution
for some items in the initial data was a concern. Several steps were taken to address this
issue. First, one case was determined to be an outlier and was removed. While most
items exhibited satisfactory variation around means near the centers of their scales, five
items deviated from the normal distribution. Four of these items were removed. After
removing these items, 43 of 44 items exhibited univariate normality. Given the large
sample size in this study, the moderate departure from univariate normality for one item
was considered a modest violation and inconsequential to the assumption of multivariate
normality necessary for SEM analyses (Hair et al. 1998).
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Scale Purification
The measurement model comprised of the remaining 44 items was a good fit with
the data (χ2=3511, df 857, CMIN = 4.097; TLI .969, CFI .973; RMSEA .0633) providing
a sound basis for scale purification. Several diagnostic tools are available using SEM to
aid in scale purification. These diagnostics were weighed against theoretical
considerations in making decisions to retain or remove items. Four diagnostic tools were
used in scale purification: 1) standardized regression weights, 2) squared multiple
correlations, 3) standardized residuals, and 4) modification indices. These tools provided
useful information for assessing unidimensionality along with convergent and
discriminant validity of scales.
Unidimensionality of scales is a fundamental assumption underlying evaluation of
scale reliability and is a function of convergent and discriminant validity in SEM analysis
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Garver and Mentzer 1999; Hair et al. 1998). Convergent
validity is demonstrated when items have substantial loadings on the constructs they are
intended to measure (i.e., greater than .70). Discriminant validity is achieved when items
are more strongly related to the constructs they are intended to measure than to other
constructs in the model. Scales that possess both convergent and discriminant validity
are deemed to be unidimensional.
Convergent validity. To assess convergent validity, the statistical significance,
direction, and magnitude of the estimated standardized regression weights (r) and squared
multiple correlations (R2) between the items and their latent variables were evaluated
(Table 7). Each latent variable-to-item equation in SEM assesses the reliability of the
individual item as a measure of the latent variable (Garver and Mentzer 1999). The R2
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Table 7. Standardized Regressions and Squared Multiple Correlations
Item
v3
v4
v5
v7
v8
v10
v11
v12
v13
v14
v15
v16
v17
v18
v19
v20
v21
v22
v23
v24
v25
v26
v27
v28
v29
v30
v31
v32
v33
v34
v35
v36
v37
v38
v39
v40
v41
v42
v43
v44
v45
v46
v47
v48

<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<--

Construct
Consumer-based Brand Equity
Consumer-based Brand Equity
Consumer-based Brand Equity
Trade-based Brand Equity
Trade-based Brand Equity
Trade-based Brand Equity
Trade-based Brand Equity
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Dependence
Dependence
Dependence
Dependence
Power
Power
Power
Power
Power
Perceived Risk
Perceived Risk
Perceived Risk
Perceived Risk
Perceived Risk
Relationship Commitment
Relationship Commitment
Relationship Commitment
Relationship Commitment
Relationship Commitment
Relationship Commitment
Cooperation
Cooperation
Cooperation
Cooperation
Cooperation
Cooperation
Propensity to Leave
Propensity to Leave
Propensity to Leave
Propensity to Leave
Forbearance
Forbearance
Forbearance
Forbearance

r
0.713
0.735
0.705
0.526
0.678
0.681
0.731
0.835
0.893
0.780
0.848
0.914
0.629
0.838
0.731
0.674
0.754
0.712
0.655
0.872
0.906
0.866
0.815
0.875
0.866
0.859
0.858
0.732
0.883
0.479
0.821
0.876
0.750
0.790
0.815
0.880
0.605
0.844
0.800
0.711
0.721
0.549
0.301
-0.422

2

R
0.508
0.540
0.497
0.277
0.460
0.464
0.534
0.697
0.797
0.608
0.719
0.835
0.396
0.702
0.534
0.454
0.569
0.507
0.429
0.760
0.821
0.750
0.664
0.766
0.750
0.738
0.736
0.536
0.780
0.229
0.674
0.767
0.563
0.624
0.664
0.774
0.366
0.712
0.640
0.506
0.520
0.301
0.091
0.178
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value is the measure of the strength of the linear relationship between the latent variable
and the item; that is, the latent variable is considered to cause variation in the item. The
higher the correlation, the stronger the systematic component of variance associated with
the item, offering strong support for the assumption of unidimensionality.
All 44 item loadings were significant; however, v48 loaded negatively. The item
was part of the FORB scale: “We reduce future orders if this manufacturer fails to
deliver as promised.” It was the only reverse-coded item in the scale and was also
problematic in the pre-test; however, it was retained in order to avoid the possibility of
having a two-item scale after purification in the main study. The item’s loading indicated
it did not converge on the construct, therefore it was removed from further analysis.
Two items were identified with weak loadings: v34 (r = .48, R2=.23) in the six-item
COMM scale and v47 (r =.30, R2 = .09) in the three-item FORB scale. The first item,
(v34 “The relationship my company has with this manufacturer would take very little
effort to end”), was the only reverse-coded item in its scale and likely suffered from order
effects. While the item was weak, it was one that is important for the theory test because
it measured the extent to which retailers believed themselves to be locked into the
relationship with the appliance manufacturer. Thus, the item was retained. The second
item, (v47 “We allow this manufacturer to substitute products”) was too weak to be
considered a reliable measure. Allowing substitution of products was apparently not
characteristic of forbearance for the home appliance industry. Product substitution may
have been routine as manufacturers ship slightly modified versions of appliances with
new product numbers. This item was reluctantly removed, reducing the FORB scale to
two items. Although a two-item scale is undesirable, it was a better alternative than
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retaining an item that did not reliably measure the construct. After removing items 47
and 48, 33 remaining items (80 percent) exhibited strong loadings with standardized
regression weights greater than .70 and squared multiple correlations higher than .50.
Standard regression weights for six items across the TBBE, PWR, DEP, and PPTL scales
were slightly lower, ranging in strength from .63 to .68, all with R2 greater than or equal
to .40. Although their loadings were somewhat lower than the recommended levels of
.70 and .50, these items were retained at this stage of analysis. Two items loaded less
than .60; one in the beleaguered FORB scale, v46 (r =.41, R2=.17) and one item in the
TBBE scale, v7 (r =.53, R2=.28). The FORB scale had been reduced to two items and
could not withstand a further reduction; therefore, v46 was retained. The item in the
TBBE scale was evaluated earlier for removal due to slight kurtosis and was retained for
theoretical reasons. It was retained again at this step for the same reasons.
An examination of standardized residuals did not point to problems with any
items. There were no negative residuals, all residuals were small (i.e., <2.58), and there
were no discernable patterns.
Discriminant validity. Modification indices (see Appendix E) were examined for
changes in relationships between indicators and latent constructs that would result in a
better fit, providing evidence for items with poor discriminant validity. Changes with a
modification index of 10 or higher were considered. Modification indices pointed to v41
in the PPTL scale as a potential problem. The item asked, “How often does your firm
invest a great deal of effort meeting with representatives from this manufacturer’s
competitors?” This item loaded on every latent construct in the model, appearing to be a
global assessment of the relationship rather than a specific measure of PPTL. Items 42
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and 43 in the PPTL scale also measured effort expended in evaluating alternatives and
searching for information, similar to item 41. Removing the item did not compromise the
substantive content of the scale, and it significantly improved the fit of the measurement
model; therefore, v41 was removed.
Exogenous constructs with high correlations also present concerns for
discriminant validity. That is, highly intercorrelated constructs may actually measure the
same latent concept. There were five exogenous constructs in this study: UNC, DEP,
PWR, CBBE, and TBBE. Among UNC, DEP, and PWR (the three exogenous
antecedents to RISK), all intercorrelations were less than .30 indicating the constructs
possess discriminant validity (Table 8). Because CBBE and TBBE were proposed as
dimensions of a higher order construct, BE, they were expected to be highly correlated
(.851).
Construct reliability and variance extracted. Construct reliability and variance
extracted provide additional evidence of convergent and discriminant validity (Table 9).
Construct reliability evaluates internal consistency of construct indicators, or the degree
to which indicators reliably depict the latent construct, and is an alternative to Cronbach’s
alpha coefficient of reliability. A commonly used threshold for acceptable reliability is
.70 (Hair et al. 1998). All scales in this study met or exceeded the .70 threshold.
Table 8. Correlations Among Exogenous Constructs
Exogenous Constructs
Uncertainty
<-->
Power
Uncertainty
<-->
Dependence
Power
<-->
Dependence
Consumer-based Brand Equity
<-->
Trade-Based Brand Equity

Estimated
Correlation
0.261
-0.181
0.225
0.851
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Table 9. Construct Reliability and Variance Extracted

Scale
Consumer-Based Brand Equity
Trade-Based Brand Equity
Uncertainty
Dependence
Supplier Power
Perceived Risk
Relationship Commitment
Cooperation
Propensity to Leave
Forbearance

CBBE
TBBE
UNC
DEP
PWR
RISK
COMM
COOP
PPTL
FORB

N of
items
3
4
3
4
5
5
6
5
4
2

Construct
a
Reliability
0.76
0.75
0.87
0.89
0.83
0.94
0.91
0.93
0.84
0.70

Variance
b
Extracted
0.51
0.43
0.70
0.66
0.50
0.75
0.63
0.68
0.64
0.58

(Σ standardized loadings)2
a
Construct reliability = (Σ standardized loadings )2 + Σ measurement error
Σ squared standardized loadings
Variance extracted = Σ squared standardized loadings + Σ measurement error

b

Variance extracted reflects the overall amount of variance in the indicators
accounted for by the latent construct. Higher variance extracted values signify that the
indicators accurately represent the latent construct. Guidelines for acceptable levels
suggest variance extracted values should exceed .50 (Hair et al. 1998). Nine of ten scales
met or exceeded the .50 threshold. TBBE was the only scale less than .50, reflecting 43
percent of variance in the indicators. Although the level of variance extracted for
TBBBE was somewhat below recommended levels, it was central to the theory and was
retained. Somewhat lower levels of variance extracted are acceptable for new scales in
exploratory research (Hair et al. 1998).
To summarize the scale purification step, one item in the FORB scale (v48) was
removed due to a negative loading. Two additional items were analyzed due to weak
loadings: one item in the COMM scale (v34) was retained for theoretical reasons and
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one item in the FORB scale (v47) was removed. One item in the PPTL scale (v41) was
identified as having poor discriminant validity and was removed. Reliability for all ten
constructs passed the threshold of .70, ranging from .70 to .94. Variance extracted for
nine of ten constructs met the criterion of .50 with a range from .50 to .75. One scale,
TBBE, measured .43 variance extracted and was retained for theoretical reasons.
After scale purification, the fit of the measurement model was evaluated again.
The changes resulted in an improved fit between the model and the data (χ2=2399, df
735, CMIN 4.08; TLI .971, CFI .975; RMSEA .062).

STRUCTURAL MODEL ANALYSIS
The basic structural model (Figure 11) estimated relationships that were the
subject of hypotheses related to the interorganizational buying situation. Because brand
equity and its dimensions (CBBE and TBBE) were hypothesized to be moderating
variables, they did not appear in the basic structural model diagram. Table 10 displays
standardized regression weights and fit statistics for the basic structural model.

Hypotheses Tests
H1a: Increased uncertainty (UNC) increases perceived risk (RISK).
The path from UNC to RISK was not significant (p = .442); therefore, the
hypothesis that uncertainty is antecedent to perceived risk was not supported by the data.
H1b: Increased dependence (DEP) increases perceived risk (RISK).
The path from DEP to RISK was significant (p = .000), in direction hypothesized,
and strong (.74). The data strongly supported the hypothesis that dependence is
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Figure 11. Basic Structural Model
Table 10. Basic Structural Model Statistics
Hypothesized Relationship
H1a: Uncertainty
Perceived Risk
H1b: Dependence
Perceived Risk
H1c: Power
Perceived Risk
H4: Perceived Risk
Relationship Commitment
H5: Relationship Commitment
Cooperation
H6: Relationship Commitment
Propensity to Leave
H7: Relationship Commitment
Forbearance
a
Not significant
b
Significant at .001
c
Significant at .05
Fit Statistics:
2
χ = 2627, 522 df
CMIN = 5.03

TLI = .968
CFI = .973

Estimates
a
-0.02
b
0.74
b
0.11
b
0.63
b
0.60
c
-0.10
b
-0.43

RMSEA = .071
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antecedent to perceived risk.
H1c: Increased supplier power (PWR) increases perceived risk (RISK).
The path from PWR to RISK was significant (p = .000) and in the hypothesized
direction, but weak (.11). The data supported the hypothesis that power is antecedent to
perceived risk.
H4: Increased perceived risk (RISK) increases relationship commitment (COMM).
The path from RISK to COMM was significant (p = .000), in the direction
hypothesized, and strong (.63). The data strongly supported the hypothesis that increased
perceived risk increases relationship commitment.
H5: Increased relationship commitment (COMM) increases cooperation (COOP).
The path from COMM to COOP was significant (p = .000), in the direction
hypothesized, and strong (.60). The data strongly supported the hypothesis that increased
relationship commitment increases cooperation.
H6: Increased relationship commitment (COMM) decreases propensity to leave
(PPTL).
The path from COMM to PPTL was significant (p = .019), in the direction
hypothesized, but weak (-.10). The data supported the hypothesis that increased
relationship commitment decreases propensity to leave.
H7: Increased relationship commitment (COMM) increases forbearance (FORB).
The path from COMM to FORB was significant (p = .000) and strong (-.43);
however, it was not in the direction hypothesized. Increased relationship commitment
decreased, rather than increased, forbearance. Therefore, the hypothesis that increased
relationship commitment increases forbearance was not supported by the data.
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H2: Both trade-based brand equity (TBBE) and consumer-based brand equity
(CBBE) are dimensions of brand equity (BE).
To test the second-order structure of brand equity, the fit of two nested models
were estimated (Figure 12) in addition to the saturated and independence models. The
second-order model estimated the path weights B1 and B2 from brand equity (BE) to its
dimensions (CBBE and TBBE), constraining them to equality (B1 = B2). The nested
first-order model did not estimate those paths; they were constrained to zero. The nested
model comparison revealed a significant difference between the first-order and second
order models (p = .000, χ2 change 417, 1 df); that is, the second-order model improved
the chi-square statistic by 417 with one additional degree of freedom. Although the
incremental fit of the second order model is good (TLI .963, CFI .983), the absolute fit of
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Figure 12. Second-Order Model of Brand Equity
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the second-order model is poor (χ2 = 301, 15 df, CMIN 23.172; RMSEA .252).
Therefore, the data offered marginal support for the hypothesis that there are two
dimensions of brand equity.
Hypothesis 3: Brand equity held by a trade partner moderates the relationships
between perceived risk and its antecedents.
Testing the moderating effect a variable using SEM is similar to testing for group
differences. Identical models are used for the groups tested; however, parameters take on
different values for the different groups as dictated by the theory (Arbuckle and Wothke
1999). To accomplish the test of brand equity as a moderator required a three-step
process. First, average scores were calculated for the dimensions of CBBE and TBBE,
and then an average of those values was taken to arrive at a BE score. Next, the data
were trichotomized by grouping the BE scores into three categories -- Low BE, Moderate
BE, and High BE. To maximize variation, the LBE and HBE groups were used to test for
a moderating effect. Finally, the parameters of interest (i.e., the paths from UNC, DEP,
and PWR to RISK) were labeled in order to constrain the estimates of their values
(Figure 13), and the fit of the two nested models were estimated.
The first model was the Moderated Model; that is, the paths from UNC, DEP, and
PWR to RISK were free to vary depending on the level of BE. For the second model -the Unmoderated Model -- the paths were constrained to equality under conditions of
Low BE and High BE (i.e., G1Low = G1High). Therefore, the Unmoderated Model
constrained the path weights to be the same regardless of the level of BE, while the
Moderated Model allowed differences in the level of BE to change the path weights. The
models were then compared to determine if there were significant differences in the fit
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Figure 13. Moderating Effect of Brand Equity
with the data. If there were significant differences, then the fit statistics were examined
to determine which model was the better fit -- in this case, the Moderated Model or the
Unmoderated Model. The nested model comparison showed no significant differences
between the Moderated Model and Unmoderated Model for any path between perceived
risk and its antecedents. Therefore, H3 was rejected, based upon the data -- brand equity
did not moderate the relationships between Perceived Risk and its antecedents. Statistics
for the tests are given following each pair of specific hypotheses.

H3a: High brand equity decreases the strength of the relationship between
uncertainty and perceived risk.
H3d: Low brand equity increases the strength of the relationship between
uncertainty and perceived risk.
The model with a moderated path from UNC to RISK was not significantly
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different from the model with an unmoderated path from UNC to RISK (p = .885).
Based upon the data, the hypotheses that brand equity moderates the relationship between
uncertainty and perceived risk was rejected.
H3b: High brand equity increases the strength of the relationship between
dependence and perceived risk.
H3e: Low brand equity decreases the strength of the relationship between
dependence and perceived risk.
The model with a moderated path from DEP to RISK was not significantly
different from the model with an unmoderated path from DEP to RISK (p = .690). Based
upon the data, the hypotheses that brand equity moderates the relationship between
dependence and perceived risk was rejected.
H3c: High brand equity increases the strength of the relationship between power
and perceived risk.
H3f: Low brand equity decreases the strength of the relationship between power
and perceived risk.
The model with a moderated path from PWR to RISK was not significantly
different from the model with an unmoderated path from PWR to RISK (p = .860).
Based upon the data, the hypotheses that brand equity moderates the relationship between
power and perceived risk was rejected.
Post-Hoc Analysis
Because the data did not support a moderating effect of brand equity, the primary
research question remained unanswered: “What is the effect of brand equity on supply
chain relationships?” The literature lends theoretical support for a direct effect of brand
equity on relationship commitment (Fournier 1998; Kapferer 1992; Morgan and Hunt
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1994; Wathne 2001). Therefore, an alternative model was tested to estimate the direct
effect of brand equity on relationship commitment (Figure 14). Two nested models were
fit along with the saturated and independence models:
Model 1. First-Order Effects of Consumer-Based Brand Equity (CBBE) and
Trade-Based Brand Equity (TBBE) on Relationship Commitment
(COMM)
Model 2. Second-Order Effect of Brand Equity (BE) on Relationship
Commitment (COMM)
Model 2, the Second-Order Effect of Brand Equity, was significantly different
from Model 1 (p=0.000). The second-order model improved the χ2 statistic over the
first-order model by 110 with 1 additional degree of freedom and has acceptable fit (χ2
4340, 773 df, CMIN 5.6; TLI .957 CFI .961; RMSEA .076).
Like the basic structural model, all paths in the model were significant with the
exception of the path from UNC to RISK (see Table 11). The path from BE to COMM
was significant (p=0.000) and relatively strong (.38). Introducing BE with a direct effect
on COMM reduced the weight of the path from RISK to COMM from .63 (in the basic
structural model) to .51. Therefore, perceived risk explained 51 percent of variance in
relationship commitment while brand equity explained 38 percent of variance in
relationship commitment.
The direct-effect model also permitted a more robust test of the second-order
structure of brand equity by allowing the second-order structure to be tested in the
presence of all other constructs. As stated previously, the fit comparison between the
first-order model and second-order model revealed a significant difference (p=0.000),
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and the second-order model was a better fit with the data providing strong support for H2.
The test of the second-order model also permitted an estimation of the relative weights of
CBBE and TBBE to BE. The path from BE to TBBE was relatively higher (.68)
compared to the path from BE to CBBE (.61).
This model permitted an analysis of the effect of the structure of brand equity
(Figure 15). To test the effect of CBBE-dominant and TBBE-dominant structures, cases
were selected where the difference between CBBE and TBBE was greater than one on a
7-point scale. There were 99 TBBE-dominant cases (i.e., TBBE - CBBE > 1) and 103
CBBE-dominant cases (i.e., CBBE - TBBE >1). All paths were significant (p< .01) with
the exception of the path from COMM to PPTL (Table 11). The model was a good fit
with the data (χ2 = 4963, 275 df, CMIN 4.9; TLI .958, CFI .964; RMSEA .050).
0,

0,
e3

e4

v3

v4

1

1

0,

0,

0,

e7

e8

1e10 1

v5

v7

v8

v10

1

1

1
0
CBBE
10, 1
p77

0,

0,
e5

e11

1

v11

0 1
0, 1
G1

p66

TBBE

1G2
0

v35

0, 1
1

0, 1

p11

p88

v36

0

1

v37

COOP

v38

0,

1

e35

0,

1

e36

0,

1

e37

0,

1

e38

0,
1 v39 1 e39
0,
1

BE

p22

0

1

0
0,
11

v40

0, 1

B2

COMM

1

PPTL
0, 1
p33

1

v43

0

FORB

1

v45
v46

0,

1

e420,

1
1

v44

p44

1

v42

e40

1
1

e430,
e44

0,
e45

0,

e46

v29 v30 v31 v32 v33 v34

1 0, 1 0, 1 0,1 0, 1 0, 1 0,
e29 e30 e31 e32 e33 e34

Figure 15. Brand Equity Structure
141

Table 11. Direct Effect Model Statistics
Hypothesized Relationship
Power
Perceived Risk
Dependence
Perceived Risk
Uncertainty
Perceived Risk
Brand Equity
Trade-Based Brand Equity
Brand Equity
Consumer-Based Brand Equity
Brand Equity
Relationship Commitment
Perceived Risk
Relationship Commitment
Relationship Commitment
Cooperation
Relationship Commitment
Propensity to Leave
Relationship Commitment
Forbearance
a
Significant at .000
b
Not significant
c
Significant at < .05

Esitmate
a
0.112
a
0.739
b
-0.016
a
0.680
a
0.605
a
0.383
a
0.506
a
0.590
c
-0.092
a
-0.415

While the path from BE to COMM was the same weight for both structures, the paths
from COMM to the outcome variables (COOP, PPTL, and FORB) were different (Table
12), suggesting a difference in COMM under different structures of BE. The path
between COMM and COOP was stronger under TBBE-dominant brand equity. COMM
explained 59 percent of variance in COOP when there was TBBE-dominant brand equity,
compared to 41 percent for CBBE dominance. The path between COMM and PPTL was
significant under TBBE-dominant brand equity, with COMM explaining 22 percent of
PPTL. The path from COMM to PPTL was not significant for CBBE-dominant brand
equity. The path between relationship commitment and forbearance was stronger for
CBBE-dominant brand equity. When BE was CBBE-dominant, COMM explained 54
percent of forbearance, and when BE was TBBE-dominant, COMM explained only 40
percent of forbearance.
These findings suggest there was a differential effect on relationship commitment
for the two structures of brand equity -- CBBE-dominant brand equity and TBBE142

Table 12. Brand Equity Structural Statistics

Brand Equity
Relationship Commitment
Relationship Commitment
Relationship Commitment
a
Not significant
b
p = .05

Relationship Commitment
Cooperation
Propensity to Leave
Forbearance

CBBE
Dominant
0.645
0.415
a
-0.122
-0.538

TBBE
Dominant
0.645
0.591
b
-0.224
-0.400

dominant brand equity. Under conditions of TBBE-dominant brand equity, relationship
commitment explained more variance in cooperation and propensity to leave. Under
conditions of CBBE-dominant brand equity, relationship commitment explained more
variance in forbearance.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provided details of the main study data analyses along with findings
related to the hypotheses proposed in Chapter II. Structural equation modeling was used
to test hypothesized theoretical relationships. The data supported six hypothesized
relationships and rejected five. One of the rejected relationships was the moderating
effect of brand equity on the relationships between perceived risk and its antecedents. A
post-hoc analysis provided an alternative model of the direct effect of brand equity on
relationship commitment that was found to be an adequate fit with the data. This
conceptualization also permitted a more robust test of the second-order structure of brand
equity, including a test of the effect of the structure of brand equity. The final chapter
discusses the findings, limitations of the study, and directions for future research.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation set out to understand the phenomenon of brand equity in the
supply chain and explain its effect on supply chain relationships. The qualitative study
described in Chapter II provided exploratory insights into the meaning of brand equity in
the supply chain and the ground for a theoretical model of the effect of brand equity in
supply chain relationships. This chapter discusses the findings of the quantitative test of
the theoretical model, the directions for future research, and marketing implications for
this research.

DISCUSSION
The primary research question for this dissertation was “What is the effect of
brand equity in the supply chain?” To answer this question, it was first necessary to
understand the meaning of brand equity in the supply chain. The qualitative study
reported in Chapter II provided a methodology for exploring the meaning of brand equity
in the supply chain in order to build a basic understanding of the phenomenon and the
context in which it is embedded. Based on reports of informants in the qualitative study,
it appeared that the effect of brand equity in supply chain relationships worked through
perceived risk to increase relationship commitment. Informants readily offered examples
of the effect of their trade-partners’ brand equity on perceived risk and its antecedents -uncertainty, dependence, and power. However, these relationships were not borne out in
the quantitative test. There are several possible explanations for this.
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First, the qualitative study was conducted in industries that differ significantly on
several points from the context for the quantitative study. Most of the qualitative data
was collected in the textile industry (home textiles and apparel) and the quantitative study
was carried out in the home appliance industry. The textile industry was described as
very dynamic and turbulent due to its fashion-orientation requiring frequent introduction
of new styles and product lines. It was also portrayed as having experienced rapid and
extensive globalization that contributed to vast restructuring in the industry. In contrast,
supply chain relationships in the home appliance industry appeared to be relatively stable
as evidenced by the length of relationships reported by survey respondents. The home
appliance industry was also very concentrated while the textile industry was becoming
increasingly fragmented. Second, the majority of informants in the qualitative study were
further upstream in the supply chain than the retail respondents in the quantitative study.
Retailers are closest to consumer demand and, therefore, experience less risk due to the
bullwhip effect compared to upstream firms. Taken together, these differences in
industry characteristics and position in the supply chain could account for different views
of the relationship between perceived risk and brand equity found in the qualitative and
quantitative studies. Perhaps the volatility of the textile industry brought perceived risk
to the foreground for upstream firms while the stability of the home appliance industry
put it in the background for downstream retailers.
For qualitative informants, managing perceived risk was portrayed as an
organizing principle for interorganizational exchange and the point where brand equity
had the greatest effect. While the quantitative study supported a strong relationship
between perceived risk and relationship commitment, it did not support an effect of brand
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equity on perceived risk. Rather, the post-hoc analysis revealed a direct effect of brand
equity on relationship commitment, a central concern for retailers in the home appliance
industry. These conflicting findings suggest the possibility of an interesting dynamic in
interorganizational exchange. Perhaps both interpretations are legitimate. Perhaps there
are situations where brand equity works through perceived risk to increase relationship
commitment and, in other situations, the effect is a direct one on relationship
commitment. The literature in interorganizational exchange provides theoretical insights
for this speculation.
Drawing on the political economy paradigm (Thorelli 1986), empirical studies in
interorganizational exchange in the 1970s centered on power-dependence relations
between members of channel dyads (Hunt and Nevin 1974; Reve and Stern 1979; Sheth
and Gardner 1982; Stern and Reve 1980). Channel relationships were conceptualized as
social structures that perform an economic function, “bridging the gap between
production and consumption” (Stern and Reve 1980, p. 55). The internal socio-political
structure of channels was defined as the pattern of power-dependence relationships, and
internal processes were described in terms of “dominant sentiments” of cooperation
and/or conflict. Although the political economy framework opened the door to
examination of cooperative forms of exchange, research based on the political economy
framework tended to focus on issues of power, dependence, and conflict.
With the advent of relational theories of interorganizational exchange, research
stemming from the political economy framework was criticized for its narrow focus on
power and conflict. Frazier (1983) proposed broadening the perspective on
interorganizational exchange behavior, suggesting a comprehensive framework for
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inquiry that was interactive and relational. The subsequent rise of the relationship
marketing paradigm in the interorganizational exchange literature spurred a stream of
research examining the nature and role of commitment in exchange (Anderson and Weitz
1992; Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer 1995; Morgan and
Hunt 1994), shifting the focus from power and conflict to commitment and cooperation.
Power and conflict were characterized as traits of dysfunctional interorganizational
relationships while commitment and cooperation were hailed as the hallmarks of
functional interorganizational exchange.
The two perspectives on the effect of brand equity in the supply chain in this
study bring together the political economy and relationship frameworks of
interorganizational exchange. Power-dependence (i.e., the political economy framework)
and commitment-cooperation (i.e., the relationship paradigm) are simultaneously
modeled as components relevant to interorganizational exchange. Both the qualitative
analysis, as well as the results of the quantitative study, support a strong relationship
between perceived risk, the outcome of power-dependence, and relationship commitment.
Why did qualitative informants describe brand equity in the supply chain in terms of its
effect on perceived risk while respondents in the quantitative study located the effect on
commitment? The following section on the structure of brand equity provides insights
that are helpful in answering this question.

The Structure of Brand Equity in the Supply Chain
The post-hoc analysis provided strong support for a second-order structure of
brand equity similar to that described by informants in the qualitative study. Brand
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equity in the supply chain was found to be comprised of two dimensions in both studies -consumer-based brand equity and trade-based brand equity. In the quantitative study,
further tests showed trade-based brand equity to be relatively more important than
consumer-based brand equity; however, as noted in the qualitative study, these
dimensions were highly correlated. Consumer-based brand equity was reported by
informants in the qualitative study to be an important aspect of the value proposition
between trade partners, often opening the door to new relationships or providing staying
power to existing relationships. At the same time, trade-based brand equity secured the
upstream and downstream resources necessary for building brand equity in the supply
chain.
The quantitative test of differences for CBBE-dominant brand equity and TBBEdominant brand equity shed additional light on the effect of brand equity in the supply
chain. Although the level of relationship commitment was the same for both types of
brand equity, the effect of relationship commitment on outcomes were different for the
two types. Cooperation and propensity to leave was stronger with firms with TBBEdominant brand equity, and the effect of relationship commitment on forbearance was
stronger for CBBE-dominant brand equity. One plausible explanation for these
differences could be that the nature of the commitment is different, thereby producing
different effects on outcomes.
Prior research proposes a three-component model of the structure of commitment
with instrumental, attitudinal, and temporal dimensions (Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer
1995; Meyer and Allen 1991). Perhaps TBBE-dominant brand equity tapped into the
attitudinal dimension of relationship commitment and CBBE-dominant brand equity
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drew on the instrumental dimension. The attitudinal component of commitment
comprises intentions to develop and maintain an enduring relationship while the
instrumental element signifies a self-interest stake in the relationship. The scale used to
measure relationship commitment is a stronger measure of attitudinal commitment (e.g.,
“This relationship is one we intend to maintain indefinitely.”) than instrumental
commitment. The concept of TBBE resonates more strongly with the attitudinal
component of commitment (e.g., “This company is known in the industry as a company
that takes good care of their trade partners.”). In contrast, CBBE represents a means to
an end for retailers, thus tapping into the instrumental notion of commitment. In the case
of CBBE-dominant brand equity, relationship commitment may be based on the retailer’s
self-interest of doing business with a manufacturer that assures high responsiveness
among consumers and has less to do with an attitude of enduring commitment. These
differences in the structure of commitment could, therefore, affect the relationship
between commitment and its outcomes.
Similarly, in the qualitative study, informants appeared to be describing
instrumental commitment; that is, the qualitative informants reported forming
relationships out of self-interest in order to defend against threats in turbulent
environments. The abandonment of intentions to develop and maintain long-standing
relationships in favor of flexibility under these conditions could be interpreted as
indicative of instrumental, rather than attitudinal, commitment. In this situation, perhaps
commitment and cooperation take a back seat to power and dependence in
interorganizational exchange. In response to the environment, firms may position
themselves to leverage their brand equity in negotiating issues around power and
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dependence rather than as a foundation for attitudinal commitment. Hence, the
qualitative informants reported brand equity related to perceived risk rather than
relationship commitment.

Perceived Risk in Interorganizational Exchange
Two of the three hypothesized relationships between perceived risk and its
antecedents -- uncertainty, dependence, and power -- were supported. The hypothesized
antecedent-phenomenon model of perceived risk was different from the conceptualization
of risk borrowed from consumer behavior and applied in the interorganizational setting.
The weak correlation between uncertainty and dependence (-.181) lends support to the
antecedent-phenomenon conceptualization of perceived risk in interorganizational
exchange rather than perceived risk as comprised of the dimensions of uncertainty and
dependence as holds in the consumer setting. Higher correlations (e.g., >.70) would be
expected if they were dimensions of a higher-order construct.
A surprising finding was the lack of significance of the relationship between
uncertainty and perceived risk. This is interesting given the prevailing conceptualization
of uncertainty as a critical dimension of perceived risk (Bauer 1960, Sheth 1973). Since
perceived risk is a function of the level of consequences multiplied by the level of
uncertainty, perceived risk would not exist where there is no uncertainty. That
relationship did not appear to hold in this study -- the level of uncertainty was not
significant to the level of perceived risk. There are several possible explanations for the
lack of significance of this relationship.
Again, it is possible very low levels of uncertainty were present in the context of
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the quantitative study. Given the length of relationships between retailers and appliance
manufacturers, it is probable that uncertainty has been reduced to background noise. In
comparison, uncertainty appeared to be a concern for informants in the qualitative study.
However, as proposed by Morgan and Hunt, uncertainty may be more appropriately
modeled as an outcome of relationship commitment. Second, it is also possible that
uncertainty is indeed antecedent, but does not have a linear relationship to perceived risk.
If the relationship is curvilinear with increasing and decreasing values at different points
on the curve, it is not amenable to testing in SEM. Finally, the lack of significance could
be the result of measurement error. The scale for uncertainty in this study was reduced to
measure only the uncertainty in the exchange relationship in order to achieve a
unidimensional construct. As a result, environmental uncertainty -- an important
dimension of uncertainty in the qualitative study -- was excluded from the study. A
different conceptualization of uncertainty may yield different results.
The weak correlation between power and dependence in this study (.225) is also
an interesting finding. Increased dependence on a trade partner is thought to increase the
power of the trade partner; however, the findings in this study do not support this notion.
This is an instance where the longevity of relationships in the home appliance industry
should provide ample opportunity for a strong correlation, if one is to be found. The
relatively weak path between power and perceived risk was also interesting. Survey
respondents were retailers; therefore, they occupy the position in the supply chain with
the highest potential for power, which could explain the weak relationship between
power and perceived risk in the quantitative study. However, these retailers were largely
small businesses -- extremely little fish compared to the large manufacturers in the home
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appliance industry -- which would argue for a stronger relationship between power and
perceived risk in this context. This finding is one that deserves further investigation in
post-hoc analyses.

Outcomes of Relationship Commitment
What do managers stand to gain by investing in brand equity in the supply chain?
Three hypotheses were tested to answer this question. H5 was strongly supported:
increased relationship commitment increases cooperation. Relationship commitment
explains 60 percent of the variance in cooperation.
H6 was also supported: increased relationship commitment reduces propensity to
leave the relationship. However, relationship commitment explained only 10 percent of
variance in propensity to leave. The low magnitude of this path indicates there are other
factors not included in the model that influence propensity to leave. H7 was significant
and strong, but not in the direction hypothesized. Relationship commitment varies
inversely (-.42) with forbearance; that is, forbearance decreases as commitment increases.
Overall, there was very little evidence for forbearance in the quantitative study.
Responses were largely below the midpoint of the scale with mean value of 3.41. It
appeared that customers were less likely to be lenient as they become more committed to
relationships with suppliers. One possible explanation for this relationship is that
increased commitment may also increase performance expectations for trade partners.
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DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Limiting the quantitative study to one industry served the research purpose by
minimizing extraneous variation for the theory test; however, the design simultaneously
constrained the generalizability of findings. In several instances mentioned previously, it
would have been useful to have data from industries with different characteristics in order
to examine the effect of industry characteristics. Similarly, this study focused on only
one point in the supply chain, the retailer-manufacturer relationship. Future studies that
include multiple industries and multiple points in the supply chain would provide the
opportunity to explore the boundaries for which theoretical relationships hold.
The scales used to measure consumer-based brand equity and trade-based brand
equity can be improved, and the understanding of the interplay of brand equity and
interorganizational exchange needs to be deepened. The relatively low variance extracted
by the trade-based brand equity scale suggests there is more work to do in tapping the
domain of this construct. As a first step, it will be interesting to revisit the qualitative
data to further examine reports of brand equity in the supply chain. It will also be
important to find field settings that introduce more variation, both in industry
characteristics and at different points in the supply chain, to round out the dimensions of
brand equity.
An intriguing aspect of brand equity in the supply chain is the effect not only with
downstream customers, but also with upstream suppliers. A study that explores this
multi-directional effect of brand equity in the supply chain could also examine the effect
on competitors, giving a 360o view of brand equity in the supply chain.
As reported by informants in the qualitative study, the effect of brand equity in
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the supply chain is dynamic, changing over time and responsive to changes in the
context. The cross-sectional nature of this study prohibited an examination the dynamic
nature of brand equity in the supply chain and constrained the exploration of hypothetical
feedback loops. A longitudinal study would provide the opportunity to explore the
dynamics of theoretical relationships over time and to discover feedback loops that may
add to or subtract from brand equity.
This study purposefully excluded an examination of industrial goods, that is,
goods that are consumed in production processes by organizational customers.
Comparing brand equity for industrial goods and services with brand equity for products
that have individual end-consumers would provide the opportunity to examine a potential
important variation in the concept of brand equity in the supply chain.
Both the qualitative and quantitative studies relied heavily on self-reports.
Although self-reports have been shown to be reliable, it would be enlightening to add
external measures such as market share or financial performance indicators.
Finally, the justification for this research is the increasing pressure on firms to
respond to globalization of supply networks. As supply chains become more global, it
will be important to extend this research to cross-cultural settings in order to examine
differences in cultural influences on the perception of brand equity in the supply chain.

MARKETING IMPLICATIONS
As stated in Chapter I, the challenge to brand managers in the supply chain
context is three-fold: 1) understanding how to build brand equity when the customer is
an organization rather than an individual, 2) knowing when to invest in the trade brand
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versus the consumer brand, and 3) identifying critical target markets both within the
supply chain as well as in consumer markets. This study provides guidance for
addressing these challenges.
First, the findings strongly suggest brands in the supply chain are much more than
“the name, term, sign, or symbol” included in the definition proposed by the AMA.
Building brand equity in the supply chain involves a different kind of effort when
compared to activities designed to build brand awareness and brand image in consumer
markets. Clearly, brand equity in the supply chain is embodied in experience,
specifically in the experience of relationships among trade partners. While traditional
tools for brand managers such as advertising and promotions are used in building brand
equity in the supply chain, they are not sufficient for the whole task. When the customer
is an organization, brands are perceived through the experience with the company as
participants in a supply chain; therefore, brand managers must be concerned about
delivering value in the relationship as well as the product. This requires a more highly
integrated effort across the firm and different tools compared to traditional brand
management. In many firms, brand management and sales management are divorced
with different organizational structures, strategies, and goals, and thus are not organized
in a way that facilitates implementing successful brand strategies in the supply chain. To
successfully manage the firm’s brand equity, executives are advised to monitor and
manage not only the dimension of consumer-based brand equity, but also the dimension
of trade-based brand equity.
When should companies invest in the consumer brand and when should they
invest in the trade brand? Results of this study suggest that firms should be aware of the
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differential effects of consumer-based dominance and trade-based dominance in their
relationships with trade partners. On one hand, strong consumer-based brand equity
provides a competitive advantage for firms in their dealings with trade partners and can
provide a basis for developing stronger trade-based brand equity. However, there may be
a point of diminishing returns in investments in the consumer brand’s contribution to the
brand equity of the firm. This study indicated that firms with trade-dominant brand
equity are in a stronger position relative to firms with consumer-dominant brand equity
when it comes to propensity to leave the relationship. At a minimum, executives should
be aware of the structure of their firms’ brand equity, and should consider whether they
are appropriately allocating investments between building the consumer brand and the
trade brand.
The final challenge for managing brand equity in the supply chain is identifying
relevant target markets. The concept of brand equity in the supply chain implies the
notion that a firm’s brand equity has potentially far-reaching effects, well beyond the next
customer or the end-consumer. As noted by informants in the qualitative study,
competent management of brand equity in the supply chain can not only provide access
to profitable customers, but also afford competitive advantage by solidifying
relationships with desirable suppliers who assure consistency and high quality resources
needed to strengthen the brand with end-consumers. Focusing efforts on building brand
equity only with end-consumers indeed overlooks critical target audiences for the brand
as suggested by Shocker, Srivistava and Reukert (1994) and Webster (2000).
For supply chain managers, this research points to the importance of integrating
the supply chain strategy with brand strategy. These strategies should be mutually
156

supportive, with common goals and objectives. The example given by one informant
who recognized the importance of building end-to-end strategic relationships in order to
support growth of the firm’s brand equity captures the vision of the power to be gained
by harnessing supply chain and brand strategy to serve the same goals. This study also
provides a framework for assessing the impact of brand equity in supply chain
relationships. Evaluating the level and structure of the firm’s brand equity relative to
competitors may provide insight into ways to strengthen critical relationships not only
with customers, but also with key suppliers.

CONCLUSION
This research lays a foundation for an ongoing program of research in the area of
brand equity in the supply chain. The study provides a different way of looking at brand
equity that captures both the effect of brand equity in consumer markets as well as the
impact of brand equity in supply chain relationships. This perspective not only holds
promise for opening up new avenues of scholarly inquiry in brand management and
supply chain management, but also offers guidance to marketing managers who are
searching for tools fitted for the task of assuring their firms’ survival and prosperity in the
turbulent business environment of the new millennium.
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APPENDIX A.
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
1. I would like to begin by having you tell me a little bit about your job. What do you
do for [your company]? How long have you worked for [your company]?
2. How does that fit into [your company’s] organizational structure?
3. Let’s start by looking upstream -- about how many suppliers do you work with? Has
that number been trending up or down?
Probes:
Are there some suppliers that are more important than others?
What characteristics make these suppliers important?
Do you have a way of letting them know how they are performing? How do the
best performers differ from the worst performers?
What do you worry about as you think about managing relationships with
suppliers?
4. What things are considered when you think about supplier qualifications? If you
think about a supplier that is a joy to work with, how would you describe that
supplier? What about one that is a real headache?
5. Are there some suppliers that are better known than others in your industry?
Probes:
What makes them better known than other suppliers like them? Do you consider
them to have consumer brand equity? Does that matter to you?
Does their reputation give them any advantages in dealing with [your company]?
Do you prefer dealing with the better-known companies?
6. Do you have stronger relationships with some suppliers as opposed to others?
Probes:
How are these relationships different from those with other suppliers?
How would you compare the turnover rates among those you consider to be
strong versus the others?
How does a supplier’s reputation affect your relationship with them?
Can you give me some examples of reasons for leaving a relationship with a
supplier? Are there any differences between reasons for leaving a close
relationship versus another relationship?
.
Is there anything else I should know if I want to understand your supply chain
relationships?
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APPENDIX B.
NODE LISTING
1

Alternative suppliers
Description: The extent to which there is a ready source of supply from other
suppliers

2

Attributes
Description: Physical characteristics of the product exchanged between supply
chain partners

3

Brand equity
Description: The added value endowed by the brand

4

Brand management
Description: Internal process designed to support and strengthen the company’s
brands

5

Brand strategy
Description: The approach for achieving corporate objectives for the brand

6

Branding
Description: Visible, tactical implementation of brand strategy such as
identifiable symbols

7

Business philosophy
Description: The firm’s beliefs that drive business practice

8

Change
Description:

Differences in internal and external environment of the firm

9

Collaboration
Description: Extremely close working partnership with another firm

10

Competition
Description: References to the competitive environment of the firm

11

Consumer-Based Brand Equity
Description: The differential effect of brand knowledge on consumer response
to the marketing of the brand
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12

Cooperation
Description: The degree to which the buying firm works with the supplier to
achieve mutual goals

13

Customer Expectations
Description: What customers expect from the firm

14

Customers
Description:

Characteristics of specific customers or the firm's customer base

15

Customer Risk
Description: Risk associated with losing customers

16

Decision making
Description: Processes within or between firms for arriving at decisions

17

Dependence
Description: The extent to which attainment of goals is mediated by another
firm and is available only through the relationship with that firm

18

Differentiation
Description: Characteristics that make a firm different from its competitors

19

Downstream customers
Description: Customers located closer to the end consumer

20

Expertise
Description: Know-how

21

Financial Risk
Description: Risk associated with financial performance of the firm

22

Forbearance
Description:

Leniency with trade partners

Future
Description:

Predictions of what may happen in the future

23
24

Global sourcing
Description: Arrangements for securing resources on a world-wide basis

25

Increased Costs
Description: Additional resource commitments
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26

Industry Restructuring
Description: Changes in the participants or structure of an industry

27

Information exchange
Description: Descriptions of method, content and frequency of data and
knowledge shared between firms in the supply chain

28

Integrity
Description:

Evaluations of the ethical conduct of trading partners

29

Interdependence
Description: The level of mutual reliance among trading partners

30

Intrafirm communication
Description: Communications within the firm

31

Mutual Gain
Description: Win/win situations

32

Non-product attributes
Description: Intangible characteristics of the offering

33

Partnership
Description:

Working with another firm for mutual gain

Penalties
Description:

Financial punishments for failing to meet terms of an agreement

34
35

Perceived Risk
Description: The potential impact of failure to acquire a resource on the
profitability of the firm

36

Power
Description: The ability to control the decision variables in the marketing
strategy of another member in the supply chain

37

Pricing
Description:

38

Actions that determine price levels

Private label
Description: Products manufactured and marketed as a retail brand
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39

Product brand
Description: The brand of a specific product offering

40

Propensity to Leave
Description: The likelihood that the buying firm will leave the relationship in
the near future

41

Pull strategy
Description: Promoting the brand with a downstream customer to pull products
through the supply chain

42

Quality
Description:

Concern for quality or quality control

43

Relationship commitment
Description: The strength of the intention to develop and maintain a stable,
long-term relationship

44

Reputation
Description:

What a company is known for

45

Responsiveness
Description: Attentiveness to the needs of the trade partner

46

Revenue Loss
Description: Potential loss of revenue

47

Reverse Auctioning
Description: Puttting business out to bid on the Internet

48

Role of the salesperson
Description: How the salesperson interacts with trade partners

49

Scorecard
Description:

Supplier performance reports

50

Service levels
Description: Percentage of products actually delivered

51

Sole-sourcing
Description: Using a single supplier for a particular resource

52

Stability
Description:

Low levels of change
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53

Strategic Supply
Description: Supply that is critical to achieving strategic goals

54

Supply base
Description:

Descriptions of the nature of the supply base

55

Supply chain relationship
Description: Descriptions of trade partner relationships

56

Switching Costs
Description: Investments in assets that are specific to one relationship

57

Trade-Based Brand Equity
Description: The differential effect of the brand on the response of trading
partners to marketing activities of the firm

58

Trustworthiness
Description: Characteristic of firms with high integrity

59

Uncertainty
Description:
predicted

The degree to which future resource flows cannot be accurately

60

Unpredictability
Description: Events that are unanticipated and unplanned

61

Value Added Services
Description: Services designed to augment product offers

62

Value proposition
Description: The value perceived in the firm’s offer

63

Volume of supply
Description: Suppliers responsible for a high volume or high percentage of
supply base for a firm
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APPENDIX C.
PRE-TEST SURVEY ITEMS
1.

How long has this manufacturer been a supplier to your business?
Less than 1 year
1 to 5 years
6 to 10 years
11 to 15 years
More than 16 years

2.

What percentage of your firm’s home appliances are supplied by this manufacturer?
Less than 20%
20 - 40%
41 - 60%
61 - 80%
More than 80%

3.

How much do you know about the relationship with this manufacturer?
No knowledge
Very little knowledge
An adequate amount of knowledge
A lot of knowledge
A very high level of knowledge

4.

How many home appliance manufacturers does your firm do business with?
1
2
3
4
5 or more

5. How many years of experience do you have in your job, including similar experience
at other companies?
Less than 1 year
1 to 5 years
6 to 10 years
11 to 15 years
More than 15 years
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6.

The name of this manufacturer is well-known by retailers in the home appliance
industry.

7.

Retailers recognize this manufacturer as a strong trade partner.

8.

This manufacturer is always given a chance to bid on our business.

9.

This manufacturer’s name gives them an advantage over other manufacturers.

10.

Many retailers in the appliance industry would not recognize the name of this
manufacturer.

11.

This manufacturer is known in the industry as a company that takes good care of
their trade partners.

12.

We are willing to pay more in order to do business with this manufacturer.

13. Our customers…
a. rarely ask for appliances produced by this manufacturer.
b. know this manufacturer’s products to be a good value.
c. expect us to carry this manufacturer’s brands.
d. are willing to pay more in order to buy this manufacturer’s appliances.
e. often buy appliances exclusively from this manufacturer.
f. would be disappointed if we did not carry this manufacturer’s brands.
14. Our company...
a. could easily replace this manufacturer.
b. is dependent on this manufacturer.
c. believes this manufacturer’s products are crucial to our success.
d. does not have a good alternative to this manufacturer.
e. needs this manufacturer to achieve our goals.
15. If we could no longer get appliances from this manufacturer,
a. it would hurt our firm.
b. our firm would be in danger of losing a lot of money.
c. we would run the risk of losing customers.
d. our firm would see virtually no change in profits.
e. our customer satisfaction levels would go down.
f. it would threaten the profitability of our firm.
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15. We know exactly what to expect from this manufacturer.
16. We are certain this manufacturer will keep its promises.
17. We can accurately predict how this manufacturer will perform.
18. We are often uncertain if this manufacturer will follow through on commitments.
19. We never know if we will get what we need from this manufacturer.
20. This manufacturer unexpectedly changes important things.
21. This manufacturer has the ability to …

a. dictate pricing policies for their appliances.
b. determine the level of inventory we carry for their appliances.
c. dictate the number of appliances we order from them.
d. determine the mix of products we order from them.
e. require us to follow rules about displaying their products.
f. require us to follow specific guidelines in promoting their products.
22. The relationship my company has with this manufacturer…

a. is something we are very committed to.
b. is one we intend to maintain indefinitely.
c. deserves our maximum effort to maintain.
d. is something we would do almost anything to keep.
e. is one we care a great deal about long-term.
f. would take very little effort to end.
23. How often do you work together with this manufacturer to …

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

boost sales of their appliances to your customers?
help them understand ways to serve your customers more effectively?
solve any problems that arise?
figure out ways to cut costs?
estimate demand for their appliances?
plan ways to achieve goals you have in common?

24. We let this manufacturer fall below our order fulfillment requirements.
25. We closely inspect this manufacturer’s products when we receive them.
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26. We are more lenient with this manufacturer than some of our other suppliers.
27. We allow this manufacturer to substitute products.
28. We reduce future orders if this manufacturer fails to deliver as promised.
29. We penalize this manufacturer if they fail to meet any of the terms of our agreement.
30. How often does your firm …

a. seriously entertain bids that would affect the volume of business with this
manufacturer?
b. invest a great deal of effort meeting with representatives from this
manufacturer’s competitors?
c. fully evaluate alternatives to this manufacturer?
d. actively search for information about alternative appliance
manufacturers?
e. explore options for replacing this manufacturer?
(NOTE: Questions 32 - 39 were proprietary to the research sponsor.)
40. What is the approximate total annual sales volume at your business location?
Under $20 million
$20 million to $39.9 million
$40 million to $59.9 million
$60 million to $79.9 million
Over $80 million
41. What is your approximate total annual sales volume for appliances?
Under $5 million
$5 million to $9.9 million
$10 million to $14.9 million
$15 million to $19.9 million
Over $20 million
42. Which of the following most accurately describes your business?
Independent retailer
Business unit of regional retail chain
Business unit of a national retail chain
Business unit of a multi-national retail chain
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APPENDIX D.
PRE-TEST ANALYSES
Trade-based Brand Equity (TBBE)
Initial TBBE Component Matrix
Component
Q9-Name advantage
Q11- Takes care
Q7-Strong TP
Q12-Will pay more
Q6-Name recog
Q10(r)-No name recog
Q8-Chance to bid

1
.811
.660
.654
.599
.376
.208
.402

2
-.232
-.106
.498
-.519
.758
.683
-.459

One-factor TBBE
Q9-Name advantage
Q12-Will pay more
Q11- Takes care
Q7-Strong TP

Component
1
.819
.729
.689
.591

One-factor TBBE Total Variance Explained
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Component Total
Variance Cumulative %
50.650
1
2.026
50.650
Final TBBE Component Matrix
Q16-Know what to expect
Q18-Predict performance
Q17-Keeps promises
Q11- Takes care
Q12-Will pay more
Q9-Name advantage

Component
1
.923
.922
.913
.758
.746
.613

Final Total Variance Explained
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Variance Cumulative %
Component Total
67.333
1
4.040
67.333
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TBBE (continued)
R E L I A B I L I T Y

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

V10
V12
V13
V31
V32
V33

A N A L Y S I S

-

S C A L E

(A L P H A)

Q9-Name advantage
Q11- Takes care
Q12-Will pay more
Q16-Know what to expect
Q17-Keeps promises
Q18-Predict performance
Correlation Matrix

V10
V12
V13
V31
V32
V33

V10
1.0000
.3453
.5629
.4491
.4420
.5496

V12

V13

V31

V32

1.0000
.2861
.7468
.6299
.5158

1.0000
.4798
.6016
.6409

1.0000
.8888
.8536

1.0000
.8402

Scale
Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
if Item
Deleted

Corrected
ItemTotal
Correlation

26.0000
25.8000
27.8250
26.0250
26.0250
26.2000

29.7949
31.2923
27.6353
27.4609
27.2045
27.5487

N of Cases =

V33

1.0000

40.0

Item-total Statistics

V10
V12
V13
V31
V32
V33

Reliability Coefficients
Alpha =
.8908

Squared
Multiple
Correlation

.5635
.5902
.6214
.8407
.8467
.8552

6 items
Standardized item alpha =

.4032
.6227
.5508
.9003
.8372
.8341

Alpha if
Item
Deleted
.8954
.8890
.8905
.8514
.8500
.8497

.8957
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Consumer-Based Brand Equity (CBBE)
Initial Component Matrix
Component
1
Q13f-Dissapoint
.862
Q13e-Exclusive buy
.861
Q13c-Exp to carry
.831
Q13b-Good value
.785
Q13d-Customers pay more
.724
Q13a(r)-Rarely asked for
.682
Final Component Matrix
Component
1
Q13e-Exclusive buy
.884
Q13f-Dissapoint
.864
Q13c-Exp to carry
.836
Q13b-Good value
.780
Q13d-Customers pay more
.743
Total Variance Explained
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Component Total
Variance Cumulative %
67.778
1
3.389
67.778
R E L I A B I L I T Y
A N A L Y S I S
Correlation Matrix
V15
V16
V17
V18
V19

-

S C A L E

(A L P H A)

V15

V16

V17

V18

V19

1.0000
.6404
.4507
.5612
.5756

1.0000
.4684
.7014
.6107

1.0000
.5898
.5918

1.0000
.7523

1.0000

Scale
Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
if Item
Deleted

Corrected
ItemTotal
Correlation

19.8333
20.2857
21.3333
20.6667
20.6429

27.9472
24.2578
22.1301
21.0569
20.1376

N of Cases =

42.0

Item-total Statistics

V15
V16
V17
V18
V19

Reliability Coefficients
Alpha =
.8681

Squared
Multiple
Correlation

.6517
.7113
.6244
.8051
.7746

5 items
Standardized item alpha =

.4704
.5828
.4056
.6763
.6251

Alpha
if Item
Deleted
.8625
.8378
.8629
.8101
.8200

.8798
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Dependence (DEP)
Initial Component Matrix
Component
1
.929
.901
.848
.795
.517

Q14c-Crucial to success
Q14e-Necessary to goals
Q14b-Dependent
Q14d-No alternative
Q14a(r)-Easily replaced
Final Component Matrix

Component
1
.933
.914
.862
.800

Q14c-Crucial to success
Q14e-Necessary to goals
Q14b-Dependent
Q14d-No alternative

Total Variance Explained
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Component Total
Variance Cumulative %
77.246
1
3.090
77.246
R E L I A B I L I T Y

A N A L Y S I S

-

S C A L E

(A L P H A)

Correlation Matrix

V21
V22
V23
V24

V21

V22

V23

V24

1.0000
.7759
.5865
.6661

1.0000
.6076
.8699

1.0000
.6552

1.0000

Scale
Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
if Item
Deleted

Corrected
ItemTotal
Correlation

13.5476
12.8571
13.4048
12.8333

22.6440
21.3449
25.3688
22.3862

N of Cases =

42.0

Item-total Statistics

V21
V22
V23
V24

Reliability Coefficients
Alpha =
.9011

Squared
Multiple
Correlation

.7546
.8664
.6692
.8326

4 items
Standardized item alpha =

.6278
.8266
.4711
.7849

Alpha
if Item
Deleted
.8817
.8389
.9094
.8526

.9005
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Uncertainty (UNC)
Initial Component Matrix
Component
1
2
Q16-Know what to expect .859 -.413
Q17-Keeps promises
.849 -.425
Q18-Predict performance .833 -.449
Q21(r)-Unexpected
.501
.763
Q20(r)-Get what we need .528
.707
Q19(r)-Uncertain
.494
.676
Component Matrix
Component
1
.912
.883
.837

Q21(r)-Unexpected
Q20(r)-Get what we need
Q19(r)-Uncertain

Total Variance Explained
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Cumulative
%
Component Total Variance
77.039
1
2.311
77.039
R E L I A B I L I T Y
A N A L Y S I S
1.
V34R
Q19(r)-Uncertain
2.
V35R
Q20(r)-Get what we need
3.
V36R
Q21(r)-Unexpected

S C A L E

(A L P H A)

Correlation Matrix

V34R
V35R
V36R

V34R

V35R

V36R

1.0000
.5751
.6469

1.0000
.7411

1.0000

Scale
Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
if Item
Deleted

Corrected
ItemTotal
Correlation

10.4762
10.5238
10.4762

6.8897
6.2555
7.0360

N of Cases =

42.0

Item-total Statistics

V34R
V35R
V36R

Reliability Coefficients
Alpha =
.8457

Squared
Multiple
Correlation

.6513
.7191
.7830

3 items
Standardized item alpha =

.4388
.5650
.6220

Alpha
if Item
Deleted
.8446
.7817
.7299

.8503
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Supplier Power (PWR)
Initial Component Matrix
Component
1
Q22e-Display
.870
Q22b-Inventory
.823
Q22f-Promotion
.812
Q22d-Mix
.812
Q22c-Quantity
.730
Q22a-Pricing
.482
Final Component Matrix
Component
1
Q22e-Display
.876
Q22b-Inventory
.837
Q22f-Promotion
.821
Q22d-Mix
.819
Q22c-Quantity
.728
Total Variance Explained
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Component Total
Variance Cumulative %
66.832
1
3.342
66.832
R E L I A B I L I T Y
A N A L Y S I S
Correlation Matrix
V38
V39
V40
V41
V42

-

S C A L E

(A L P H A)

V38

V39

V40

V41

V42

1.0000
.6027
.6278
.6238
.5991

1.0000
.5640
.4685
.4641

1.0000
.6622
.5236

1.0000
.8099

1.0000

Scale
Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
if Item
Deleted

Corrected
ItemTotal
Correlation

17.0976
16.9512
17.2927
16.4634
16.1951

34.5402
36.2476
37.5622
35.0049
35.7110

N of Cases =

41.0

Item-total Statistics

V38
V39
V40
V41
V42

Reliability Coefficients
Alpha =
.8779

Squared
Multiple
Correlation

.7409
.6137
.7130
.7765
.7180

5 items
Standardized item alpha =

.5544
.4282
.5566
.7378
.6791

Alpha
if Item
Deleted
.8440
.8765
.8522
.8358
.8496

.8800
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Perceived Risk (RISK)
Initial Component Matrix
Component
1
.920
.912
.876
.853
.823
.490

Q15b-Lose money
Q15c-Lose customers
Q15f-Threaten profits
Q15a-Hurt firm
Q15e-Lower satisfaction
Q15d(r)-No profit loss
Component Matrix

Component
1
.919
.909
.887
.871
.826

Q15c-Lose customers
Q15b-Lose money
Q15f-Threaten profits
Q15a-Hurt firm
Q15e-Lower satisfaction

Total Variance Explained
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
Cumulative
% of
%
Component Total
Variance
77.951
1
3.898
77.951
R E L I A B I L I T Y
A N A L Y S I S
Correlation Matrix
V25
V26
V27
V29
V30

-

S C A L E

(A L P H A)

V25

V26

V27

V29

V30

1.0000
.7352
.8339
.5725
.7146

1.0000
.8510
.6912
.7346

1.0000
.6467
.7118

1.0000
.7642

1.0000

Scale
Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
if Item
Deleted

Corrected
ItemTotal
Correlation

17.8780
18.2927
17.7561
18.3171
18.3902

35.8598
36.4622
36.6890
40.0720
36.6439

N of Cases =

41.0

Item-total Statistics

V25
V26
V27
V29
V30

Reliability Coefficients
Alpha =
.9292

Squared
Multiple
Correlation

.8005
.8517
.8673
.7361
.8197

5 items
Standardized item alpha =

.7294
.7675
.8204
.6268
.7110

Alpha
if Item
Deleted
.9165
.9056
.9029
.9272
.9118

.9297
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Relationship Commitment (COMM)
Component Matrix
Component
1
.962
.954
.927
.897
.840

Q23a-Commited
Q23c-Max effort
Q23b-Intend to maintain
Q23e-Long-term
Q23d-Do anything to
keep
Q23f(r)-Easy to end

.662

Total Variance Explained
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Cumulative
Component Total Variance
%
77.375
1 4.642
77.375
R E L I A B I L I T Y
A N A L Y S I S
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

V43
V44
V45
V46
V47
V48R

-

S C A L E

(A L P H A)

Q23a-Commited
Q23b-Intend to maintain
Q23c-Max effort
Q23d-Do anything to keep
Q23e-Long-term
Q23f(r)-Easy to end
Correlation Matrix

V43
V44
V45
V46
V47
V48R

V43

V44

V45

V46

V47

V48

1.0000
.9139
.9082
.7827
.8464
.5747

1.0000
.8821
.7090
.8007
.5608

1.0000
.7579
.8680
.5661

1.0000
.6989
.4607

1.0000
.4702

1.0000

Scale
Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
if Item
Deleted

Corrected
ItemTotal
Correlation

26.0000
25.9756
26.0488
26.8780
25.9756
26.4390

41.3500
42.9244
42.2476
38.7598
43.6744
44.6024

N of Cases =

41.0

Item-total Statistics

V43
V44
V45
V46
V47
V48R

Reliability Coefficients
Alpha =
.9292

Squared
Multiple
Correlation

.9287
.8825
.9153
.7620
.8321
.5676

6 items
Standardized item alpha =

.9015
.8525
.8765
.6284
.7755
.3522

Alpha
if Item
Deleted
.8998
.9069
.9026
.9262
.9128
.9483

.9391
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Cooperation (COOP)
Component Matrix
Component
1
.916
.904
.896
.889
.881
.842

Q24d-Cut costs
Q24e-Est demand
Q24b-Serve customers
Q24c-Solve problems
Q24f-Common goals
Q24a-Boost sales

Total Variance Explained
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Cumulative
Variance
%
Component Total
78.905
1
4.734
78.905
R E L I A B I L I T Y
A N A L Y S I S
1.
V49
Q24a-Boost sales
2.
V50
Q24b-Serve customers
3.
V51
Q24c-Solve problems
4.
V52
Q24d-Cut costs
5.
V53
Q24e-Est demand
6.
V54
Q24f-Common goals

-

S C A L E

(A L P H A)

Correlation Matrix
V49
V50
V51
V52
V53
V54

V49

V50

V51

V52

V53

V54

1.0000
.6795
.8515
.7073
.6378
.6280

1.0000
.7988
.7732
.7538
.7640

1.0000
.7301
.7058
.6603

1.0000
.8656
.7930

1.0000
.8452

1.0000

Scale
Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
if Item
Deleted

Corrected
ItemTotal
Correlation

20.5238
20.8333
20.3095
21.4762
21.3810
20.9524

59.2799
58.1911
58.5604
52.5482
54.7294
54.8757

N of Cases =

42.0

Item-total Statistics

V49
V50
V51
V52
V53
V54

Reliability Coefficients
Alpha =
.9451

Squared
Multiple
Correlation

.7706
.8454
.8326
.8762
.8642
.8300

6 items
Standardized item alpha =

.7520
.7550
.8220
.8048
.8243
.7606

Alpha
if Item
Deleted
.9420
.9341
.9355
.9302
.9311
.9356

.9464
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Forbearance (FORB)
Initial Component Matrix
Component
Q29(r)-Reduce orders
Q28-Allow substitution
Q30(r)-Penalize
Q27-Lenient
Q25-Lower fulfillment
Q26(r)-Always inspect

1
-.705
.645
-.630
.606
.582
.132

2
.533
.385
.577
.409
.526
-.478

Final Component Matrix
Q27-Lenient
Q28-Allow substitution
Q25-Lower fulfillment
Q29(r)-Reduce orders

Component
1
.752
.747
.720
-.447

Total Variance Explained
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Component Total
Variance Cumulative %
46.031
1
1.841
46.031
R E L I A B I L I T Y
A N A L Y S I S
1.
V55
Q25-Lower fulfillment
2.
V57
Q27-Lenient
3.
V58
Q28-Allow substitution
4.
V59R
Q29(r)-Reduce orders

S C A L E

(A L P H A)

Correlation Matrix
V55
V57
V58
V59R

V55
1.0000
.3908
.3923
-.0485

V57

V58

V59R

1.0000
.3260
-.2292

1.0000
-.2120

1.0000

Scale
Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
if Item
Deleted

Corrected
ItemTotal
Correlation

Squared
Multiple
Correlation

Alpha
if Item
Deleted

11.0000
10.9268
11.3171
9.1951

8.3500
7.4695
8.2720
14.7610

.4678
.2942
.3127
-.2262

.2385
.2186
.2129
.0823

-.0033
.1504
.1398
.6262

N of Cases =
41.0
Item-total Statistics

V55
V57
V58
V59R

Reliability Coefficients
Alpha =
.3591

4 items
Standardized item alpha =

.3153
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Propensity to Leave (PPTL)
Initial Component Matrix
Component
1
.908

Q31c-Evaluate
alternatives
Q31b-Meet with
competitors
Q31d-Search for
information
Q31a-Take bids
Q31e-Explore options

.809
.752
.715
.604

Final Component Matrix
Component
1
.917

Q31c-Evaluate
alternatives
Q31b-Meet with
competitors
Q31d-Search for
information
Q31a-Take bids

.847
.746
.729

Total Variance Explained
Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Component Total
Variance Cumulative %
66.191
1
2.648
66.191
R E L I A B I L I T Y
A N A L Y S I S
Correlation Matrix
V61
V62
V63
V64

-

S C A L E

V61

V62

V63

V64

1.0000
.5535
.5471
.3094

1.0000
.7153
.4512

1.0000
.6777

1.0000

Scale
Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance
if Item
Deleted

Corrected
ItemTotal
Correlation

10.7619
10.2143
10.0238
9.9286

19.7956
17.6847
16.8043
19.3362

N of Cases =

(A L P H A)

42.0

Item-total Statistics

V61
V62
V63
V64

Reliability Coefficients
Alpha =
.8251

Squared
Multiple
Correlation

.5445
.6967
.8188
.5573

4 items
Standardized item alpha =

.3579
.5499
.6924
.4654

Alpha
if Item
Deleted
.8259
.7576
.7004
.8215

.8258
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APPENDIX E.
MAIN SURVEY APPENDICES
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SURVEY ITEMS
Scale
Consumer-Based
Brand Equity
Reliability =.76

Trade-Based
Brand Equity
Reliability =.75

Uncertainty
Reliability = .87

Dependence
Ganesan (1994)
Reliability = .89

Supplier Power
Gaski and Nevin
(1985)
Reliability = .83

Items
[Anchors: Strongly Disagree (1) - Strongly Agree (7)]
Our customers…
a
v1 … know this manufacturer’s products to be a good value
a
v2 … expect us to carry this manufacturer’s brands
v3 … are willing to pay more in order to buy this manufacturer’s
appliances
v4 … often buy appliances exclusively from this manufacturer
v5 … would be disappointed if we did not carry this manufacturer’s
brands
[Anchors: Strongly Disagree (1) - Strongly Agree (7)]
a
v6 - We know exactly what to expect from this manufacturer.
v7 - We can accurately predict how this manufacturer will perform.
v8 - This manufacturer’s name gives them an advantage over other
manufacturers.
a
v9 - We can rely on this manufacturer to keep its promises.
v10 - This manufacturer is known in the industry as a company that takes
good care of their trade partners.
v11 - We are willing to pay more in order to do business with this
manufacturer.
[Anchors: Strongly Disagree (1) - Strongly Agree (7)]
v12 - We are often uncertain if this manufacturer will follow through on
commitments.
v13 - We never know if we will get what we need from this manufacturer.
v14 - This manufacturer unexpectedly changes important things.
[Anchors: Strongly Disagree (1) - Strongly Agree (7)]
Our company...
v15 - … is dependent on this manufacturer
v16 - … believes this manufacturer’s products are crucial to our
success
v17 - … does not have a good alternative to this manufacturer
v18 - … needs this manufacturer to achieve our goals
[Anchors: Strongly Disagree (1) - Strongly Agree (7)]
This manufacturer has the ability to...
v19 - … determine the level of inventory we carry for their
appliances.
v20 - … dictate the number of appliances we order from them
v21 - … determine the mix of products we order from them
v22 - … require us to follow rules about displaying their products
v23 - … require us to follow specific guidelines in promoting their
products
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Scale
Perceived Risk
Reliability = .94

Items
[Anchors: Strongly Disagree (1) - Strongly Agree (7)]

If we could no longer get appliances from this manufacturer…
v24 - … it would hurt our firm
v25 - … our firm would be in danger of losing a lot of money
v26 - … we would run the risk of losing customers
v27 - … our customer satisfaction levels would go down
v28 - … it would threaten the profitability of our firm

Relationship
Commitment
Morgan and Hunt
(1994)
Reliability = .91

[Anchors: Strongly Disagree (1) - Strongly Agree (7)]

Cooperation
Reliability = .93

[Anchors: Never (1) - Always (7)]

Propensity to
Leave
Reliability = .84

[Anchors: Never (1) - Always (7)]

Forbearance
Reliability = .70

[Anchors: Never (1) - Always (7)]
v44 - We let this manufacturer fall below our order fulfillment

The relationship my company has with this manufacturer…
v29 - … is something we are very committed to.
v30 - … is one we intend to maintain indefinitely
v31 - … deserves our maximum effort to maintain
v32 - … is something we would do almost anything to keep
v33 - … is one we care a great deal about long-term
v34- … would take very little effort to end
How often do you work together with this manufacturer to…
v34 - …boost sales of their appliances to your customers?
v35 - ... help them understand ways to serve your customers more
effectively?
v36 - …solve any problems that arise?
v37 - … figure out ways to cut costs?
v38 - … estimate demand for their appliances?
v39 - … plan ways to achieve goals you have in common?
How often does your firm…
v40 - … invest a great deal of effort meeting with representatives
from this manufacturer’s competitors?
a
v41 - … fully evaluate alternatives to this manufacturer?
v42 - … actively search for information about alternative appliance
manufacturers?
v43 - … seriously entertain bids that would affect the volume of
business with this manufacturer?

requirements.
v45 - We are more lenient with this manufacturer than some of our
other suppliers.
v46 - We allow this manufacturer to substitute products.
v47 - We reduce future orders if this manufacturer fails to deliver as
promised.
a
Item removed from final scale
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Table 14. Basic Structural Model Modification Indices
Regression Weights:
v10 <-Uncertainty
v10 <-Forbearance
v10 <-Consumer-based Brand Equity
v10 <-Relationship Commitment
v11 <-Uncertainty
v17 <-Uncertainty
v17 <-Relationship Commitment
v20 <-Cooperation
v21 <-Relationship Commitment
v22 <-v23
v23 <-Cooperation
v23 <-Relationship Commitment
v23 <-v22
v26 <-Power
v27 <-Consumer-based Brand Equity
v27 <-Trade-based Brand Equity
v28 <-Power
v3
<-Perceived Risk
v3
<-Relationship Commitment
v3
<-Dependence
v30 <-Perceived Risk
v32 <-Perceived Risk
v32 <-Dependence
v32 <-Forbearance
v32 <-Uncertainty
v34 <-Forbearance
v34 <-Uncertainty
v34 <-Power
v35 <-Relationship Commitment
v35 <-Dependence
v35 <-Perceived Risk
v36 <-Power
v37 <-Uncertainty
v37 <-Forbearance
v41 <-Cooperation
v41 <-Relationship Commitment
v41 <-Dependence
v41 <-Perceived Risk
v41 <-Trade-based Brand Equity
v41 <-Uncertainty
v41 <-Forbearance
v41 <-Consumer-based Brand Equity
v41 <-v40

M.I.
33
15
14
14
17
20
10
25
12
12
13
12
11
12
18
12
12
24
18
16
11
43
33
11
11
38
24
16
20
17
14
11
17
11
82
56
38
31
29
24
23
16
12

Par Change
-0.22
-0.171
-0.15
0.141
0.164
0.207
-0.145
-0.245
-0.146
0.034
0.178
0.166
0.035
0.112
0.156
0.127
-0.114
-0.198
-0.171
-0.162
-0.082
0.256
0.227
0.153
0.135
-0.365
-0.255
-0.215
0.146
0.137
0.122
0.102
-0.15
-0.137
0.412
0.34
0.28
0.25
0.253
-0.225
-0.25
0.192
0.039
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Table 14. Continued
Regression Weights:
v41 <-v39
v43 <-Cooperation
v43 <-Relationship Commitment
v43 <-Forbearance
v43 <-Trade-based Brand Equity
v44 <-Forbearance
v44 <-Uncertainty
v44 <-Cooperation
v45 <-Relationship Commitment
v45 <-Consumer-based Brand Equity
v45 <-Dependence
v45 <-Trade-based Brand Equity
v45 <-Perceived Risk
v45 <-Cooperation
v45 <-Power
v46 <-Relationship Commitment
v46 <-Dependence
v46 <-Trade-based Brand Equity
v46 <-Consumer-based Brand Equity
v46 <-Perceived Risk
v46 <-Cooperation
v46 <-Power
v47 <-Relationship Commitment
v47 <-Dependence
v47 <-Trade-based Brand Equity
v47 <-Perceived Risk
v47 <-Cooperation
v47 <-Consumer-based Brand Equity
v5
<-Perceived Risk
v5
<-Relationship Commitment
v5
<-Dependence
v5
<-Cooperation
v7
<-Uncertainty
v7
<-Power
v7
<-Forbearance
v8
<-Uncertainty
v8
<-Propensity to Leave
v8
<-Consumer-based Brand Equity
v8
<-Forbearance

M.I.
10
28
16
12
12
23
13
11
34
25
25
22
22
19
19
43
41
38
38
34
29
15
32
18
16
14
14
12
34
20
17
12
30
15
12
25
13
11
10

Par Change
0.038
-0.195
-0.148
0.148
-0.133
0.227
0.15
-0.135
-0.222
-0.204
-0.191
-0.188
-0.177
-0.169
-0.176
0.279
0.273
0.275
0.277
0.247
0.231
0.173
0.288
0.218
0.208
0.189
0.189
0.183
0.22
0.168
0.154
0.131
-0.214
-0.153
-0.155
0.182
0.137
0.125
0.133
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